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This thesis is structured around three empirical analyses, which are based on bank failures 
that occurred in the US between 1984 and 2013.  
The first analysis tests whether financial crises contribute to removing the most 
inefficient banks from the market and to liberating resources for more efficient use (cleansing 
effect), or whether they destroy banks regardless of their efficiency (scarring effect). The 
results show that the nature of bank failures during financial crises are not fully aligned with 
either a cleansing or a scarring effect. While efficiency helps banks survive over the full 
sample period, financial crises do not amplify the removal of inefficient institutions. 
Additional tests show that financial crises contribute to producing a scarring effect via the 
increase in the failure rate of young banks regardless of their efficiency but also generate a 
cleansing effect by liberating resources that are more efficiently used by new entry banks. 
The second set of empirical analyses investigates the long-term post-acquisition 
performance of failed bank acquirers. The results show that after an acquisition failed bank 
acquirers’ performance deteriorated significantly, with an exception being the deals 
completed during the global financial crisis, during which no performance changes were 
evident. This result is likely caused by the loss-sharing agreements included in most of the 
latter transactions. Further analysis shows that although no benefit in terms of performance 
materializes for the acquiring banks, they are less likely to disappear from the market through 





The final analysis examines the relation between failed bank resolution costs and the 
competitive pressures in the market. The results show that when restrictions on competition 
are relaxed, large (small) targets become more (less) desirable, and the associated costs to 
resolve them reduce (increase). This finding, however, is merely evident during normal times. 
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Throughout its history, the banking industry in the US has faced numerous bank failures, 
which have mainly clustered around periods of economic distress. Due to the negative 
consequences associated with episodes of high numbers of bank failures, the US financial 
system and the regulatory framework has been shaped in a way to reduce the number and 
the extent of these episodes and to resolve troubled and insolvent banks in the least 
disruptive manner to the economy and the least costly to the federal system. 
By analysing bank failures in the period between 1984 and 2013, this thesis is aimed 
to provide further insight into the management of insolvent banks in the US. At the first 
step, an empirical investigation is conducted to test whether the episodes of financial crises 
benefited the financial system by displacing the least efficient banking firms and allowing 
new entrants to take over the released resources and to employ them more effectively. This 
potential benefit of financial crises would, therefore, justify a more limited government 
intervention to reduce the short-term impact of crises on bank failures, whereas a lack of 
evidence to support this notion would warrant a wider use of bailout policies in order to 
reduce the short-term effects of crises on bank failures and improve the long-term prospects 
for the banking industry. 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 





The second and third steps of this thesis are concerned with the analysis of the 
individual failed bank resolutions that are managed by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC). In the first step, empirical analysis is conducted to investigate potential 
benefits to healthy banks that occur via the transfer of failed banks’ assets and liabilities. 
Better use of the assets in the hands of successors would help the FDIC promote such 
transfers to the private sector and reduce the costs associated with failed bank resolutions. 
In addition, it would boost confidence of the failed bank depositors, preventing a run on the 
failing bank prior its closing. However, if the gains on the acquiring institutions’ performance 
are not evident, alternative resolution design methods should be considered. 
The final empirical investigation of this thesis, and the second step, is the analysis of 
the relation between the competitive pressures in local banking markets and failed bank 
resolution costs. Specifically, an examination is conducted to evaluate how the shift in 
competition, caused by individual state branching deregulation, affected losses incurred by 
the FDIC from resolving failed banks. Understanding this relation would help the FDIC 
advertise and manage failed bank resolutions in a more cost-efficient manner and, in turn, 
help reduce the losses incurred by the insurance fund. 
The aforementioned empirical investigations are presented in three empirical 
chapters. The next section discusses in more detail the research questions, main findings and 
the contribution of each empirical chapter. 
1.2.1. Do Financial Crises Clean or Scar? Evidence from Bank Exits and Entries 
While the negative effects stemming from financial crises have been widely acknowledged in 
the existing literature, chapter 3 raises an alternative view of the effects that financial crises 
may have. Specifically, by looking into bank failures in the US, empirical analysis is conducted 
1.2. Research Questions, Main Findings and Contribution 





to test whether financial crises that occurred in the US helped clean out inefficient banks 
from the market (“cleansing effect”), or diminished the financial industry by obliterating 
banks regardless their productivity (“scarring effect”). 
To answer these questions, a data sample of 20,524 (from which 1672 failed) unique 
bank quarterly balance sheet data has been collected for the period between 1984 and 2013. 
Five separate crisis events have been identified to occur in the observed timeframe, which 
belong to two banking crisis episodes and three market crises. 
The analysis conducted in this first empirical chapter is aimed to answer three main 
questions: 
The first question raised is how the likelihood of a bank failing is dependent on crises 
given different levels of bank efficiency; and consecutively how bank efficiency affects bank 
probability of failure in crises and normal times. In accordance to the existing view that 
market and banking crises might have different consequences for the banking industry, this 
analysis is further replicated by splitting the crisis periods into market and banking crises. 
Finally, as the recent global financial crisis had the most severe effects on the banking 
industry since the Great Depression, empirical tests are conducted to test how the interaction 
between efficiency and the global financial crisis as well as the interaction between efficiency 
and other crises affect the likelihood of a bank failing. 
The results show that while efficiency helps banks survive at all times, this was not 
the case during the global financial crisis. In fact, the probability of failing increased during 
this crisis regardless the levels of bank efficiency. It is further shown the marginal effect of 
other crises on bank probability of failure was not different from the effect of normal times. 
Overall, the findings are in support of a scarring view stemming from financial crises, and 
this effect was mainly evident during the global financial crisis. 





The second question raised in this chapter is whether the scarring or the cleansing 
effect materializes when bank age is controlled for. The grounds for the notion that bank 
age may be an important element in determining which effect of crises prevails, stem from 
the fact that young banks may be more vulnerable to crises, although their full potential has 
not yet been reached. To answer this question, tests are conducted to evaluate how the 
likelihood of bank failure is dependent on the interplay between crises, efficiency and bank 
age. 
The results only partly support the scarring view of crises in the banking industry. 
Specifically, it is shown that while crises increase the probability of failure of old inefficient 
banks, a higher failure rate is also associated with young banks, regardless their efficiency 
levels. In summary, while the previous analysis suggests that the scarring effect of crises 
prevails in the US banking industry, after controlling for bank age, the results neither fully 
support the cleansing nor the scarring view of the dynamics of bank failures during crisis 
periods. 
The final question raised in this chapter is aimed to evaluate whether any benefit 
from crises materializes when considering bank entry. Following the notion of the 
proponents of the “cleansing view”, this final analysis tests whether banks that enter during 
periods of economic distress achieve higher efficiency levels by taking over the resources of 
failed banks. 
The results provide evidence that some gains stemming from financial crises emerge 
when considering new bank entry. It is shown that new bank entrants achieve higher 
efficiency levels and this is especially the case, when they enter during periods of economic 
distress. As for efficiency gains stemming from entry during banking crises and market crises, 
new banks achieve even higher levels of efficiency when entering during the latter. It, 





therefore, seems that although market crises do not exhibit any signs of either cleansing or 
the scarring view, the banks that fail during market crises liberate resources for the new banks 
to take over and use more efficiently. 
Overall, the findings in this chapter do not fully support either the cleansing or the 
scarring view. On the one hand, in line with the scarring view is the evidence that the least 
efficient banks are not more likely to fail during crisis periods than the most efficient banks 
are. In addition, crises tend to penalize young banks, which have not yet reached their full 
potential, regardless of their efficiency levels. On the other hand, in support of the cleansing 
view are the findings that crises affect the least efficient old banks, and has no effect on the 
most efficient old banks. Furthermore, as implied by the cleansing view, banks that enter the 
market during periods of financial distress achieve higher levels of efficiency. Although 
neither the cleansing nor the scarring view in the banking industry can be fully supported in 
the presence of market crises, this result is mostly pronounced during the latter periods. 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, it 
contributes to the cleansing/scarring debate by examining banking firms. Second, it evaluates 
whether the cleansing or scarring effect is dependent on the type of financial crisis. The third 
contribution of this chapter is the inclusion of firm age, when evaluating the 
cleansing/scarring effect. Finally, it contributes to the studies on bank efficiency and bank 
entry by examining whether new banking firms achieve higher efficiency levels when entering 
during crisis periods, which, as implied by the cleansing view, liberate resources from failed 
institutions for the new firms to take over and use more efficiently. 





1.2.2. The Long-Term Effects of Failed Bank Acquisitions on Acquirer 
Performance 
Failed banks in the US are mainly resolved using Purchase and Assumption (P&A) 
transactions, where a healthy institution purchases some or all of the failed bank’s assets and 
assumes some or all of the institution’s liabilities. While these transactions have been 
considered to be the least disruptive for local communities and failed bank customers, as 
well as the least costly for the FDIC (the institution responsible for resolving failed banks), 
this empirical chapter analyses the long-term effects these acquisitions have on the acquiring 
firms.  
Based on a sample of 486 failed bank acquisitions in the period between 1985 and 
2010, this chapter first analyses the pre- and post-acquisition profitability, efficiency, capital 
adequacy and asset quality measures of the acquiring firms. Findings show that in the three 
years following an acquisition failed bank acquirers deteriorate significantly, however, remain 
significantly more profitable and with better quality of assets than an average bank in the 
industry.  
In the second stage of the empirical investigation, analysis is conducted to check 
whether the impact on the acquiring institutions differs depending on the timing the 
acquisition took place. Initially, two main acquisition periods are investigated: crisis periods 
and normal times. The crisis periods are further split into market and banking crises and 
finally, a separate analysis is conducted for the acquisitions that occurred during the recent 
global financial crisis. Apart from the recent global financial crisis, the results are in line with 
the initial analysis, i.e. failed bank acquirers’ accounting-based measures deteriorate 
significantly after an acquisition. However, the acquisitions during the recent global financial 
crisis, with an exception of ROA, do not show any significant changes to the acquirers’ 
performance. 





The second part of the empirical analysis in this chapter is aimed to investigate the 
potential factors that influence the changes in the long-run performance. Specifically, the 
pre-acquisition characteristics of the acquirer (together with some additional conventional 
controls) and their effects on the acquirers’ long-run performance changes are analysed. The 
findings, however, do not present a clear pattern that allows to identify a specific type of 
acquirer that improves the performance after a failed bank is acquired. 
Due to the lack of evidence of gains to acquirers from failed bank acquisitions, the 
final step of this chapter is the investigation of other potential benefits for the acquirers that 
might emerge from these acquisitions. Specifically, it is examined whether the increase in size 
after an acquisition helps the acquirers survive in the market. To this end, the probability of 
exit via outright failure and acquisition is examined for institutions that acquired a failed 
bank. The results show that the probability to survive in the market increased significantly 
for those banks that acquired a failed bank in the preceding four and eight quarters.  
Overall, the analysis in this chapter does not show any accounting-based long-run 
performance gains for failed bank acquirers. In fact, apart from the acquisitions that took 
place during the recent global financial crisis, the performance measures of failed bank 
acquirers deteriorated significantly. However, in spite of evidence on performance gains, 
failed bank acquirers have been found to be less likely to fail, or become acquisition targets 
themselves. 
This empirical chapter contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, 
apart from the study by Peristiani (1997), this is the first investigation to test the long-term 
effects produced by failed bank acquisitions on the acquiring institutions. The analysis of 
Peristiani (1997) is extended by analysing the impact of failed bank acquisitions on a wider 
range of acquirers’ characteristics. In addition, the analysis in this chapter is conducted for 





acquisitions over a 26-year period, which allows to further examine the effects the P&A 
transactions have on banks that acquired in normal times and crisis periods. 
Second, this chapter adds to the existing literature by studying the potential factors 
that help explain the performance changes after an acquisition. Third, it complements the 
studies that focus on the immediate market reaction stemming from a failed bank acquisition 
announcement. Finally, it contributes to the general debate on the long-term performance 
gains of ordinary deals. 
1.2.3. Competitive Pressure Effects on Failed Bank Resolution Costs 
Since the establishment in 1933, the FDIC has resolved over 2,500 failed banks and thrifts, 
which cost the insurance funds over $118.5 billion. The recent global financial crisis and the 
wave of failures that occurred in the period have depleted the deposit insurance funds to a 
record high negative balance of -$20.9 billion (Davison and Carreon, 2010) and has brought 
back the debate amongst regulators, academics and practitioners as to how the costs 
associated with failed bank resolutions could be minimised. 
The third empirical chapter of this thesis contributes to the debate on the 
determinants of failed bank resolution costs by evaluating the relation between the 
competitive pressures in the banking markets and the losses incurred by the FDIC from 
individual failed bank resolutions. The notion that failed bank resolution costs are dependent 
on the competitive dynamics in banking markets emerges from the set of studies that have 
identified the value of a failed bank’s charter as a determinant of failed bank resolution costs 
(see, for instance, Giliberto and Varaiya, 1989; James, 1991). Meanwhile, the value of the 
charter has been by and large associated with competition, i.e. the stricter the competition, 
the higher the value of a firm’s charter (see, for instance, Buser et al, 1981; Keeley, 1990; 
Repullo, 2004). 





The analysis is based on 1,040 failed bank P&A transactions selected for the period 
between 1986 and 2013 and is aimed to answer two main questions. First, by employing state 
bank branching deregulation through M&As as an instrument to test the shift in competitive 
pressures of individual states, it is analysed how the relaxation of state branching restrictions 
affected failed bank resolution costs and how this effect was dependent on the relative size 
of the survived banks in the market and the size of the failed bank.  
The results show that failed bank resolution costs reduced significantly after 
deregulation for those failed banks that were relatively similar by size to an average survived 
bank, whereas increased the costs for the relatively smallest failed banks. This finding has a 
sensible economic interpretation: when the restrictions to merge freely were lifted, due to 
the anticipation of consolidation process, the competitive pressure to gain market share 
prompted acquisitions of larger targets. Therefore, it is likely that more and higher bids were 
offered in failed bank auctions, which reduced the costs to the FDIC. Smaller targets, 
however, were likely to be less desirable targets, especially when healthy banks were given 
the opportunity to merge freely with other, healthy, firms in the market.  
While the first analysis conducted in this empirical chapter is based on the full sample 
period, the second question raised in this chapter is whether the effect of deregulation was 
dependent on the timing the acquisition took place. Specifically, it is hypothesized that the 
effects of deregulation were only evident in normal times and eliminated in times of crises. 
Essentially, the results are in line with the expectations and show that while the benefit of 
deregulation in terms of reduced failed bank resolution costs is evident in normal times, it 
disappears in times of economic distress. 
This empirical chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it adds to 
the existing study of James (1991) - which is the only study known to date to test the direct 





relation between branching deregulation and failed bank resolution costs – by analysing a 
longer time period, which allows including additional state deregulation cases, more crisis 
events and a bigger sample of resolutions in the analysis. In addition, the analysis is extended 
by including two additional contributors to the deregulation effect on failed bank resolution 
costs – the relative size variable and the time period factor. It finally contributes to the general 
debate on factors that help explain the losses incurred by the FDIC from failed bank 
resolutions. 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. First, in the Institutional Framework chapter 
(chapter 2), the major episodes of financial crises in the history of US banking are discussed 
and the role of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is depicted. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 
present respectively the three empirical investigations conducted for this thesis. The final 
chapter (chapter 6) draws conclusions, outlines the limitations of the empirical analyses 
conducted, and offers suggestions for future research. 
1.3. Structure of the Thesis 





In its history, the US banking industry has faced numerous bank failures, which have 
mainly occurred in waves caused by severe economic downturns. These episodes of bank 
failures had a great impact on the US economy and the shaping of the banking industry that 
exists today. One of the major events that highly influenced how troubled financial 
institutions were handled and the failed ones resolved was the creation of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 1933. Having handled a total of 2,764 institutions 
in the period between 1934 and 2015, the FDIC saved all of the insured deposits, mitigated 
serious bank runs and prevented escalation of the worsening conditions in the banking 
industry during periods of distress. 
The aim of this chapter is to depict the main episodes of financial distress and their 
effects on the banking system in the US, and to introduce the FDIC – the institution that 
has become a crucial element in the US banking system.   
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section describes the 
financial panics from the establishment of the first bank in 1781 to the passage of the Federal 
Reserve Act in 1913. Section 2.3 presents the Great Depression and introduces the the FDIC 
and its creation. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 present respectively the S&L crisis together with the 
Credit Crunch and the Stock Market Crash and the Recent Global Crisis, as well as includes 
Chapter 2. Institutional Framework 
2.1. Introduction 





the evolution of the FDIC and presents failed bank resolution methods. The final section 
concludes. 
The beginning of the US banking industry can be traced back to 17811 – the year when the 
first bank, the Bank of North America, was established by the Continental Congress, and 
chartered by the state of Pennsylvania (Wilson, 1942). In the following four decades, many 
more banks opened up as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution, which fostered the 
need for capital, and by 1819 more than 420 banks were operating in the US (FDIC, 2014a). 
2.2.1. The Panic of 1819 
In 1819 the US faced its first major financial crisis – the Panic of 1819. As in the case of 
many other future crises, the Panic of 1819 was preceded by an economic boom in the 
aftermath of the War of 1812. Confronted with a vastly growing economy and the increasing 
number of banks, the US government was not prepared: “the monetary system was not 
highly developed”, there was no uniformity in currency, and control over banks was lax 
(Rothbard, 1962).  
The significant need for government finance resulted in monetary expansion as 
numerous banks opened up and the issue of currency grew rapidly (Rothbard, 1962). 
However, soon the non-existence of sole currency led to depreciation of individual bank’s 
notes, and the need for a nationwide uniform currency emerged (Rothbard, 1962). As a 
result, the Congress authorized the opening of the Second Bank of the United States 
(Rothbard, 1962), which was the second attempt at a central bank (FDIC, 2014a). The Bank 
was expected to stabilize the sitituation; however, rather than implementing contractionary 
                                                 
1 In the historical timeline, provided by the FDIC, the establishment of the Bank of North America is 
documented to be in 1782, which is the year, when the bank began its operations (Bradbury, 1972) 
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policy, it further spurred the growth in the economy by acting as a profit seeking institution 
and further expanding note issue (Rothbard, 1962). 
Many suggestions were offered as a response to resolve the Panic that burst in 1819 
(for a discussion on proposals to resolve the issues regarding the Panic, see Rothbard, 1962), 
however, most of the legislations were at the state level (Rothbard, 1962). The Panic of 1819 
caused many banks to fail, and in 1820 there were 300 banks that were operating in the US2 
(a significant drop from just the previous year). 
2.2.2. The Panic of 1837 
Not long after the the Panic of 1819 did another boom form, spiked by inflated commodity 
prices (Bordo and Wheelock, 2004). The boom was occuring in land sales, the stock market, 
as well as canal and railroad building projects (Bordo and Wheelock, 2004). The final straw 
in the overheated economy were the monetary policy actions: federal funds were removed 
from the New York City banks to those in other states and use of specie (gold and silver) 
were required for public land purchases (Bordo and Wheelock, 2004; FDIC, 2014a). 
Exhausted reserves in the New York City banks left them exposed to shocks and when the 
bubble in inflated markets burst, in the five years following 194 out of 729 banks failed, 
which, together with the losses occurred from loans, reduced the total value of state 
chartered banks’ assets by 45 % (Rousseau, 2002). 
2.2.3. The Panic of 1857 
The following crisis in the US was the Panic of 1857. Prior to 1857 yet another boom was 
emerging – the expansion in railroad construction coupled with increased land sales, required 
for the building of new railways, resulted in increasing speculative behaviour in the stock 
market (Calomiris and Schweikart, 1991), as well as “overextension by banks to finance 
                                                 
2 FDIC, 2014a. 





construction” (FDIC, 2014a). As the bubble burst, speculators started defaulting on their 
debts and banks started failing. The extent of the Panic and the negative effects on banks, 
however, varied widely across states, depending on the coordination behaviour, as well as 
branching opportunities (Calomiris and Schweikart, 1991). Specifically, Calomiris and 
Schweikart (1991) show that in states with statewide branching the coordination of banks 
was stronger, the response to the crisis was more succesful and the recovery was faster.  
2.2.4. The National Banking Era 
The decade following the Panic of 1857 was of a great importance to the banking industry 
in the US – a national currency was established, a dual banking system was created and the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency was established (FDIC, 2014a). To understand 
the creation and evolution of laws and regulations in the 1860s, it is important to understand 
the pre-existing conditions and the structure of the banking industry.  
First, the period between 1835 and 1885 can be generally described as a period of 
economic growth: the population increased nearly four times, national income was growing 
at an average annual rate of 3.5-4 % and the national wealth increased approximately ten 
times (Warburton, 1958). To support the growing economy the number of state banks was 
increasing at a rapid pace and as there was no uniform national currency, 7,000 different 
bank notes and coins were circulating in 1862 (FDIC, 2014a). There was great confusion in 
the market regarding the specific value of the notes, as well as whether the bank that issued 
the notes was still in existence (Grossman, 2008).  
Second, after the charter of Second Bank in the United States expired in 1836, there 
was no central bank or a uniform regulator for financial institutions. There were great 
disagreements across states regarding a federal role in financial system regulation (Komai 
and Richardson, 2011) and the banking industry was left in chaos: each bank issued its own 





notes and coins, approximately half of the opened banks failed, the banks were short lived, 
i.e. an average bank’s life span was five years, and “state governments left bank regulation to 
market forces” (Komai and Richardson, 2011). 
The first important legislations to be enacted were the National Currency Act of 
1863 (renamed as the National Banking Act in 1864) and the National Banking Act of 1864. 
These acts established national currency, i.e. the dollar, and created a dual banking system by 
establishing national banks, created the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 
and “inititate[d] the system of bank examinations” (FDIC, 2014a). This Act authorized the 
newly established national banks to issue national currency, which was backed by the US 
Treasury securities and depended on the banks’ capital and the bonds deposited with the 
OCC, and imposed taxes on the notes issued by state banks, which ultimately banished them 
from circulation (Grossman, 2008).  
2.2.4.1. THE PANIC OF 1873 
The first crisis to occur in the National Banking Era that began in 1863 was the Panic of 
1873. Similarly to the Panic of 1857, the Panic of 1873 was preceded by a boom in railroad 
construction. In fact, in the period between 1867 and 1873 more than 30,000 miles of roads 
were constructed (FDIC, 2014a). The initial shock to the whole economy occurred when 
Vienna and Berlin suspended their funds for completion of railroad construction 
(Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005). As a result, several banking houses, which were heaviliy 
invested in railroad securities, as well as Jay Cooke & Co bank (associated with the railroad 
projects) failed (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005), triggering a run on banks (Shachmurove, 
2011). 44 banks failed in 1873 alone and in the following five years, another 265 banks 
suspended their operations (Grossman, 2008).  





2.2.4.2. THE PANIC OF 1893 
The final, yet the most severe crisis in the 19th century, was the Panic of 1893. Not having 
yet reached its full stability after the previous Panic, the US economy was once again struck 
by a panic, fuelled by the expansion in money supply, over-investment in railroad 
construction and high indebtedness in farm mortgages (Sprague, 1910; Kindleberger and 
Aliber, 2005). When a railroad declared bankruptcy, the stock market fell sharply, the 
economy slowed down and as the panic heightened, a run on banks (for the first time outside 
New York City) befell the banking industry (FDIC, 2014a). In 1893 alone, 326 banks failed, 
from which 65 were national bank failures. “Claims against all failed banks amounted to 
$14,434,105, and $9,778,449 was paid” (Sprague, 1910). In the following five years, an 
additional 568 banks failed, with a total of over $117 million in assets. What is surprising is 
that although followed by the highest number of bank failures in the National Banking Era 
(Grossman, 2008), the Panic of 1893 did not lead to any changes in banking methods or 
legislation (Sprague, 1910). 
2.2.4.3. THE PANIC OF 1907 
The first major financial crisis that occurred in the 20th century was the Panic of 1907. 
Although not as severe as some of the earlier crises (Moen and Tallman, 1992), the Panic of 
1907 was of a great importance to the history of the US banking as it formed the foundations 
for America’s central bank (Tallman and Moen, 1990).  
Three main events have been considered as the catalyst of the Panic of 1907:  the 
seasonal demand in money markets (see, for instance Tallman and Moen, 1990), the 
international gold flow (see, for instance, Odell and Weidenmier, 2004; Bordo and Haubrich, 
2010), as well as the run on trust companies, triggered by a failed attempt to corner the 
copper market (see, for instance, Tallman and Moen, 1990; Moen and Tallman, 1992; Bordo 
and Haubrich, 2010; Shachmurove, 2011).  





During the National Banking Era, the New York money markets were highly 
exposed to seasonal changes in interest rates and liquidity. These changes were a result of 
seasonal fluctuations in agriculture, specifically, during the months of September and 
October, a high demand for money to finance crop shipments left the New York City money 
markets drained of cash. This high demand for money resulted in increased interest rates in 
autumn. Whilst the demand for money was seasonal, the money supply was not adjusted for 
these demand fluctuations. In other words, the money supply was ‘inelastic’ (Tallman and 
Moen, 1990) and in times of elevated demand for money, it left New York City banks 
sensitive to shocks. 
The next trigger for the Panic of 1907 was the halted gold flow to the US. In 1906 
the US money markets experienced a sharp increase in gold imports due to two main reasons. 
First, the US Treasury Department implemented policies to stimulate gold imports by using 
finance bills, which led to a $50 million gold inflow in merely a month’s time (Tallman and 
Moen, 1990). Second, in April of 1906 an earthquake struck San Francisco, causing damage 
equal to 1% of GNP; and although centralized, this disaster had an international effect as 
gold started flowing into the country from foreign insurers (Odell and Weidenmier, 2004). 
As a response to the sudden and severe export of gold, the Bank of England (together with 
other European central banks (Odell and Weidenmier, 2004)), in order to protect its financial 
markets, raised its discount rate (Tallman and Moen, 1990; Odell and Weidenmier, 2004). In 
addition, the bank of England pressured the US to pay for the finance bills upon maturity, 
without extension; and as  a result, finance bills were suspended throughout 1907 (Tallman 
and Moen, 1990). “These actions practically cut off gold exports to the United States, ... 
pushed the United States into a recession and made New York markets susceptible to a 
financial panic” (Odell and Weidenmier, 2004). 





The final trigger to the Panic of 1907 was the failed attempt to corner the copper 
market (see, for instance, Tallman and Moen, 1990; and Komai and Richardson, 2011). 
Augustus Heinze was a businessman highly involved in banking. He served prominent 
positions in many banks, whose assets totalled to $71 million – a substantial amount, as 
compared to all banks’ $2 billion in New York City. When A. Heinze’s attempt to corner the 
copper market failed, fear spread in the market regarding the solvency of the banks, where 
A. Heinze held prominent positions. And when A. Heinze was forced to resign from his 
presidency in the Mercantile National Bank, a run on this bank began (Tallman and Moen, 
1990). 
As the New York City money market was drained of cash, the stock market, preceded 
by a speculative boom, faced a major decline and a run on banks and trust companies began 
(Shachmurove, 2011; FDIC, 2014a). The run was most severe on trust companies, which 
played a major role in the New York financial market. In fact, in the decade preceding 1907, 
assets in New York State trusts grew 244%, whereas assets in national banks in new York 
grew 97% and assets in state banks in New York grew by 82%; and by the end of 1907 New 
York City trusts held $1.364 billion in assets, national banks held $1.8 billion, and state banks 
held $541 million (Moen and Tallman, 1992). 
When the run on trusts began, Knickerbocker Trust Company, one of the largest 
trusts in New York City, failed and several other trusts were suffering from severe deposit 
withdrawals (Moen and Tallman, 1992). As the situation worsened several trust company 
presidents sought to resolve the issue by offering financial aid to troubled trusts, however, 
the cash they collected was not enough, and they turned to J.P. Morgan for help (Tallman 
and Moen, 1990). Soon financial aid, led by J.P. Morgan, was provided to banks and trusts, 





and the panic was mitigated, however, only after convertibility was suspended did the panic 
come to an end (Bordo and Haubrich, 2010).    
The Panic of 1907 exposed the flaws in the US financial system: the money supply 
was inelastic (Tallman and Moen, 1990), the regulation of banks and trusts was uneven 
(Moen and Tallman, 1992) and there was no lender of last resort (although the New York 
City Clearinghouse had some functions of a central bank, its legal authority was not explicit, 
and not directly available for trusts (Tallman and Moen, 1990)). Following the Panic of 1907, 
in order to stabilize the financial markets, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was passed and 
the Federal Reserve System was created (FDIC, 2014a). 
2.2.5. Summary 
In general, the Panics of the 19th century were of similar origins. Specifically, preceded by 
speculative behaviour of market participants, booms in specific industries, the growing 
number of banks and high levels of indebtedness, the Panics erupted as the created bubbles 
burst. The effects these crises had on the banking industry were severe, and highlighted the 
need for the supervision of financial institutions at the national level, as well as the need for 
a lender of last resort (Shachmurove, 2011). However, not until another crisis struck – the 
Panic of 1907 – and the weaknesses of the financial system were once again exposed, were 
actions taken at the Federal level.  
Similar to previous crises, the Great Depression was followed by a period of economic boom 
in the 1920s, also known as the “roaring twenties”. Although followed by a short crisis, the 
First World War did not affect the US society directly, and people quickly started an era of 
consumerism, which was stimulated by vastly booming production in numerous industries. 
2.3. The Great Depression 





To keep up with the growing demands for goods, manufacturers invested in new 
technologies, employed more people and the economy started booming. 
The vastly growing demand fuelled high levels of borrowing and increased the use 
of the stock markets to finance firms’ growth. As a consequence, the stock market 
experienced a six fold increase in the years between 1921 and 1929, indebtedness was rising 
and bank lending standards were slowly eroding (Bovenzi, 2015).  
When the bubble burst, the Dow Jones Industrial fell 39 % between October 23rd 
and November 13th in 1929, a total of $16 billion was lost in the stock market in October 
alone and by mid-1932 the stock prices were 85 % to 90 % lower than they were at their 
peak in 1929 (Bovenzi, 2015). What followed was the beginning of the Great Depression: a 
race to sell, panic-enticed run on banks, fire sales of assets and numerous bank closures. 
“There were no taxpayer bailouts. Instead, there were suicides, bankruptcies, and massive 
levels of poverty and unemployment” (Bovenzi, 2015). 
In the years 1932 and 1933 the Great Depression reached its height: in 1932 
unemployment reached 25 %, national income dropped 50 % and bank runs and closures 
were common (FDIC, 2014a). In fact, the loss of confidence in financial institutions was one 
of the major reasons for the financial collapse; and the ratio of bank failures to the total 
number of operating banks in the years between 1930 and 1933 was 5.6%, 10.5%, 7.8%, and 
12.9%, respectively (Bernanke, 1983).  
To deal with the numerous bank runs just a day after his inauguration in 1933, 
President Roosevelt declared a four-day bank holiday to prevent more bank runs and in the 
meantime to liquidate the insolvent banks and reorganize others. In the same year three 
pivotal acts were signed, including the Emergency Banking Act of 1933, The Securities Act 
of 1933 and The Banking Act of 1933, which were designed to regain the public’s confidence 





in the banking system, ensure transparency and better disclosure of companies’ financial 
statements, and protect bank depositors (FDIC, 2014a). Passed in the Banking Act was also 
the Glass-Steagall Act, which separated commercial and banking activities, and created the 
FDIC, which in the period between 1934 and 2015 has handled over 2,700 failure and 
assistant transactions3.  
2.3.1. The Creation of the FDIC 
The FDIC was established by the Congress as an independent agency to maintain stability 
and public confidence in the nation’s financial system. The main tasks include deposit 
insurance, supervision of financial institutions, management of receiverships, and resolution 
of financial institutions (FDIC, 1998).  
At the beginning of its operations, the FDIC used two main resolution methods to deal with 
insolvent banks: deposit payoffs and purchase and assumption transactions. In the case of a 
deposit payoff, the FDIC was responsible for assuming the insolvent institution’s assets and 
liabilities and paying off the insured deposits (FDIC, 1998). In a case of a P&A transaction, 
a healthy institution was allowed to acquire all of the deposits of the failed bank. As shown 
in Figure 2-1, in the period between 1934 and 1942 deposit payoffs were used a total of 240 
times, and purchase and assumption transactions were used to resolve 150 insolvent 
institutions. These methods were later further developed and supplemented by additional 
resolution strategies. 
In the 1970s yet another boom was forming in financial markets. Strict banking regulation 
made depositing money in banks and S&Ls unattractive and as people started searching for 
                                                 
3 Calculations are based on the failed bank list, provided by the FDIC. 
https://www5.fdic.gov/hsob/SelectRpt.asp?EntryTyp=30&Header=1 
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better places to invest, money started flowing out of the banking system, leaving businesses 
and consumers with difficult access to credit and very expensive loans (Bovenzi, 2015). Soon 
deregulation started, controls on interest rates were relaxed, financial markets were 
accelerating and the oversight of negligent borrowing was diluting (Bovenzi, 2015). To deal 
with the inflation Paul Volcker, who was then the chairman of the Federal Reserve, increased 
interest rates to over 20 %, which led to severe distress in the banking system (Bovenzi, 
2015). 
As the interest rates sky-rocketed banks faced a great mismatch between the interest 
rates they had to pay for the depositors, and the interest they received from loans. At the 
time, most S&Ls, which were regulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB), 
had issued long-term mortgages of 30-year fixed-rate terms, and soon they started losing 
money. The FHLBB that stood to supervise the savings and loans industry did not have 
enough money to close the insolvent S&Ls, therefore, it loosened regulation in the hope of 
their recovery. However, lack of supervision and the depletion of capital encouraged S&Ls 
to take on extraordinary risks, as they had nothing to lose. “It was worth the gamble. Heads, 
they’d win; tails, the federal government would lose” (Bovenzi, 2015). 
The monetary policy by the Fed was eased in the years between 1984 and 1987, 
however, partly due to the rising prices in the stock market, the Fed started increasing the 
inflationary pressure again (Greenspan, 2004). Although the potential negative effect to the 
stock market, which was experiencing a boom, was realized, no one had anticipated such a 
traumatic experience (Greenspan, 2004) and when the stock market crashed on the 19th of 
October of 1987, also known as Black Monday, the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index 
plummeted by 23% in just one day (FDIC, 2014a). After the stock market crash, in order to 
keep the financial markets stable, large amounts of liquidity were injected into the markets 
and the easing continued until 1988 (Greenspan, 2004).  





Fed tightening began again in December of 1988, and was followed by a credit 
crunch in the early 1990s (Bordo and Haubrich, 2010). The credit crunch was caused by a 
capital drop associated with severe loan losses in the late 1980s (Peek and Rosengren, 1995) 
and increased capital requirements (Berger and Bouwman, 2013). This fall in lending made 
the economic recovery slow as access to credit for businesses was diminished (Bernanke, 
1983). The credit crunch slowly lifted as the policies eased, and the fund rate dropped to 3% 
in September 1992, which restored profitability, and eventually the capital of banks 
(Bernanke, 1983). 
The S&L crisis, the stock market crash together with the credit crunch had severe 
implications for the banking industry as well as the insurance funds responsible for the 
industries. In the period of 1980s together with the first half of the 1990s, over 2,900 banks 
and S&Ls became insolvent, and the S&L deposit insurance fund went bankrupt (Bovenzi, 
2015). By the end of the year 1991, the insurance fund of the FDIC reached a deficit of $7 
billion (FDIC, 2014a). In total, bank failures cost the BIF (bank insurance fund) over $30 
billion, and “[t]he total cost to taxpayers was $125 billion” (Bovenzi, 2015). 
 As a response to the crisis as well as the $7 billion deficit that the BIF reached at the 
end of the year 1991, the Congress passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act (FDICIA), which widely changed the bank insurance model, as well as the 
way troubled institutions were handled and the failed ones resolved. The FDICIA is depicted 
in more detail in section 2.6.1. 
The Global Financial Crisis that erupted in 2007 was the most severe economic downturn 
since the Great Depression (Laeven and Valencia, 2013). As in the case of previous crises, it 
was preceded by an economic boom, which was mainly pronounced in the housing market. 
2.5. The Global Financial Crisis 





The housing bubble was a consequence of lax interest rate policy led by the Federal Reserve, 
as well as large capital inflows from abroad (Brunnermeier, 2009; Allen and Carletti, 2010). 
The cheap and easy access to credit contributed to the bubble that burst in 2007 (Allen and 
Carletti, 2010). However, there were other factors that played a significant role in 
exacerbating the extent of the crisis: the high number of subprime mortgages, weak 
regulatory oversight and high levels of debt in financial institutions (Allen and Carletti, 2010). 
The increasing demand for credit to fund real estate purchases was accompanied by 
increased levels of mortage approvals. The traditional banking model, where banks hold on 
to the mortgages until they are repaid, was replaced by an ‘originate to distribute’ model, 
where banks sold off the mortgages via the securitization process (Brunnermeier, 2009; Allen 
and Carletti, 2010). Although seemingly advantageous to the banking system due to the 
shifting of risk from loan originators to those who wished to bear the risks (Brunnermeier, 
2009), this transformation destroyed the incentives to carefully screen the creditworthiness 
of the borrowers and created a system where banks were rewarded for the amount rather 
than the quality of mortgages approved (Allen and Carletti, 2010).  
The trigger to the crisis was the increase in the number of default on subprime 
mortgages that was first noted in February of 2007 (Brunnermeier, 2009). What followed 
was a downgrade of a number of tranches of subprime deals, which put stress on the credit 
markets, and hedge funds started having troubles meeting margins calls (Brunnermeier, 
2009). Home sales started declining and house prices started to drop (Brunnermeier, 2009).  
Uncertainty hovered the financial markets, and on 9th of August of 2007 an 
“illiquidity wave” began in the interbank market (Brunnermeier, 2009). To deal with the 
frozen interbank lending market, the Federal Reserve followed the European Central bank 
and injected $24 billion in the interbank market, reduced the discount rate and eased the 





conditions for banks to borrow at the discount window (Brunnermeier, 2009).  Although the 
liquidity injections by the Fed seemed to be effective, in November 2007 the estimate of 
$200 billion loss in the mortgage markets was an underestimation. The Fed further reduced 
the discount rate and the federal funds rate; however, the liquidity crunch was too severe for 
these policies to be effective. 
The consequences were severe. Several hundred billion dollars of bad loans were 
written off, and the loss in stock market capitalization of the major banks was twice the 
amount (Brunnermeier, 2009). The stock market experienced an $8 trillion decline in wealth 
between the all-time high in October 2007 and October 2008 (Brunnermeier, 2009). The 
high interconnectedness across financial institutions had a severe chain reaction when some 
of the institutions defaulted.  
The first major financial institution that ran into trouble was Bear Stearns – one of 
the largest investment banks in the US (Bovenzi, 2015). Realizing the danger of contagion 
the default of Bear Stearns could create, the Federal Reserve arranged its takeover by 
JPMorgan Chase, providing $30 billion to support the transaction (Bovenzi, 2015). Not long 
after, more institutions started defaulting: IndyMac was taken under the ownership of the 
FDIC, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, with an outstanding debt and guarantees of $5 trillion 
were taken over by the federal government, Lehman Brothers failed, after becoming too 
weak, “Merrill Lynch sold itself to Bank of America”, AIG, an insurance company with $500 
billion in financial firm insurance, was bailed out (Bovenzi, 2015). 
The costs of the crisis were immense. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
– a bailout package set up by the Treasury – amounted to $700 billion (Berger and Bouwman, 
2013). Between 2008 and 2011, almost 400 FDIC-insured banks failed, depleting the 
insurance funds to a record low deficit of $20.9 billion (Davison and Carreon, 2010). The 





global economy was at a halt due to the uncertainty over the real value of assets that had 
been inflated for some time, therefore, it was difficult for market participants to make long 
term decisions, as the future prices of assets were highly uncertain, both in the short and in 
the long run (Allen and Carletti, 2010). As a consequence of the Fed allowing exchange of 
wide range of securities to Treasuries, the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet nearly tripled 
(Allen and Carletti, 2010). 
As a response to the crisis, the US Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, with the aim “[t]o promote the financial stability of 
the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to 
end ‘‘too big to fail’’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect 
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes” (Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act). 
Given the large number of crises, associated with bank failure waives, critical for financial 
stability and trust in the financial services industry was the implementation of a smooth 
system for failed bank resolutions. This section presents the development of failed bank 
resolution strategies employed by the FDIC, explains the resolution methods used and, using 
the data provided by the FDIC, presents some summary statistics on the failed bank 
resolution methods for the period between 1934 and 2015. 
2.6.1. The Development of the Resolution Methods 
Since the establishment in 1933, the resolution practises employed by the FDIC have 
changed significantly and have been shaped in a way to minimise the costs to the insurance 
fund and to reduce the disruption to the communities (FDIC, 1998). The major event that 
triggered the change in the resolution strategies employed by the FDIC was the wave of bank 
2.6. The Resolution of Failed Banks 





failures in the 1980s, and the subsequent enactment of the FDICIA. Its main provisions 
include risk-based premiums, prompt corrective action, least-cost resolution, too big to fail 
and borrowing authority.  
Before the FDICIA, the FDIC was by statute required to charge a flat rate for deposit 
insurance, i.e. every bank was charged equally for deposit insurance (FDIC, 1998). The 
FDICIA, however, required the FDIC to charge the banks according to the risks it posed to 
deposit insurance funds. This provision was implemented on 1st January, 1993 (FDIC, 1998).  
The prompt corrective action resolution required all institutions to be placed under 
one of the five capital zones, ranging from well capitalized to critically undercapitalized 
(FDIC, 1998). Critically undercapitalized institutions were the ones, whose tangible equity 
fell below 2% of total assets (FDIC, 1998). These institutions faced closure if the capital 
levels were not restored in a 90-day period (FDIC, 1998). The reasoning behind early closure 
was the expectations that it would mitigate the losses incurred by the insurance funds (FDIC, 
1998). In addition, in 1991, the FDIC was granted the authority to close an institution if it 
was critically undercapitalized, and did not have adequate plans for restoring the equity to 
the required levels; if the institution had “substantial dissipation of assets due to a violation 
of law, operated in an unsafe or unsound manner, engaged in a deliberate violation of a cease 
and desist order, concealed records, or ceased to be insured” (FDIC, 1998). Before the 
FDICIA, the power to close an insured bank rested on the state or the Office of Comptroller 
and Currency (OCC) (depending on which was the chartering authority) (FDIC, 1998).  
The least-cost resolution provision requires the FDIC to choose the least costly 
resolution method when resolving a failed institution (FDIC, 1998). Previously, the FDIC 
could have chosen any method if it was proven to be less costly than an insured deposit 
payoff and asset liquidation (FDIC, 1998). Under the least cost resolution requirement, the 





FDIC must evaluate the present value of the costs of alternative resolution methods, 
documenting the underlying assumptions, and including the “forgone federal tax revenues 
as part of the cost” (Carpenter and Murphy, 2008). Although minimizing the costs was 
always an important factor, there were several other considerations that the FDIC took on 
prior 1991 to choose the resolution method. Deposit payoffs, for instance, were discouraged 
due to the adverse effects it may have had in smaller communities, i.e. it may have reduced 
local available banking services in small communities (FDIC, 1998). It also looked at the 
effects on banking stability, shareholders and creditors; specifically, the FDIC aimed to 
discourage insured institutions from excessive risk-taking (FDIC, 1998). Finally, the FDIC 
considered the increase in the inventory level of loans serviced by the FDIC (FDIC, 1998). 
After 1991, the FDIC was required to choose the least costly resolution method, regardless 
any other factors, unless there was a threat to systemic risk (FDIC, 1998).  
Under the too big to fail provision, the least cost resolution could be waived if the 
institution was proven to be of systemic importance (FDIC, 1998). This waiver of the least 
cost resolution provision has to be determined by the Secretary of Treasury (“in consultation 
with the President”), and recommended by the FDIC and the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System (Carpenter and Murphy, 2008). Specifically, it has to be approved 
with a 2/3’s vote from each (Carpenter and Murphy, 2008).   
The borrowing authority provision increased the amount the FDIC is allowed to 
borrow from the Treasury in order to cover the insurance losses (FDIC, 1998). Specifically, 
the FDICIA increased the amount that the FDIC was eligible to borrow from the Treasury 
from $5 billion to $30 billion (FDIC, 1998). 





2.6.2. Failed Bank Resolution Methods 
In general, the FDIC uses three methods to resolve a failing institution: open bank assistance, 
deposit payoff, or purchase and assumption (P&A) transactions. The remaining part of this 
section explains each of the resolution methods in more detail. Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2 
show respectively the total number of resolutions, as well as the distribution of transaction 
methods used in the period between 1934 and 2015. 
2.6.2.1. OPEN BANK ASSISTANCE 
In the case of an open institution assistance, the FDIC provides assistance to a troubled 
institution to return to its normal operations and remain open (Carpenter and Murphy, 2008). 
The financial assistance has several forms: the FDIC can either give a loan, place deposits, 
purchase assets or securities, or assume liabilities of the troubled insured institution (FDIC, 
1998; Carpenter and Murphy, 2008). If it is possible, the troubled institution is expected to 
repay the loans made by the FDIC in an open bank assistance (FDIC, 1998). 
Apart from several instances, open bank assistance was most widely used during the 
S&L crisis in the 1980s and early 1990s. Specifically, from the 154 open bank assistance 
transactions provided between the years 1934 and 2015, it was used 137 times in the period 
between 1980 and 1992.   
In order to provide assistance, the FDIC has to prove, among other things, that the 
deterioration of the capital of the troubled institution was not caused by the management’s 
abuse or incompetence (Carpenter and Murphy, 2008). Nevertheless, the FDIC often 
required a new management team to take over the institution (FDIC, 1998). In addition, the 
Corporation made sure that the interests of shareholders were reduced to a nominal amount, 
and sought capital from the private sector (FDIC, 1998). Although shareholders were 
required to reduce their ownership interests, the major criticism regarding open bank 
assistance was in fact that shareholders benefited from such resolutions (FDIC, 1998).  





2.6.2.2. DEPOSIT PAYOFFS 
Deposit payoffs are used when the FDIC is unable to find an acquirer for the failed 
institution’s assets and liabilities (Carpenter and Murphy, 2008) or when the bids received 
are more costly than a deposit payoff (FDIC, 1998). Most of the times, deposit payoffs were 
used for small failed institutions, when there was little interest from the healthy institutions 
regarding the banking franchise (FDIC, 1998). In the case of a deposit payoff the FDIC may 
either pay for the insured deposits directly to each customer (straight deposit payoff), or 
make these funds available to customers by transferring the insured deposit accounts 
together with an equivalent amount of cash to a healthy institution (insured deposit transfer) 
(FDIC, 1998; Carpenter and Murphy, 2008). 
In a straight deposit payoff, the FDIC evaluates the amount of all insured depositors 
and pays it directly to depositors, and all other liabilities as well as the assets remain with the 
FDIC, which is responsible for all the costs associated with liquidating those assets (Bennett, 
2001).  
In a case of an insured deposit transfer, a healthy institution acts as an agent to the 
FDIC, and receives insured deposits and secured liabilities from the failed institution (FDIC, 
1998). Insured deposit transfers are considered to be a less disruptive resolution strategy and 
more consumer-friendly than straight deposit payoffs, therefore, they were used whenever 
practicable (FDIC, 1998). It saves the FDIC overhead expenses and also provides an 
opportunity for the acting agent to introduce and provide services to potential new 
customers (FDIC, 1998). 
Deposit payoffs have been used considerably less than purchase and assumption 
transactions. Specifically, from 1934 through 2015, 637 failed banks have been resolved using 
deposit payoffs, whereas P&A transactions have been used in 1,973 cases. From the total 
deposit payoff transactions, insured deposit transfers were used in 179 cases, whereas straight 





payoffs occurred 458 times. However, the first insured deposit transfer occurred in 1983, 
after which it was the preferred choice over the straight deposit payoff (from the two 
resolution methods, insured deposit transfer was used 56% of the time). 
2.6.2.3. PURCHASE AND ASSUMPTION TRANSACTIONS 
In the case of a P&A transaction, a healthy institution buys some of the closed institutions 
assets, and assumes some of its liabilities (Carpenter and Murphy, 2008). There are several 
types of P&A transactions: 
1) Basic P&A transaction. In a basic P&A transaction, a healthy institution assumes 
insured deposits, and buys cash (and cash equivalent) assets. In the case the bid is 
high enough, the healthy institution also assumes uninsured deposits as well as bank 
premises (Carpenter and Murphy, 2008).  
2) Loan purchase P&A transaction. In this transaction, a healthy institution buys a 
portion of the loan portfolio of the closed institution (Carpenter and Murphy, 2008).  
3) Whole bank P&A transaction. In the case of a whole bank P&A transaction, a healthy 
institution buys all of the closed institution’s assets and assumes all of its liabilities 
(Carpenter and Murphy, 2008).  
The enactment of the FDICIA in 1991 also introduced loss sharing P&A 
transactions. In this case, the institution assumes the failed institution’s deposit liabilities, and 
the FDIC transfers the fixed pool of assets to the acquirer at a discounted price (Carpenter 
and Murphy, 2008). The FDIC also agrees to share the future losses that the acquirer may 
experience from taking over the fixed pool of assets (Carpenter and Murphy, 2008).  
Throughout the history of the FDIC, most of the times P&A transactions have been 
the most widely used resolution method. To date (end of 2015), P&A transactions have been 
used for 71% of the total failed bank resolutions. There are several benefits associated with 





using P&A transactions over other resolution methods. First, it is considered to be the least 
disruptive resolution method for local communities (FDIC, 2014b). Second, usually the 
acquirers pays a premium for the deposits assumed, which in turn reduces the costs for the 
FDIC (FDIC, 1998). Third, it is the most convenient resolution method for depositors. 
Finally, as opposed to deposit payoffs, the charter value of the failing institution is preserved.  
2.6.3. Summary 
The FDIC has become one of the most important institutions in the US financial system. 
Having resolved a total of 2,764 institutions in the period between 1934 and 2015, it has 
saved all of the failed banks’ insured deposits, mitigated serious bank runs and prevented 
escalation of the worsening conditions in the banking industry during periods of distress. 
The effective resolution practices have been proven to limit the negative effects failed 
financial institution failures have on the economy, financial system, and depositors. Finally, 
“[F]or more than 80 years, the FDIC has carried out its mission of maintaining public 
confidence and stability in the nation's financial system”4. 
The financial crises in the history of the US share certain similarities: preceded by a booming 
economic period, bubble in asset prices, and overextension of credit, the periods of distress 
came unexpectedly and with harsh consequences. The Panics that occurred before the Great 
Depression, however, were distinctly different in terms of how the distress in the financial 
system was dealt with. Not having a deposit insurer in the system, bank failures were mainly 
a result of uncertainty and fear of loss of deposits, which caused contagious bank runs. When 
the Congress established the FDIC in 1933 as a response to the Great Depression, bank runs 
were largely mitigated and all the insured deposits were saved. 
                                                 
4 From the Message from the Chairman in the 2014 Annual Report, available at 
https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/2014annualreport/chairman.html. 
2.7. Concluding Remarks 





The Global Financial Crisis, however, was of a different scale, and touched a great 
variety of financial institutions, including commercial banks, investment banks, insurance 
companies, various investment funds, and many others. It was also “an opaque web of 
interconnected obligations”, as suggested by Brunnermeier (2009), that made this crisis 
different from the previous episodes of distress. Although the FDIC, which had great past 
experience in handling failing institutions, helped mitigate the damages of the crisis, the 
responsibility of the large institution failures, which mainly were not covered by deposit 
insurance, fell into the hands of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, which did not have 
such experience (Bovenzi, 2015). As a result “[t]hey were forced to improvise, relying on 
bailouts or the bankruptcy process, neither being a good course of action for handling large 

















NUMBER OF FAILURES AND ASSISTANCE TRANSACTIONS BY YEAR 
 




DISTRIBUTION OF FAILED BANK RESOLUTIONS BY RESOLUTION TYPE, 1934-2014 
 
NOTES: PO – deposit payoffs; IDT – insured deposit transfers; AT – assistance transactions; P&A – purchase of some or all assets and 
assumption of some or all of the liabilities; PI – purchase and assumption of insured deposits only; PA – purchase and assumption of 
insured and uninsured deposits, and certain other liabilities, as well as a part of the assets. 



























































































































































Numerous studies have highlighted the substantial costs stemming from financial crises in 
terms of financial instability and the decline of economic growth (see, for instance, Dell’ 
Ariccia et al., 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2014). These negative effects have been confirmed 
by the recent turmoil in the financial industry (erupting in the second half of 2007) that has 
required costly bank bailouts to restore confidence and has led to episodes of severe 
economic recession in several countries (Brunnermeier, 2009; Zhang et al., 2015). While the 
costs of financial crises are indisputable, more controversial is the possibility that some 
benefits might follow from episodes of financial distress when the focus is on firm exit and 
entry. In this respect, the literature has proposed two alternative views – cleansing or scarring 
- that have substantially different policy implications for the management of financial crises 
(Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers, 2013). The empirical analysis in this chapter evaluates 
whether these two alternative views explain the nature of bank failures, and the related effect 
on bank entry, in the US banking industry during episodes of financial crises that have 
occurred between 1984 and 2013. 
Chapter 3. Do Financial Crises Clean or Scar? Evidence 
from Bank Exits and Entries 
3.1. Introduction 





The cleansing view implies that unproductive firms are more likely to fail during 
crises and are likely to be replaced by more productive entities with an overall positive effect 
at the industry level (see, for instance, Bresnahan and Raff, 1991; Hallward-Driemeier and 
Rijkers, 2013). The idea that crisis periods may have a “cleansing” effect is not new, dating 
back to Schumpeter (1939) and his concept of creative destruction. Studies by Bresnahan 
and Raff (1991) and Caballero and Hammour (1994) support this notion by concluding that 
productivity-improving techniques increase during periods of economic distress, and the 
firms, that do not keep up with innovations, eventually fail.  
The scarring view suggests instead that rather than cleaning up the market, crises 
might destroy firms, regardless of their productivity, as they amplify market imperfections 
(Barlevy, 2002, 2003; Blalock et al., 2008; Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers, 2013; Ouyang, 
2009). For instance, Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers (2013) fail to find any evidence that the 
Indonesian crisis in the second half of the nineties induced the exit of relatively unproductive 
firms. Similarly, Casacuberta and Gandelman (2012) show that the banking crisis in Uruguay 
diminished the nexus between a lack of productivity and firm exit. 
In general, the studies above have tested for the presence of a cleansing or scarring 
effect for non-financial corporations by focusing on a single crisis episode. However, there 
is a lack of empirical evidence as to whether a cleansing or a scarring effect emerges in the 
banking industry as a consequence of the eruption of financial crises and as to whether 
different types of financial crises produce a similar cleansing or scarring effect. These appear 
to be important omissions for at least two reasons. 
First, the different policy implications for crisis management related to each of the 
two effects appear extremely important to design regulatory interventions for the banking 
industry with the purpose of limiting the short-term costs of bank failures. Specifically, the 





presence of a cleansing effect would motivate more limited government interventions to 
reduce the short-term impact of crises on bank failures. In contrast, the prevalence of a 
scarring effect would justify a wider use of bailout policies to minimize the short-term effects 
of crises on bank failures and maximize the long-term prospects for the banking industry. 
Second, an understanding of which effect prevails for banks is not only relevant for the long-
term influence of financial crises on the productivity of the banking industry, but also for 
the impact of crises on the real economy. In fact, market imperfections that can lead to a 
scarring effect for non-financial firms are normally linked with frictions in the credit markets 
and consequently with bank behaviour (Barlevy, 2003; Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers, 
2013).  
This chapter contributes to the cleansing/scarring debate and the banking literature 
in several ways. In particular, it is the first to provide empirical tests on whether financial 
crises accelerate the removal of unproductive banking firms. To this end, the unproductive 
banks are identified by computing measures of bank cost efficiency (quantifying how 
effectively a bank uses its resources to produce its outputs) and its components – allocative 
and technical efficiency.5. While some studies of banks have examined the nexus between 
efficiency and the likelihood of bank failure (see, for instance, Cebenoyan et al., 1993; 
Hermalin and Wallace, 1994; Luo, 2003; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000), or more broadly how 
bank efficiency affects bank risk (Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Sun and Chang, 2011), to date no 
evidence has been offered on whether the importance of efficiency for bank survival differs 
between normal and crisis periods. Overall, this chapter shows that while more efficient 
banks are less likely to fail over the full sample period, the removal of inefficient institutions 
                                                 
5 Allocative efficiency measures the ability of banks to choose the correct mix of inputs given their prices while 
technical efficiency quantifies the ability of banks to use a minimum level of inputs to achieve a given level of 
output (Isik and Hassan, 2002; Havrylchyk, 2006; Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010). 





is not amplified by the eruption of financial crises. In essence, at a general level there is a lack 
of support for the presence of a cleansing effect in the banking industry and this conclusion 
does not vary with the definition of bank efficiency employed in the empirical tests or with 
changes in the model specification.  
The second contribution of this chapter is the evaluation of whether the occurrence 
of a cleansing or scarring effect depends on the type of financial crisis that affects the banking 
industry. The initial conjecture is that especially when banks are affected by an extremely 
severe crisis, such as those originating within the banking industry with a consequent larger 
number of failures, any cleansing effect is unlikely to materialize. This conjecture finds 
support in the set of studies suggesting that severe crises might affect healthier institutions 
by generating panic amongst uninformed depositors (see, for instance, Chari and 
Jagannathan, 1988; Saunders and Wilson, 1996; Chen, 1999; Iyer and Puri, 2012) or by 
amplifying contagion risk via the interbank market (Dasgupta, 2004). 
Two steps are taken to conduct this additional test. Initially, by following Berger and 
Bouwman (2013) two types of crises are distinguished: the crises that have originated within 
the banking sector (henceforth banking crises), and that consequently are expected to have 
a more severe impact on banks, and the crises that erupted in the stock market (henceforth 
market crises) and that are generally expected to have a milder impact on banks. For instance, 
in the sample, while the annualized bank failure rate during episodes of banking crisis is equal 
to 0.95%, it drops to about half of this in the presence of a market crisis. This initial analysis 
suggests that the general conclusion of a lack of any cleansing effect holds for crises that 
originate within the banking sector (namely, efficiency has little bearing on bank failure), 
whereas the findings show that market crises do not exhibit any signs of either the cleansing 
or the scarring view. Overall, the findings reported in this chapter show that although 





efficiency helps banks survive at all times, banking crises, namely crises that show higher 
average bank failure rates, increase probability of failure at all levels of efficiency as 
postulated by the scarring view. Market crises, interestingly, do not exhibit any significantly 
different effects on bank probability of failure than normal times. 
In a second step, it is shown that the conjecture, that severe crises are unlikely to lead 
to a cleansing effect, is also confirmed when the focus is drawn on the global turmoil that 
erupted in the second half of 2007. In essence, efficiency did not help banks survive during 
this crisis, and the effect of the crisis was not different at any levels of bank efficiency. 
The third contribution of this chapter is the examination of the interplay between 
the impact of financial crises and the role played by bank age in ensuring the survival of 
efficient banks. The point of departure of this analysis is the set of studies that have 
highlighted how the interpretation of firm exit during periods of crises requires a 
consideration of firm age (Nishimura et al., 2005; Ouyang, 2009). Periods of economic 
downturn may be especially detrimental for young firms as they are prevented from reaching 
their full potential. Therefore, a higher number of failures amongst inefficient but young 
banks is not necessarily supportive of the cleansing view of crises. While the findings show 
that financial crises help remove inefficient old banks, they also generate a high failure rate 
of young banks, regardless of their efficiency levels. In summary, these additional tests show 
that neither the cleansing nor the scarring effect can fully explain the dynamics of bank 
failures during periods of financial crisis when bank age is controlled for.  
The final contribution of this chapter is the examination of whether new entry banks 
achieve higher levels of efficiency than competing banks if they enter the banking industry 
after financial crises that are expected to liberate resources via the waves of bank failures. 
Existing studies have generally tested for the presence of an efficiency gap between 





incumbent banks and new entrants without focusing on the importance of the timing of 
entry. For instance, DeYoung and Hassan (1998) study the profit efficiency of US banks that 
received charters between 1980 and 1994, and find that while profit efficiency increases 
rapidly for new banks, it takes on average nine years to reach the profit efficiency levels of 
existing banks. In contrast, Canhoto and Dermine (2003) find that, after the implementation 
of the deregulation process de novo Portuguese banks were more efficient than the 
established banks. 
The results of this chapter are consistent with the presence of higher efficiency gains 
for banks entering the market during crises as implied by the cleansing view and this 
conclusion holds for the various measures of bank efficiency employed in the empirical tests. 
Next, it is examined whether the different impact on firm exit played by banking and market 
crises is mirrored in the entry effect.  In line with the results for the exit effect, the analysis 
shows that efficiency gains for new entry banks are less pronounced when banks enter in the 
aftermath of banking crises than when they enter during market crises. This is not entirely 
surprising as banking crises include the recent global financial crisis, which shows signs of 
scarring effect, whereas market crises are not in line with either view. It, therefore, seems 
that regardless their efficiency, banks that fail during market crises liberate resources for the 
new institutions to take over and employ more efficiently.  
Overall, the findings in this chapter suggest that the nature of bank failures during 
financial crises are more aligned with the scarring view. However, this result is fully 
confirmed only when evaluating the global banking crisis. Furthermore, as postulated by the 
scarring view, a key detrimental effect of any financial crisis appears to be the removal of 
young (relatively efficient) banking firms.  





The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces related 
research and presents the testable hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the data and the 
methodology, while section 3.4 offers the empirical results on the effect of bank efficiency 
on bank survival during crisis and normal times. Section 3.5 examines how the results depend 
on bank age and section 3.6 presents tests on the cleansing and scarring effects in terms of 
bank entry. The final section draws conclusions and offers final remarks.   
3.2.1. Firm Exit and Financial Crises 
The impact of financial crises on firm survival has been generally described as a selection 
process that should penalize specific types of entities (Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers, 2013; 
Knott and Posen, 2005). In this respect, the literature has focused on the impact of crises on 
the least productive firms in an industry with conflicting theoretical views (Hallward-
Driemeier and Rijkers, 2013). 
A first view can be linked to the Schumpeterian (1939) process of creative 
destruction. Advocates of this view argue that crises accelerate the “cleansing” process of 
low productivity firms, with only high productivity firms (with a competitive advantage) 
being likely to survive. In essence, this selection effect would lead to the disappearance of 
firms that are far from the best practice entities in an industry with an overall beneficial effect 
at the industry level. This effect is generally incorporated in macro-models such as those 
proposed by Caballero and Hammour (1994) and Gomes et al. (2001). 
Against this view, however, other studies highlight the presence of potential scarring 
effects associated with crisis periods (Barlevy, 2002, 2003; Blalock et al., 2008; Ouyang, 2009; 
Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers, 2013). In essence, crises might jeopardize the performance 
of market participants as they amplify market imperfections. It follows that rather than 
3.2. Related Research and the Development of Hypotheses 





cleaning up the market, crises might destroy firms, regardless of their efficiency. For instance, 
Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers (2013) fail to find any evidence that the Indonesian crisis in 
the second half of the nineties led to the exit of relatively unproductive firms. Similarly, 
Casacuberta and Gandelman (2012) show that the banking crisis in Uruguay diminished the 
nexus between low productivity and firm exit. 
Additional studies have also highlighted that the interpretation of firm selection 
during periods of crisis under the cleansing or the scarring views requires the consideration 
of firm age. Ouyang (2009) suggests that periods of economic downturn are detrimental, 
especially for young firms with the effect of preventing them from reaching their full 
potential. Hence, the removal of young unproductive institutions from the market is not 
necessarily perceived as a good outcome stemming from financial crises, as these institutions 
might not have had sufficient time to exploit their full potential. It follows that an effective 
cleansing effect should lead to the failure of unproductive firms, especially when they are 
old.  From this perspective, Nishimura et al. (2005) find that the 1996-1997 banking crisis in 
Japan led to the exit of some young and relatively efficient institutions. 
The analyses discussed above have been conducted on non-financial firms and on a 
single crisis episode. There is a lack of empirical tests on whether a cleansing or a scarring 
effect emerges in the banking industry as a consequence of financial crises. The importance 
of such an analysis of banks is, however, highlighted by the fact that the cleansing and the 
scarring views have substantially different policy implications for the management of 
banking crises. 
While the manifestation of a cleansing effect would motivate more limited 
government interventions to reduce the short-term impact of crises on bank failures, a 
scarring effect would justify a wider use of bailout policies to minimize the short-term effects 





of crises on bank failures and maximize the long-term prospect for the banking industry. 
Yet, an understanding of which effect prevails for banks is not only relevant for the long-
term influence of financial crises on the productivity of the banking industry but also for its 
impact on the real economy. In fact, market imperfections that can lead to a scarring effect 
for non-financial firms are normally linked with frictions in the credit markets and 
consequently with bank behaviour (Barlevy, 2003; Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers, 2013). 
Despite the importance of such analysis for banks, the existing banking studies have 
generally examined how bank productivity- measured in terms of efficiency - influences bank 
survival without a specific focus on crisis periods. The conclusion achieved by this group of 
studies is that inefficient banks are more likely to fail (Cebenoyan et al., 1993; Hermalin and 
Wallace, 1994; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Luo, 2003; Knott and Posen, 2005; Koetter and 
Poghosyan, 2010), and are generally riskier (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Fiordelisi et al., 
2011). Furthermore, while a second group of studies has identified several drivers of bank 
survival in periods of financial distress (see, for instance, Jin et al., 2011; Berger et al., 2012; 
Cole and White, 2012; Berger and Bouwman, 2013; DeYoung and Torna, 2013), none of 
them test how the likelihood of failure during crises varies with bank efficiency and how it 
compares with normal times. 
This chapter extends the existing studies on non-financial corporations by testing 
two hypotheses for the US banking sector that refer to the selection effect of banks during 
crises and to its interplay with bank age. More specifically, the first hypothesis focuses on 
the impact that financial crises are expected to exercise on inefficient (unproductive) banks 
and is formulated as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of bank survival is lower for inefficient banks during 
periods of financial crises than in normal times.  





Essentially, the validation of Hypothesis 1 would imply the presence of a cleansing 
effect associated with financial crises that hit the banking industry with the consequence of 
generating (long-term) potential gains at the industry level. In contrast, its rejection would 
be in line with the scarring view of financial crises. 
The second hypothesis refers to the age effect and its interplay with the selection 
mechanism of financial crises. Specifically, this chapter tests whether inefficient banking 
firms are more likely to be removed from the banking market if old. In short, the following 
is postulated:  
Hypothesis 2: Old inefficient banks are more likely to be removed from the market 
during financial crises than Young banks.  
Evidence in favour of Hypothesis 2 would imply that inefficient institutions removed 
from the market are especially those with a lack of potential as implied by the cleansing 
effect. In contrast, the predominant removal of young banks would be in line with the 
scarring view and the failure of firms with the potential to show longer-term potential. 
3.2.2. Firm Entry and Financial Crises 
The effect of financial crises in terms of firm selection is only one of their possible outcomes 
on industry structure. Several analyses have also emphasized a potential impact in terms of 
the entry of new firms (see Bresnahan and Raff, 1991; Caballero and Hammour, 1994; Knott 
and Posen, 2005). For instance, under the cleansing view, since outdated production units 
become unprofitable and the incentives to undertake productivity-improving activities 
increase, new entry firms should show improved levels of innovation and achieve a higher 
degree of productivity. In this respect, Fiol and Lyles (1985) argue that some types of ‘crises’ 
are associated with a higher-level of entrepreneurial learning that improves the long-term 
survival prospects of new entrants. More broadly, a similar beneficial effect on firm entry 





has been associated with failures independently of their nexus with episodes of financial 
crises or economic recession (Pe’er and Vertinsky, 2008).  
The banking literature, however, also lacks analyses of the potential entry effect of 
financial crises. More generally, existing studies have dedicated much attention to the degree 
of efficiency achieved by new entry banks without a distinction between normal times and 
periods of crisis. Canhoto and Dermine (2003) find that new Portuguese banks were more 
efficient than the established banks after the deregulation process. However, DeYoung and 
Hasan (1998) find that while profit efficiency of de novo banks in the US increases rapidly 
throughout the first three years after establishment, it takes on average nine years to reach 
the levels of the incumbent banks. Furthermore, Knott and Posen (2005) focus on the entry 
effect of bank failure and suggest that due to a selection effect aggregate cost decreases 
because firms with less efficient endowments are replaced with more efficient ones. 
The final test in this chapter, therefore, aims at evaluating the impact of financial 
crises on bank entry and its interplay with bank efficiency. In particular, the following 
hypothesis is formulated: 
Hypothesis 3: If crisis periods help to liberate resources for more efficient use, 
banks that enter the market during crises will achieve higher levels of efficiency than 
incumbent banks and banks that enter in normal times.  
To validate Hypothesis 3 and to identify potential long-term benefits from financial 
crises two conditions should be observed. First, banks entering the market in periods 
characterized by a financial crisis should achieve (on average) a higher degree of efficiency 
than incumbent banks. Second, the degree of efficiency of these banks should also be higher 
than the degree of efficiency of banks entering in other time periods. 






For the population of US commercial and savings banks, the quarterly data between 1984:Q2 
and 2013:Q4 is obtained from the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income, provided 
by the FDIC (for data after the first quarter of 1993), and the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago (for data before the first quarter of 1993). 
The list provided by the FDIC is then used to identify failed banks (Liu and Ngo, 
2014). In this list, failed institutions are categorized into two broad groups: 1) banks whose 
charter has been terminated; 2) banks whose charter survives.6 The definition provided by 
the FDIC is used to identify entry banks during the sample period. Specifically, the FDIC 
uses the date when a bank begins its operations as the date of establishment. Hence, an entry 
bank is defined as a banking firm with operations starting in the period between 1984 and 
2013. 
 [Table 3-1 here] 
The initial data set consisted of 22,009 banks (of which 2055 failed, and 4813 are 
entry banks), and 2,149,996 quarterly observations between 1984:Q2 and 2013:Q4. Then 
consistent time series according to the data manual, provided by Den Haan et al. (2002), are 
formed, and observations, for which a clear reporting error is identified and with missing 
values7, are removed. Furthermore, as detailed in section 3.3.4, a two quarter lag for the 
explanatory variables are chosen to reduce potential endogeneity problems in the 
                                                 
6 The first group consists of banks that cease to exist and their assets are auctioned off. The second group 
includes banks that were reprivatized (management takeover followed by a sale, not dependent on whether 
there was assistance for the takeover) or subject to an assisted transaction (either open assistance transaction 
or the assistance was provided for an acquiring institution). For a full definition of failure and assistance 
transactions, visit http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/help.asp#BF1TT.  
7 For instance, if there are negative entries in the Call Report, and these entries do not belong to the several 
exceptions that are allowed to be negative, it is a clear reporting error (Den Haan et al., 2002). 
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econometric analysis with the consequence that the failures occurring in the first two quarters 
of the sample period are removed from the empirical tests8. Finally, an additional 2014:Q1 
is added to the dataset to incorporate bank failures that occurred in this quarter and had 
accounting data available at the third quarter of 2013. The applications of the criteria 
described above lead to a final sample of 1,160,804 quarterly observations belonging to 
20,524 unique banks (of which 1,672 are failed banks, and 4,218 are entry banks) between 
1984:Q4 and 2014:Q1. From the 20,524 banks, 18,227 are commercial banks (from which 
5,504 are federally chartered and 12,723 are state chartered) and 2,266 are savings banks 
(hereinafter, banks)9. To conduct the tests of bank failure a dummy is then constructed that 
equals to one for banks that failed in a given quarter and zero otherwise (Fail). The summary 
statistics of the variable Fail are reported in Panel A of Table 3-1. 
3.3.2. The Identification of Financial Crises 
To identify financial crises, the definition provided by Berger and Bouwman (2013) is 
followed. More specifically, crisis periods include two banking crises, the 1990s credit crunch 
between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4, as well as the global financial crisis that took place between 
2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4. Furthermore, additional episodes of financial distress embrace 
market crises such as the stock market crash in 1987:Q4, the Russian debt crisis together 
with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4, 
and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 
2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3.  
                                                 
8 Before removing the observations due to the two-quarter lag used in the empirical tests, the sample consisted 
of 1,216,290 observations, according to which some of the explanatory variables (Efficiency variables, Young 
and M_share) were computed to avoid potential selection bias. These variables are introduced in the following 
sections. 
9 The remaining 31 banks have relinquished FDIC insurance before the third quarter of 1992 and do not offer 
further specification on the charter class. 





It is worth noting that in the empirical setting, the periods involving financial crises 
are identified with dummies that take a value of one not only in the dates described above 
but also for the following four quarters. The purpose is to control for the possibility that 
bank failures originating from financial crises materialize with a lag compared to the eruption 
of the shock. However, as the choice of four quarters is to a degree arbitrary, additional tests 
are conducted where to the period identified above the following two and eight quarters are 
added, and where the periods of the exact date of the crises and the following four quarters 
are analysed separately. The results of these additional tests are reported in the section 
Additional Figures and Tables (section 3.8.1). 
[Figure 3-1 here] 
Panel B of Table 3-1 reports summary statistics for the crisis dummy and separately 
for banking and market crises, while Figure 3-1 presents the distribution of entry and failure 
rates of banks throughout the sample period at quarterly intervals. The Figure shows that 
bank failures cluster in three key periods: normal times between 1984:Q2 and 1993:Q1, and 
the two banking crises between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4, and 2008:Q1 and 2014:Q1, with 
56.01% of the total bank failures occurring in the periods that have been identified as being 
linked to a financial crisis. Further, as predicted, the failure rate appears larger when crises 
originate within the banking sector rather than in the stock market. In terms of the entry 
rate, an upward trend can be observed in bank entry during normal times, and a downward 
trend throughout periods of crisis.  
3.3.3. The Estimation of Bank Efficiency 
The choice of using cost efficiency to measure bank productivity has been based on the 
following. Although the change in productivity does not necessarily imply improved 
efficiency, but rather a technical change or increase in scale economies (or a combination of 





the three) (Coelli et al, 2005), the technical change in the banking sector has been largely 
associated with external factors, such as deregulation (see, for instance, Berg et al, 1992; 
Mukherjee et al, 2001)10. In addition, productivity focuses on physical quantities and technical 
relations and does not incorporate input prices (Coelli et al, 2005). In essence, the 
behavioural element of a banking firm may be lost when focusing merely on productivity, 
whereas cost efficiency allows the incorporation of management choice in terms of input 
mix given their prices. As a result, cost efficiency is better aligned with the managerial goals 
of cost minimisation. Finally, in their study Berg et al. (1992) have identified efficiency 
growth as the major sources of productivity growth in the banking sector. 
The literature has proposed both parametric approaches (the Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA), the Thick Frontier Approach and the Distribution Free Approach) and non-
parametric approaches (the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Free Disposal Hull 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997) to estimate different types of bank efficiency. In this thesis 
DEA is employed to estimate banks’ cost efficiency that reflects a bank’s ability to effectively 
utilize resources. The distance from the efficient frontier reflects the resources that have 
been wasted. This estimation method further allows decomposing cost efficiency into the 
product of technical and allocative efficiency. The former measures a bank’s ability to use a 
minimum level of inputs to produce a given level of outputs, and the latter shows how 
adequately the mix of inputs are selected regarding the input prices (Havrylchyk, 2006).  
In contrast to parametric techniques, DEA does not require the use of a specific 
function, defining a constant relationship between the inputs and outputs used by banks. 
This is particularly important in evaluating the efficiency of financial institutions, as they do 
                                                 
10 It, therefore, can be argued that technical progress should allow the whole population of banks to achieve 
higher levels of productivity, with the ones that do not exploit the technological advancement declining in 
terms of efficiency scores. 





not operate using a specific, “well defined production function” (Holod and Lewis, 2011). 
In addition, while the major concern about non-parametric techniques is that they do not 
take into account the existence of a random error (Berger and Humphrey, 1997), the study 
of Ruggiero (2007) suggests that the random error in parametric techniques such as SFA is 
assumed to have a specific distribution, and this assumption undermines the potential 
advantages of SFA over DEA11. More formally, cost efficiency levels are estimated by using 
the following input-oriented variable returns to scale (VRS) DEA model developed by 
Banker et al (1984) 12:  
minimize   𝜕 ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝑧𝑖𝑘 ≤ 𝜕𝑧𝑖0𝑘 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 1, 𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ; 
subject to  ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝑦𝑟𝑘 ≥ 𝑦𝑟0𝑘 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑟 = 1, 𝑠̅̅ ̅̅ ; 
∑ 𝜆𝑘 = 1𝜆𝑘 ≥ 0 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑘 ∈ 1, 𝑛.̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
                   
(3.1) 
Here yik and zrk represent the amounts of i’th output and r’th input for bank k, 
respectively. Critical for the estimation process of bank efficiency is, therefore, the choice of 
bank inputs and outputs. Following the majority of the studies documented in Berger and 
Humphrey (1997), total deposits, premises and fixed assets, and the number of employees 
are employed as inputs. The related input prices are the interest paid on deposits scaled by 
total deposits, expenses of premises and fixed assets divided by total premises and fixed 
assets, and salaries and employee benefits, scaled by the number of employees, respectively. 
Outputs include total securities and total gross loans and leases. Summary statistics for 
                                                 
11 Specifically, by following Ondrich and Ruggiero (2001), he argues that as the overall error in the SFA is 
perfectly correlated with the conditional estimator, the latter cannot “usefully decompose overall error into the 
efficiency and statistical noise components”. 
12 Other bank efficiency studies favor the VRS model over the constant return to scale (CRS) model, as the 
latter is appropriate when firms operate at an optimum scale - an assumption that does not fit the banking 
industry (Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010). 





inputs, input prices and outputs are provided in section Additional Figures and Tables (section 
3.8.1) Table A3-1.  
The input-oriented VRS DEA model selects the banks that use the minimum amount 
of inputs to produce the maximum level of outputs. Efficiency values equal to 100% are 
then assigned to the banks that form the efficient frontier to which other banks are 
compared.13  
The measures of bank efficiency are estimated by size groups and separately for each 
quarter. The estimation by size allows to control for differences in bank technology 
depending on bank production scale and is conducted for the following five categories of 
banks: very small banks (less than $50 million in assets), small banks (between $50 and $100 
million in assets), medium banks (between $100 and $500 million in assets), large banks 
(between $500 million and $1 billion in assets) and very large banks (over $1 billion in assets). 
The estimation of efficiency by quarters removes concerns over a potential forward-looking 
bias in the econometric tests. Essentially, the aim is to avoid assessing the degree of efficiency 
of a bank in a given quarter by using accounting information that will be available only in 
future quarters.  
Panel C of Table 3-1 provides definitions and descriptive statistics of the three types 
of efficiency measures used in the empirical models. The average cost efficiency is 41.20%, 
which is lower than what has been reported in other US based studies (see, for instance, Aly 
et al., 1990; Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The estimates in this chapter, however, focus only 
on the cross-sectional dimension of bank efficiency to remove forward looking bias and on 
                                                 
13 An alternative to the input-oriented approach is the output-oriented approach. Nevertheless, while an input 
oriented approach is considered to be more likely a reflection of factors under the influence of managers (Fethi 
and Pasiouras, 2010), an output-oriented approach, is also likely to reflect more generally variations in economic 
conditions not under full managerial control such as changes in the demand for loans.  
 





a significantly larger number of banks with relatively fewer banks forming an efficient 
frontier, and a higher proportion of banks operating inefficiently. In line with Aly et al. 
(1990), Berger and Humphrey (1991) and Isik and Hassan (2002), most of the efficiency 
achieved by banks can be attributed to allocative efficiency rather than to technical efficiency. 
Hence, banks seem to be more successful in selecting the appropriate mix of inputs rather 
than using the appropriate quantities of inputs. 
The time series trends of the average efficiency measures used in this thesis are 
provided in Figure A3-1. The summary statistics of efficiency measures are further 
decomposed according to the time period, i.e. normal times, market and banking crisis 
periods, and are further presented in Table A3-2. 
3.3.4. Parametric Survival Model for Bank Failures 
As in Calomiris and Mason (1997) and Schaeck et al. (2009), a parametric Survival (PS) model 
is employed for estimating bank survival probabilities. The PS model is fitted by maximizing 
the following likelihood function: 




𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑗  (3.2) 
where h(.) is the hazard function of the assumed distribution; S(.) is the corresponding 
survivor function; Failj is the failure indicator for each observation j (j = 1, 2, …, N), and tj 
denotes the failure or censoring time for each observation j (j = 1, 2, …, N). θ are the ancillary 
parameters required for the assumed distribution. Whether an observation represents failure 
or censoring depends on whether a bank failed or survived at time tj. Finally, Xj is the vector 





of covariates (reported in Panel D of Table 3-1), and βx is the corresponding vector of 
coefficients on Xj.14  
Critical for the estimation of a parametric survival model is the selection of the 
distributional form (exponential, Weibull, or Gompertz) underpinning the proportional 
hazard function ℎ(𝑡). To this end the Akaike information criterion is employed to select the 
distribution that offers the lower value of this statistic; namely, the Gompertz distribution is 
selected. The Gompertz hazard function for the PH model has the following form: 
ℎ(𝑡|𝑿𝑗) = exp(𝛾𝑡) exp (𝛽0 + 𝑿𝑗𝜷𝑥), (3.3) 
where exp(𝛾𝑡) exp (𝛽0) is the baseline hazard of a Gompertz model, and 𝛾 is the ancillary 
parameter. 
Thus, the survivor function in the PH metric with a Gompertz baseline hazard has 
the following form: 
𝑆(𝑡| 𝑿𝑗) = exp[−𝛾
−1 exp(𝛽0 + 𝑿𝑗𝜷𝑥) {exp(𝛾𝑡) − 1}] (3.4) 
To test the Hypotheses the baseline specification is extended with the addition of 
interaction terms between measures of bank efficiency and the crises dummies. This 
extended specification allows to evaluate how efficiency effects differ across normal and 
crisis periods, and how the effects of crises vary given different levels of bank efficiency. 
Nevertheless, as the sign or magnitude of the interaction terms are not very informative in 
non-linear models (Berger and Bouwman, 2013), marginal effects are used to test how 
efficiency affects banks’ probability of failure under different economic conditions. 
                                                 
14 Parametric survival models can be categorized into two main types: accelerated failure time (AFT) or 
proportional hazards (PH). The former assumes that the effects of covariates are to accelerate or decelerate the 
survival time by a constant, and the latter assumes that a one unit change in a covariate affects the hazard rate 
by some constant. While the AFT models report the coefficients in an accelerated failure time metric, the PH 
models report the coefficients in a proportional hazard metric. The PH metric is chosen, because the interest 
is in how covariates affect the hazard rates rather than the time to failure. 





Furthermore, in the following Tables the coefficients are presented in terms of hazard rates. 
It follows, therefore, that a value larger (lower) than one indicates that a covariate increases 
(reduces) the probability of bank failure. 
Panel D of Table 3-1 describes the set of control variables employed in the survival 
model including bank-specific characteristics, as well as the state-macroeconomic 
environment.  Following Liu and Ngo (2014), the former consists of bank Size (measured 
by the natural logarithm of assets), ROA (measured by net income to total assets), NPL (the 
ratio of non-performing loans to total loans), and M_Share (measured as a bank’s assets to 
total state banks’ assets). As Liu and Ngo (2014) a too many to fail (TMTF) variable is also 
included, that measures the average capital ratio of other banks that operate in the same state. 
A Leverage ratio, measured as the ratio between assets and equity, is included as in Adrian 
and Shin (2010). Finally, a dummy variable Young is included that equals one if bank age is 
lower than the first quartile of the banks’ age in the sample15. All independent variables apart 
from Crises and Young are lagged by two quarters to avoid possible endogeneity16. 
Similar to Cole and White (2012), there are no a priori expectations for the bank size 
and failure relationship. Liu and Ngo (2014) find a lower probability to fail in large US banks 
reflecting the fact that large banks have a more diversified investment opportunity set. In 
contrast, Jin et al. (2011) find an opposite result and suggest larger banks are more likely to 
engage in riskier lending and securitization. Higher ROA, lower leverage ratio (the inverse 
of capital ratio) and lower levels of non-performing loans are expected to decrease banks’ 
probability of failure (see Cole and White, 2012; Berger and Bowman, 2013). A high bank 
                                                 
15 The first quartile of a bank’s age in the sample is 25.5 years, and the average age of the first quartile is 11.06 
years, which is close to the number of years required for a bank to reach the performance of existing banks 
reported in DeYoung and Hassan (1998). 
16 The correlation matrix for all explanatory variables used is presented in Additional Figures and Tables section 
(section 3.8.1) Table A3-3. 





market share can instead reflect the presence of a too-big-to-fail status and thus reduce the 
probability of failure (Liu and Ngo, 2014). However, previous studies find a higher likelihood 
of failure associated with this variable but they also show that this effect is motivated by the 
inclusion of government assisted banks in the group of failed banks. In a similar manner to 
Liu and Ngo (2014) the expectation is that a higher too many to fail indicator is associated 
with a higher probability of failure, as governments are more likely to assist a bank and 
protect it from failure when the whole banking sector is weak (Brown and Dinc, 2011). As 
for the dummy variable Young, the literature normally suggests that young banking firms are 
more exposed to adverse economic environments and are more likely to exit the market 
(Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; DeYoung, 2003). Finally, controls for local economic 
conditions (Growth) are included to measure the quarterly change of personal income in a 
State where the bank operates. The expectation is that better local economic conditions 
should reduce the likelihood of bank failures. 
3.3.5. Regression Analysis for Entry Banks 
To test the third hypothesis, it is analysed whether crisis periods help liberate resources for 
new banks to use more efficiently. To this end, two dummy variables are constructed, 
Enter_norm and Enter_cr, that take values equal to 1 if a bank has entered the banking 
market over the sample period during normal or crisis periods, respectively. These dummy 
variables are then employed as explanatory variables in the following econometric model that 
is estimated by OLS and with clustered standard errors at the bank level: 
EFFi,t = α0 + α1*Enter_normi + α2*Enter_cri + 𝚱1Xi, t-2  + α3*Timet + εi, t (3.5) 
where EFFi,t is one of the measures of efficiency computed for bank i at quarter t. Xi,t-2 is a 
vector of control variables including the set of characteristics described in the previous 
section. The expectation is that ROA, M_share, TMTF, Size, Growth and Young have a 





positive effect on efficiency, and NPL and Leverage have a negative effect on efficiency. 
Furthermore, quarterly time fixed effects are controlled for. Definitions and summary 
statistics of the entry dummies are presented in Panel E of Table 3-1.  
To verify Hypothesis 3, two conditions need to be satisfied. First, Enter_cr should 
enter the regression models with a positive and significant coefficient; namely, it should have 
a positive effect on all efficiency measures. Second, Enter_norm should either show a 
positive sign but a lower magnitude than Enter_cr, or a negative sign. In the first case, 
entrants would be more efficient than failed and incumbent banks regardless of the timing 
of entry, thus supporting the presence of a more general innovation effect characterizing 
new firms. Nevertheless, financial crises can amplify this innovation effect. In the second 
case, entry banks are more efficient than failed and incumbent banks only when they enter 
during disturbed market conditions, thus providing even stronger evidence of the potential 
benefits of financial crises.  
3.4.1. The Impact of Bank Efficiency on the Probability of Bank Failure 
Table 3-2 reports the regression results of the impact of different types of bank efficiency 
on the likelihood of bank survival. The initial estimates are benchmark specifications to test 
whether more efficient banks are more likely to survive, as suggested by the results reported 
in Wheelock and Wilson (2000), Knott and Posen (2005), and Koetter and Poghosyan 
(2010). The validity of the first hypothesis - whether the importance of bank efficiency for 
bank survival increases during periods of financial crises - is then evaluated by including in 
the baseline models interaction terms between the measures of bank efficiency and the crisis 
dummy. 
The initial tests show that more efficient banks are, in general, more likely to survive, 
confirming the view that crises can generate a cleansing effect in the banking industry (Knott 
3.4. Do Crises Clear out Inefficient Banks?  





and Posen, 2005). Furthermore, the results do not vary with the way bank efficiency is 
measured: all three measures of bank efficiency significantly lower the hazard rate.  
[Table 3-2 here] 
The impact of bank efficiency on bank survival appears also economically relevant. 
For instance, by using the estimation results reported in column (1) it is found that a ten 
percentage point17 (pp) increase in cost efficiency reduces the hazard of failure by 8% per 
quarter, or 32 % per annum. Furthermore, extending the analysis to the two cost efficiency 
components, the results suggest that a ten pp increase in technical inefficiency has a lower 
impact in terms of the decline of the bank hazard of failure (-7% per quarter and -28% per 
year) than a similar increase in allocative efficiency (-8 % per quarter and -32% per year). 
This suggests that for banks the efficiency in the allocation of resources is more important 
than the efficiency in the overall utilization of inputs. This is not entirely surprising given 
that managers’ choices to alter the input mix according to their prices show their ability to 
adapt to regulatory changes and market prices (Isik and Hassan, 2002; Havrylchyk, 2006).  
Moving onto the analysis of the remaining variables, a number of significant 
determinants of the probability of bank failure are found: higher ROA, lower amount of 
assets and lower leverage, as well as lower levels of non-performing loans help banks survive. 
Furthermore, banks are less likely to survive during financial crises and when the economy 
is weaker. Finally, market share does not show any significant effect on bank probability of 
failure. 
                                                 
17 The use of percentage points (pp) rather than percent (%) refers to an actual instead of a relative change (or 
difference) of percentages. For instance, if bank efficiency reduces from 60 % to 50 %, it is a 10 pp change (60 
– 50 = 10), whereas this drop would represent a 16.67 % decline (((50-60)/60)*100 = -16.67%) in efficiency. 





The last three columns show the results of the direct test of Hypothesis 1) on the 
effect of bank efficiency on the probability of failure during financial crises with the use of 
interaction terms between bank efficiency and the crisis dummy. To ease the interpretation 
of the results, and given interaction terms in non-linear models, such as parametric survival 
models, cannot be understood by simply relying on their sign, magnitude or significance 
levels of the reported coefficients (Berger and Bouwman, 2013), the marginal effects are 
presented in Table 3-3. 
The findings suggest that an increase in bank efficiency reduces the hazard rate of 
bank failure in both normal and distress periods. Further tests, reported in Panel B, on the 
equality between the marginal effects in normal and crisis periods show that the effects 
during financial crises are not more pronounced than in the rest of the sample period. More 
importantly, Panel B shows that financial crises do not increase the likelihood of removing 
inefficient institutions as compared to normal times. Furthermore, additional tests, reported 
in Panel D highlight that the likelihood of surviving a financial crisis is essentially similar for 
more and less inefficient banks. 
[Table 3-3 here] 
Overall, the results are not consistent with the presence of a cleansing effect: the 
results do not show that inefficiency matters more during financial crises than normal times 
and that more inefficient banks are more likely to fail during disturbed market conditions 
than in normal times. Overall, financial crises do not seem to accelerate the removal of 
inefficient institutions from the market. 
3.4.2. Additional Tests 
To assess the robustness of the findings additional tests are conducted. First the validity of 
the definition of financial crises is tested. Specifically, as including four quarters following a 





crisis is to a degree arbitrary, additional analysis is conducted to test whether the results are 
robust when extending the crisis periods, defined by Berger and Bouwman (2013), by two 
and eight quarters. In line with the previous findings the results show that efficiency, in 
general, helps banks survive with no significant differences between crisis and normal 
periods. The effects of crises on banks probability of failure are positive and significant, with 
no significant difference between more and less efficient banks. The results are provided in 
Table A3-4 and Table A3-5 for including post-crisis periods as two and eight quarters, 
respectively. 
One possible concern related to the estimation of bank efficiency at quarterly 
intervals, is the possibility of capturing noise. In essence, under the estimation approach 
employed, a bank can show a temporary inefficiency in a given quarter despite achieving 
higher levels of efficiency over a longer time period. Therefore, the quarterly value of bank 
efficiency in the models is replaced with its average over a three-quarter period. Again, 
findings suggest that inefficient banks are more likely to fail but this effect is not amplified 
by financial crises. The results are provided in Table A3-6. 
Although in the econometric analyses bank size and market share are controlled for, 
it has been widely accepted that due to their systemic importance in the economy, large 
financial institutions are different, and their probability of failing is not dependent directly 
on their performance (see, for instance, Berger et al., 2012; Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Cole 
and White, 2012; DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Liu and Ngo, 2014). In order to test, whether 
the results are driven by the inclusion of systemically important banks, as in Berger and 
Bouwman (2013) additional tests are performed excluding the 19 largest banks in each 
quarter. Again, the results, reported in Table A3-7 basically replicate those shown in Tables 
3-2 and 3-3.  





Further, a different distributional assumption is employed to evaluate whether the 
results hold. Specifically, as in Schaeck et al. (2009) the exponential distribution is employed 
to estimate the survival model. Once again, the results provided in Table A3-8 remain 
qualitatively similar to those of the initial analysis.  
In the final robustness check, a different bank exit mechanism in the empirical setting 
is employed. Specifically, the study by Wheelock and Wilson (2000) is followed and an 
additional analysis is conducted to test whether exit via acquisitions presents similar 
findings18. To be relevant for the initial analysis, both main explanatory variables, efficiency 
and crises, should have the same sign on the probability of banking exiting via an acquisition. 
Presented in the first three columns of Panel A of Table A3-9, the results show that while 
the effect of efficiency is in line with the initial analysis, the probability of a bank being 
acquired reduces significantly during times of crisis. The marginal effects of efficiency, 
provided in Panel B of Table A3-9, are further in line with the initial analysis, whereas the 
opposite from the initial analysis marginal effect of crises are presented in Panel C of Table 
A3-9. Specifically, the results show that crises reduced bank probability of being acquired 
and this effect was not different for any level of bank efficiency.   
These findings, therefore, show that for the purpose of the analysis presented in this 
chapter, the exit mechanism via acquisitions should not be investigated in conjunction with 
outright bank failures. 
                                                 
18 For the purpose of this test, the dataset of 1,216,290 observations (before the removal of observations due 
to lagged variables introduced) is employed. The model used is the same as the one described in section 3.3.4, 
where the dependent variable is changed into the probability of a bank being acquired. Specifically, the 
dependent variable Acq acquires a value of one if a bank was acquired in that quarter, and zero otherwise. 
Acquired banks and the dates of the acquisition are identified using the dataset provided in 
https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/fdic-institution-directory-id-insured-insitution-download-file. Explanatory 
variables are the same as in the initial analysis in this chapter. 





3.4.3. Banking Crises versus Market Crises 
The definition of financial crises includes periods of distress that differ in nature and it is 
widely believed that banking crises might differ from market crises in different aspects (see, 
for instance, Berger and Bouwman, 2013). In particular, during banking crises the destruction 
of the banking sector tends to be more pronounced than during market crises as proved by 
a much larger number of bank failures (Berger and Bouwman, 2013). In essence, the severity 
of banking crises might then undermine the potential benefits associated with higher bank 
efficiency thus affecting also relatively efficient banks. This is in line with the view that a 
severe crisis might lead to panic amongst bank creditors that impacts on healthier institutions 
via uninformed depositors (see, for instance, Chari and Jagannathan, 1988; Saunders and 
Wilson, 1996; Chen, 1999; Iyer and Puri, 2012) or via the interbank market (Dasgupta, 2004). 
In contrast, market crises tend to have a milder effect on the banking sector with the 
consequence of increasing the chances that greater bank efficiency might lead to greater bank 
survival. For instance, in the sample, while the annualized bank failure rate during episodes 
of banking crisis is equal to 0.95%, it drops to about half of this in the presence of a market 
crisis. 
This possibility is evaluated in Table 3-4, where the survival model with dummies 
that separately identify market and banking crises is presented. The two dummies are then 
interacted with the measures of bank efficiency and the related marginal effects are shown 
in Table 3-5.  
[Table 3-4 here] 
[Table 3-5 here] 
While the sign, significance and magnitude of efficiency measures and control 
variables are similar to those reported in the previous section, the analysis of the marginal 





effects reported in Panel A of Table 3-5 suggests that an increase in the degree of efficiency 
decreases the probability of bank failure during normal times and market crises. Efficiency, 
nevertheless, seems to also be important during banking crises, as the results show that apart 
from technical efficiency, it helps banks survive.  
Furthermore, Panels B and C present the marginal effects of banking and market 
crises on the probability of failure at different levels of bank efficiency. The results indicate 
that banking crises tend to increase banks’ probability of failure more than normal times, 
regardless of the value of bank efficiency. Market crises, however, do not show any different 
effect on bank probability of failure than normal times at any levels of bank efficiency. 
Overall, the results show that an increase in all measures of efficiency reduces the 
likelihood of failure during normal times and during both types of crises.  It, therefore, 
cannot be concluded that efficiency is more important during market crises that exhibit a 
milder effect on the banking industry. Compared to normal times, the eruption of banking 
crises, generally, increases the probability of bank failure at all levels of efficiencies, while 
shocks stemming from market crises do not affect the probability of failure at any level of 
efficiency more than in normal times. In overall, the findings are more in line with the 
presence of a scarring effect stemming from banking crises, whereas market crises do not 
exhibit any different effect on the probability of bank failure than normal times. 
3.4.4. The Global Financial Crisis versus Other Financial Crises 
The key assumption of the previous tests is that banking crises are more disruptive than 
market crises for the banking sector and this leads to a reduction in the potential benefits of 
having a high degree of efficiency. This notion is confirmed by the insignificant marginal 
effect of market crises and the significant effect of banking crises as compared to normal 
times on banks’ likelihood of failure. Efficiency, nevertheless, seems to help banks survive 





during all times. In this section, additional analysis for this argument is provided by 
comparing the effects of efficiency during the latest financial crisis with those associated with 
the other crises. In essence, as it is widely agreed that the turmoil of the banking sector 
erupted in the second half of 2007 led to the most severe banking crisis since the great 
depression (Laeven and Valencia, 2013), to further test the findings of the previous section 
a lack of any significant role played by bank efficiency during the recent crisis should be 
observed. 
To conduct these additional tests a dummy equal to one for the periods identifying 
the global financial crisis (GFC) and a dummy equal to one for the remaining crises 
(Other_crises) are constructed. The baseline specifications are then re-estimated with the 
addition of interaction terms between the two crisis dummies and the measures of bank 
efficiency.   
[Table 3-6 here] 
[Table 3-7 here] 
The regression results are presented in Table 3-6 and, more importantly, the related 
marginal effects for different types of financial crises are shown in Table 3-7. Panel A, where 
the marginal effects of bank efficiency during normal periods, the global financial crisis and 
other crises are reported, suggests that while the probability of bank failure is reduced by 
increases in efficiency, this was not the case for the global financial crisis. In other words, 
under a very severe financial crisis an increase in bank efficiency is not important for bank 
survival. The equality tests between the effects of efficiency in different periods are presented 
in Panel B, and further support the findings, as suggested by the significantly more important 
role of efficiency in normal times and other crisis periods than in global financial crisis.  





More importantly, Panels C and D show that the marginal effects of the global 
financial crisis on the likelihood of failure was significant at any level of bank efficiencies, 
whereas other crises (apart from allocative efficiency) did not have a stronger effect on bank 
probability of failure than normal times.  
Overall, the results reported in this section suggest that efficiency does not help 
banks to survive when the banking sector is hit by an extremely severe shock; whereas, in 
terms of milder financial crises, efficiency has a positive impact on the survival of banking 
firms. 
In this section the Hypothesis 2 is tested; namely, that bank age plays a moderating effect on 
how financial crises impact on the survival of banks with different degrees of efficiency. To 
test this hypothesis the dummy variable Young is interacted with Crisis and Efficiency and 
with the product between Crisis and Efficiency. 
Panel A of Table 3-8 shows the parametric survival model results, and, more 
importantly, Panels B and C show the marginal effects of efficiency and crises for young and 
old banks separately. While the analysis presented in Panel A, in general, confirms the 
findings of the previous models, Panels B and C of Table 3-8 do not support the hypothesis 
that old inefficient banks are more likely to be removed from the market during financial 
crises than young banks. In other words, although crises seem to contribute to removing 
only the least efficient old banks, they appear to exercise a much stronger impact on the 
probability of failure of young banks independently of their efficiency levels. In fact, 
efficiency does not seem to play a role in helping young banks survive crises at all. This is 
highlighted by the results in Panel B showing that an increase in bank efficiency does not 
influence the probability that young banks fail during financial crises. This conclusion holds 
3.5. Crisis, Bank Efficiency and Bank Age 





for all the different measures of bank efficiency employed in the empirical tests. In contrast, 
an increase in efficiency reduces the probability of failure during crises in the group 
consisting of the oldest banking firms. 
Overall, the results discussed in this section do not support Hypothesis 2 whereas 
they appear more in line with the presence of a scarring effect produced by financial crises. 
In essence, during financial crises, young banks fail regardless of their efficiency levels with 
the consequence of being incapable of achieving their full potential. Furthermore, while there 
is some evidence that financial crises penalize more mature banks when they are less efficient, 
the impact of financial crises appear more pronounced for young banks even when they are 
relatively more efficient. 
[Table 3-8 here] 
In this section the validity of Hypothesis 3 is tested; namely, that crises help liberate resources 
for new banks to take over and employ more efficiently. To this end, the model described in 
section 3.3.5 is employed. Hence, the initial focus is on the effect of the timing of bank entry 
on the degree of bank efficiency. 
The regression results reported in the first three columns of Panel A of Table 3-9 are 
generally supportive of Hypothesis 3. More precisely, the results show that entry banks tend 
to achieve (on average) higher levels of cost and technical efficiency than failed and 
incumbent banks and this effect is significantly higher for banks that enter during periods of 
financial distress. The higher levels of efficiency for new entry banks are, therefore, 
consistent with the findings reported by Canhoto and Dermine (2003). However, the results 
show that new entrants achieve better performance than the remaining banks in terms of 
3.6. Do Crises Liberate Resources for New Banks to Use More 
Efficiently? 





technical efficiency more than in terms of allocative efficiency; this is not, however, entirely 
surprising. Technical efficiency rather than allocative efficiency is related to innovation and 
as suggested by Geroski (1995) firm entry is positively related to increases in efficiency via 
innovation.  
[Table 3-9 here] 
More importantly, in the context of the analysis, is the result shown in Panel B of 
Table 3-9, that increases in efficiencies produced by entering during crisis periods are 
significantly larger than the increases observed when banks enter in normal times. This 
finding is, therefore, consistent with the view that financial crises might help innovation via 
new entry banks.   
It is evaluated further whether the results depend on the type of financial crisis. The 
dummy that identifies bank entry during crises is separated into a dummy for banking crises 
and a dummy for market crises. The results of these additional tests, shown in the last three 
columns of Table 3-9, highlight that new entry banks in the aftermath of financial crises 
achieve higher levels of efficiency than incumbent banks independently of the type of crises. 
However, in Panel B the results show that the effect on bank efficiency is even higher when 
banks enter during market crises.19 
Overall, the results of this section and the evidence provided by the previous analysis 
show that the concept of creative destruction materializes in the banking industry via a bank 
entry channel rather than by amplifying the importance of bank efficiency for bank survival 
                                                 
19 Moving onto the analysis of the control variables, higher ROA, higher capital levels (with the exception of 
allocative efficiency), bigger market share, higher capitalization of other banks and longer survival time increase 
efficiency levels. Two exceptions from the general consensus are the effects of personal income growth 
(decreases cost and technical efficiency levels, and has no effect on allocative efficiency), and size (although 
higher market share increases efficiency levels, the size of a bank reduces efficiency). As expected, non-
performing loans reduce efficiency; the effect is, however, significant only for allocative efficiency. 





during crises as compared to normal times. In short, financial crises have the potential benefit 
of liberating resources for more efficient use. In line with the previous findings, this effect is 
weaker for crises that materialize within the banking sector and stronger for market crises. 
It, therefore, seems that although market crises do not exhibit different marginal effects on 
bank failure probability as compared to normal times, banks that fail during market crises 
liberate resources for new banks to use more efficiently. 
Based on quarterly US commercial and savings bank data between 1984 and 2013, this 
chapter shows that neither the cleansing nor the scarring view can fully explain the nature of 
bank failures during financial crises.  On the one hand, in contrast to a cleansing effect, it is 
found that crises that are extremely severe and originate within the banking sector, as was 
the case with the global banking crisis that erupted in the second half of 2007, do not tend 
to accelerate the removal of inefficient banks compared to normal times. On the other hand, 
other crises do not exhibit any signs of either the cleansing or the scarring view, as they do 
not show any different effect on bank probability of failure as compared to normal times. 
Overall, it is found that the severity of the crisis plays a crucial role in determining the scarring 
effect that emerges in the banking industry.   
Further evidence aligned with the scarring perspective of crises emerges when the 
analysis is extended to incorporate the impact of bank age. While the results show that a 
cleansing effect materializes for older banks – that is, the least efficient are more likely to be 
removed from the market - such an effect is not found to be present for young banks. In 
this latter case, the results suggest that an increase in efficiency does not reduce the risk of 
failing during financial crises. Indeed, the occurrence of financial crises seems to accelerate 
also the removal of the relatively efficient young institutions.  
3.7. Conclusions 





Furthermore, although the analysis suggests that the presence of a cleansing effect 
via the removal of the most inefficient banks is at best controversial, additional tests show 
that some benefits of crises emerge via an entry effect. Essentially, banks that enter during 
crises, and especially during market crises, are able to achieve higher levels of efficiency than 
the competing banking firms. As a result, bank failures seem to liberate resources for a more 
efficient use by de-novo banks. 
Overall, the fact that during severe crises, banks are affected regardless of their level 
of efficiency highlights the importance of ex-ante mechanisms for crisis management (such 
as the establishment of resolution funds) to moderate the effects of severe banking crises 






















FAILED AND ENTRY BANKS IN THE SAMPLE BETWEEN 1984 AND 2013 
NOTES: This figure shows the distribution of fail and entry banks in the sample between 1984 and 2013. The definitions of fail and entry 
banks have been obtained from the FDIC. Fail bank is defined as a bank that failed or received government assistance in a given quarter, 
and entry bank is defined as a bank that began its operations in a given quarter. The solid and dash lines show the amount of fail and entry 
banks in a quarter, respectively, as a percentage of total number of banks in that quarter. The dark grey and light grey columns show the 
amount of fail and entry banks in time period, respectively, as a percentage of total fail and entry banks in the sample. The horizontal and 
diagonal shaded areas present market and banking crises, respectively, and the unshaded areas present normal times. The crises dating is 
as in Berger and Bouwman (2013) for the crises dating. The three market crises are the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt 
crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst 
coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3. The two banking crises are the 1990s credit crunch 


































































































































% fail bank per period % entry bank per period Market crises
Banking crises % fail bank per quarter % entry bank per quarter
3.8. Figures and Tables 







Symbol Description N mean p50 St. dev. p1 p99 
Panel A: Main dependent variable for PS model 
Fail 
Fail is a dummy variable, equal 1 if a bank 
failed in a particular quarter, and 0 otherwise. 
For full definition of failed bank, see section 
3.1. 
1,160,804 0.001 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.000 
Panel B: Crisis dummies for PS models 
Crises 
Crises is a dummy equal to 1 for the quarters 
of crisis periods and the following quarters, 
and 0 otherwise. 
1,160,804 0.460 0.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 
Banking 
Crises 
Banking Crises is a dummy equal to 1 for the 
quarters of a banking crisis and the following 
four quarters, and 0 otherwise. 
1,160,804 0.246 0.000 0.431 0.000 1.000 
Market 
Crises 
Market Crises is a dummy equal to 1 for the 
quarters of a market crisis and the following 
four quarters, and 0 otherwise. 
1,160,804 0.214 0.000 0.410 0.000 1.000 
Panel C: Efficiency variables 
CE Cost efficiency measured by using DEA (%). 1,160,804 41.201 41.300 19.643 4.900 90.500 
TE 
Technical efficiency measured by using DEA 
(%). 
1,160,804 49.504 50.500 20.379 8.100 100.000 
AE 
Allocative Efficiency measured by using 
DEA (%). 
1,160,804 81.689 86.300 15.315 31.600 99.500 
Panel D: Main control variables 
Size 
Log(assets) ($US000s) adjusted using implicit 
price deflator, provided by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
1,160,804 11.561 11.425 1.231 9.208 15.691 
ROA Net income divided bank total assets (%). 1,160,804 0.416 0.400 0.530 -1.903 1.810 
Leverage Total assets divided to book equity (%). 1,160,804 11.149 10.990 3.354 4.136 23.621 
NPL Non-performing loans over total loans (%). 1,160,804 0.932 0.418 1.380 0.000 7.721 
M_Share 
Bank's assets over total banking assets in the 
State where the bank is chartered (%). 
1,160,804 0.481 0.101 2.407 0.004 8.116 
TMTF 
Average capital ratio of other banks in the 
same State (%). 
1,160,804 7.941 7.893 2.284 4.497 12.979 
Growth 
Quarterly change of personal income growth 
in the State where the bank is chartered (%). 
1,160,804 1.306 1.346 1.129 -2.034 4.293 
Young 
Young is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a 
bank is younger than the first quartile of the 
sample, and 0 otherwise. 
1,160,804 0.245 0.000 0.430 0.000 1.000 
Panel E: Entry variables and Age variable for OLS regressions 
Enter_nor
m 
Enter_norm is a dummy variable equal 1 if a 
bank began its operation during normal 
times, and 0 otherwise 
1,160,804 0.080 0.000 0.272 0.000 1.000 
Enter_cr 
Enter_cr is a dummy variable equal 1 if a 
bank began its operations during crisis 
period, and 0 otherwise 
1,160,804 0.054 0.000 0.227 0.000 1.000 
NOTES: This table presents descriptions and summary statistics of the key variables used in this chapter. Panel A presents definitions and 
summary statistics of the dependent variable Fail used in the PS models. The average of 0.001 shows that the average probability of a bank 
failing in a quarter is equal to 0.10%. Panel B presents descriptions and summary statistics of the efficiency variables, cost efficiency (CE), 
technical efficiency (TE), and allocative efficiency (AE). Efficiency values are reported as percentages, and can acquire a value between 0 
and 100. Panel C presents the time dummy variables used in the PS models. The time dummies include Crises, Banking Crises and Market 
Crises. Crisis periods are two banking crises (the 1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the global financial crisis that took 
place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4) and three market crises (the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with the 
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 
11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3), and include four quarters of post-crisis periods. Panel D presents definitions and 
summary statistics of the control variables employed in the econometric models: Size, ROA, Leverage, NPL, M_share, TMTF, Growth, 
and Young. Variables ROA, NPL, M_share, TMTF and Growth are reported as percentages, Leverage is reported as a ratio, Size is reported 
as the natural log in $US000s, and Young is a dummy variable equal to one if a bank is young, and zero otherwise. Young is defined as a 
bank, which is younger than the first quartile of the whole sample. Entry variables Enter_norm and Enter_cr, used in the OLS regressions, 
are presented in Panel E. 




















Efficiencyt-2 0.992*** 0.993*** 0.992*** 0.992*** 0.994*** 0.990*** 
 (-5.192) (-4.736) (-4.821) (-3.146) (-2.896) (-4.181) 
Crises 1.432*** 1.414*** 1.445*** 1.452*** 1.450*** 1.087 
 (7.441) (7.177) (7.601) (3.301) (2.968) (0.351) 
Efficiencyt-2*Crises    1.000 0.999 1.004 
    (-0.137) (-0.218) (1.213) 
ROA t-2  0.257*** 0.255*** 0.258*** 0.257*** 0.255*** 0.257*** 
 (-33.754) (-33.926) (-33.416) (-33.755) (-33.922) (-33.443) 
Size t-2  1.066*** 1.073*** 1.077*** 1.066*** 1.073*** 1.077*** 
 (2.635) (2.921) (3.064) (2.633) (2.916) (3.072) 
Leverage t-2  1.084*** 1.084*** 1.086*** 1.084*** 1.084*** 1.086*** 
 (9.793) (9.688) (10.000) (9.792) (9.686) (10.001) 
NPL t-2   1.207*** 1.206*** 1.209*** 1.207*** 1.206*** 1.209*** 
 (13.415) (13.330) (13.620) (13.398) (13.310) (13.647) 
M_Share t-2  1.003 1.003 1.002 1.003 1.003 1.002 
 (0.164) (0.190) (0.092) (0.161) (0.186) (0.114) 
TMTF t-2  0.702*** 0.700*** 0.700*** 0.702*** 0.700*** 0.702*** 
 (-6.802) (-6.852) (-6.798) (-6.792) (-6.850) (-6.729) 
Growth t-2  0.900*** 0.902*** 0.901*** 0.900*** 0.902*** 0.900*** 
 (-4.122) (-4.047) (-4.056) (-4.114) (-4.046) (-4.111) 
Young 1.343*** 1.357*** 1.349*** 1.343*** 1.358*** 1.350*** 
 (6.019) (6.285) (6.158) (6.034) (6.304) (6.168) 
Constant 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.490 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (-17.973) (-18.261) (-1.551) (-17.851) (-18.117) (-15.740) 
Observations 1,160,804 1,160,804 1,160,804 1,160,804 1,160,804 1,160,804 
NOTES: This table shows the results of how bank cost efficiency (CE), technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE) affect banks’ probability of failure. The method employed is a parametric survival (PS) 
model, with a Gompertz proportional hazard function. The dependent variable, Fail, is a dummy that equals one if a bank failed or received government assistance in a given quarter, and zero otherwise. Crises is a 
dummy that equals one for periods of financial distress and the following four quarters. Crisis periods are two banking crises (the 1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the global financial crisis that 
took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4) and three market crises (the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 
1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3). ROA is the ratio between bank net income and bank total assets, Size is the log of bank total 
assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real terms, Leverage is the ratio between bank total assets and bank book value of equity, NPL is the ratio between non-performing loans and total loans, M_Share 
is the ratio between bank total assets and the volume of bank total assets in the State where the bank is chartered, TMTF is the average capital ratio of the other banks in the same State, Growth is the quarterly change 
of personal income growth in the State where the bank is chartered, and Young is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is young, and zero otherwise. Young is defined as a bank, which is younger that the first 
quartile of the banks’ age in the sample. All independent variables apart from Crises and Young are lagged by two quarters to avoid possible endogeneity. The coefficients presented are hazard rates, which show how 
much a one unit change in the independent variable increases (decreases) the probability of a bank's failure. z values are provided in parentheses; values below one indicate a decline in bank probability of failure, and 
values above one indicate an increase in the dependent variable. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 






MARGINAL EFFECTS OF BANK EFFICIENCIES AND CRISES ON BANKS' PROBABILITY OF 
FAILURE 
Panel A: Marginal effects of cost, technical and allocative efficiencies on banks' probability of failure during crisis periods and normal 
times 
  CE  TE  AE 
Normal times  -0.0073**  -0.0062**  -0.0065** 
   (-2.08)  (-2.05)  (-2.26) 
Crises  -0.0098**  -0.0086*  -0.0053* 
   (-2.02)  (-1.95)  (-1.80) 
Panel B: Equality tests between the effects of efficiency variables during normal times and crisis periods 
  CE  TE  AE 
Efficiency effect at normal times = 
efficiency effect at crisis periods 
 0.51  0.49  0.59 
Panel C: Marginal effects of crisis periods as opposed to normal times, given different levels of efficiency 
  CE  TE  AE 
p25  0.4159*  0.4212*  0.2790* 
   (1.90)  (1.88)  (1.84) 
p50  0.3629*  0.3705*  0.2841* 
   (1.90)  (1.89)  (1.88) 
p75  0.3199*  0.3319*  0.2856* 
   (1.82)  (1.83)  (1.88) 
Panel D: Equality tests between the effects of entry variables on banks’ efficiency levels 
Crisis effect at 25th percentile of 
efficiency=crisis effect at 75th 
percentile of efficiency 
 0.97  0.87  0.03 
NOTES: This table shows the marginal effects of efficiencies and crises on banks’ probability of failure. The dependent variable, Fail, is a 
dummy that equals one if a bank failed or received government assistance in a given quarter, and zero otherwise. The efficiencies employed 
include cost efficiency (CE), technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE). Crises is a dummy that equals one for periods of crises 
and the following four quarters. Crisis periods are two banking crises (the 1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the global 
financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4) and three market crises (the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt 
crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst 
coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3). Panel A shows the results of marginal CE, TE and AE 
effects on banks’ probability of failure during normal and crisis periods; and Panel C shows the results of marginal Crises effects on banks’ 
probability of failure given the first (p25), second (p50) and third (p75) quartile of the sample efficiencies. The equality tests of the marginal 
CE, TE and AE effects between normal and crisis periods, and the equality tests of the marginal Crises effects between the last and first 
quartile of sample efficiencies are presented in Panel B and Panel D, respectively. The coefficients presented in Panels A and B show how a 
one unit change in the independent variable increases (decreases) the hazard rates computed using a parametric survival model. For Panel A 











THE EFFECTS OF BANK EFFICIENCY, BANKING AND MARKET CRISES ON BANKS’ 







Efficiencyt-2 0.992*** 0.994*** 0.989*** 
 (-3.363) (-2.964) (-4.606) 
Banking crises 1.495*** 1.474*** 1.121 
 (3.224) (2.823) (0.442) 
Market crises 1.369** 1.452** 1.083 
 (2.052) (2.170) (0.233) 
Banking crises*Efficiency t-2 1.003 1.002 1.005 
 (0.752) (0.646) (1.560) 
Market crises*Efficiency t-2 0.994 0.994 1.001 
 (-1.347) (-1.564) (0.139) 
ROA t-2 0.260*** 0.257*** 0.261*** 
 (-33.430) (-33.600) (-33.092) 
Size t-2 1.063** 1.070*** 1.067*** 
 (2.430) (2.770) (2.615) 
Leverage t-2 1.084*** 1.083*** 1.086*** 
 (9.762) (9.656) (9.994) 
NPL t-2 1.211*** 1.210*** 1.213*** 
 (13.623) (13.511) (13.912) 
M_share t-2 1.003 1.003 1.002 
 (0.138) (0.163) (0.099) 
TMTF t-2 0.711*** 0.707*** 0.713*** 
 (-6.684) (-6.755) (-6.579) 
Growth t-2 0.907*** 0.909*** 0.907*** 
 (-3.800) (-3.716) (-3.789) 
Young 1.335*** 1.351*** 1.344*** 
 (5.890) (6.170) (6.077) 
Constant 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (-17.918) (-18.319) (-15.499) 
Observations 1,160,804 1,160,804 1,160,804 
NOTES: This table shows the results of how bank cost efficiency (CE), technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE) affect banks’ 
probability of failure. The method employed is a parametric survival (PS) model, with a Gompertz proportional hazard function. The 
dependent variable, Fail, is a dummy equals to one if a bank failed or received government assistance in a given quarter, and zero otherwise 
Banking crises is a dummy that equals 1 for periods of banking crisis and the following four quarters; and Market crises is a dummy that 
equals one for periods of market crisis and the following four quarters. The two banking crises are the 1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 
and 1992:Q4; and the global financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4; and the three market crises are the stock market 
crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; 
and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3. ROA is the ratio between 
bank net income and bank total assets, Size is the log of bank total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real terms, Leverage 
is the ratio between bank total assets and bank book value of equity, NPL is the ratio between non-performing loans and total loans, 
M_Share is the ratio between bank total assets and the volume of bank total assets in the State where the bank is chartered, TMTF is the 
average capital ratio of the other banks in the same State, Growth is the quarterly change of personal income growth in the State where the 
bank is chartered, and Young is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is young, and zero otherwise. Young is defined as a bank, which 
is younger that the first quartile of the banks’ age in the sample. All independent variables apart from Crises and Young are lagged by two 
quarters to avoid possible endogeneity. The coefficients presented are hazard rates, which show how much a one unit change in the 
independent variable increases (decreases) the probability of a bank's failure. z values are provided in parentheses; values below one indicate 
a decline in bank probability of failure, and values above one indicate an increase in the dependent variable. All models are estimated with 
robust standard errors clustered by bank. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
 
  






MARGINAL EFFECTS OF BANK EFFICIENCIES, BANKING AND MARKET CRISES ON BANKS' 
PROBABILITY OF FAILURE 
Panel A: Marginal effects of cost, technical and allocative efficiencies on banks' probability of failure at normal times, banking and market 
crises 
  CE  TE  AE 
Normal times  -0.0080**  -0.0065**  -0.0065** 
   (-2.14)  (-2.09)  (-2.30) 
Banking Crises  -0.0083*  -0.0066  -0.0053* 
   (-1.76)  (-1.57)  (-1.70) 
Market crises  -0.0132**  -0.0125*  -0.0062* 
   (-1.96)  (-1.95)  (-1.67) 
Panel B: Marginal effects of Banking crises as opposed to normal times, given different levels of efficiencies 
  CE  TE  AE 
p25  0.5785**  0.5977*  0.2860 
   (1.97)  (1.90)  (1.09) 
p50  0.5623**  0.5879**  0.3290 
   (1.98)  (1.97)  (1.47) 
p75  0.5451*  0.5771**  0.3565* 
  (1.91)  (1.97)  (1.74) 
Panel C: Marginal effects of Market crises as opposed to normal times, given different levels of efficiencies 
  CE  TE  AE 
p25  0.1774  0.2636  0.1018 
  (1.39)  (1.45)  (0.38) 
p50  0.0772  0.1377  0.0949 
  (0.93)  (1.28)  (0.54) 
p75  0.0083  0.0465  0.0884 
   (0.09)  (0.54)  (0.77) 
NOTES: This table shows the results of efficiencies, banking and market crises marginal effects on banks’ probability of failure. The 
efficiencies employed include cost efficiency (CE), technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE). The dependent variable, Fail, is 
a dummy that equals one if a bank failed or received government assistance in a given quarter, and zero otherwise. Banking crises is a 
dummy that equals one for periods of banking crises and the following four quarters; and Market crises is a dummy that equals one for 
periods of market crises and the following four quarters. Banking crises are the 1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the 
global financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4; and three market crises are the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the 
Russian debt crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble 
burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3. Panel A shows the results of marginal CE, TE and 
AE effects on banks’ probability of failure during normal, banking and market crisis periods; Panel B and Panel C show respectively the 
results of marginal Banking crises and Market crises effects on banks’ probability of failure given the first (p25), second (p50) and third (p75) 
quartile of the sample efficiencies. The equality tests of the marginal CE, TE and AE effects between normal, banking and market crisis 
periods, and the equality tests of the marginal Banking crises and Market crises effects between the last and first quartile of sample efficiencies 
are insignificant and excluded to save space. The coefficients presented in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C show how a one unit change in the 
independent variable increases (decreases) the hazard rates computed using a parametric survival model. z values are provided in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
 
  






THE EFFECTS OF BANK EFFICIENCY, GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND OTHER CRISES ON 







Efficiencyt-2 0.990*** 0.994*** 0.985*** 
 (-4.021) (-2.929) (-6.014) 
GFC 2.299*** 2.649*** 0.646 
 (4.560) (4.680) (-1.223) 
Other crises 1.266* 1.368** 0.815 
 (1.956) (2.345) (-0.776) 
GFC*Efficiency t-2 1.009** 1.003 1.021*** 
 (2.027) (0.710) (4.640) 
Other crises*Efficiency t-2 0.998 0.996 1.005 
 (-0.586) (-1.227) (1.515) 
ROA t-2 0.268*** 0.265*** 0.267*** 
 (-32.044) (-32.264) (-31.845) 
Size t-2  1.059** 1.064** 1.069*** 
 (2.364) (2.574) (2.754) 
Leverage t-2 1.085*** 1.085*** 1.087*** 
 (9.827) (9.711) (10.075) 
NPL t-2 1.204*** 1.202*** 1.205*** 
 (13.181) (13.055) (13.477) 
M_share t-2 1.002 1.002 1.003 
 (0.124) (0.133) (0.188) 
TMTF t-2 0.661*** 0.659*** 0.659*** 
 (-7.807) (-7.830) (-7.821) 
Growth t-2 0.949** 0.949** 0.947** 
 (-2.025) (-2.007) (-2.070) 
Young 1.333*** 1.359*** 1.339*** 
 (5.890) (6.346) (6.065) 
Constant 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (-16.293) (-16.723) (-13.574) 
Observations 1,160,804 1,160,804 1,160,804 
NOTES: This table shows the results of how bank cost efficiency (CE), technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE) affect banks’ 
probability of failure. The method employed is a parametric survival (PS) model, with a Gompertz proportional hazard function. The 
dependent variable, Fail, is a dummy that equals one if a bank failed or received government assistance in a given quarter, and zero otherwise. 
GFC is a dummy that equals 1 for periods of the global financial crisis and the following four quarters; and Other crises is a dummy that 
equals one for periods of other crises and the following four quarters. The global financial crisis took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4; 
and other crises include the 1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis 
together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding 
with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3. ROA is the ratio between bank net income and bank total assets, 
Size is the log of bank total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real terms, Leverage is the ratio between bank total assets 
and bank book value of equity, NPL is the ratio between non-performing loans and total loans, M_Share is the ratio between bank total 
assets and the volume of bank total assets in the State where the bank is chartered, TMTF is the average capital ratio of the other banks in 
the same State, Growth is the quarterly change of personal income growth in the State where the bank is chartered, and Young is a dummy 
variable that equals one if a bank is young, and zero otherwise. Young is defined as a bank, which is younger that the first quartile of the 
banks’ age in the sample. All independent variables apart from Crises and Young are lagged by two quarters to avoid possible endogeneity. 
The coefficients presented are hazard rates, which show how much a one unit change in the independent variable increases (decreases) the 
probability of a bank's failure. z values are provided in parentheses; values below one indicate a decline in bank probability of failure, and 
values above one indicate an increase in the dependent variable. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. * 
Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
 
  






MARGINAL EFFECTS OF BANK EFFICIENCIES, GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND OTHER CRISES 
ON BANKS' PROBABILITY OF FAILURE 
Panel A: Marginal effects of cost, technical and allocative efficiencies on banks' probability of failure at normal times, GFC and other crisis 
periods 
  CE  TE  AE 
Normal times  -0.0059**  -0.0043**  -0.0043** 
   (-2.18)  (-2.05)  (-2.28) 
GFC  -0.0005  -0.0013  0.0012 
   (-0.37)  (-0.88)  (1.05) 
Other  crises  -0.0088**  -0.0084**  -0.0036* 
   (-2.08)  (-2.05)  (-1.87) 
Panel B: The equality tests of the marginal CE, TE and AE effects between normal, GFC and other crisis periods 
Efficiency effect at normal times = 
efficiency effect at GFC 
3.77*  2.28  3.73* 
Efficiency effect at other crises = efficiency 
effect at GFC 
3.94**  3.96**  2.91* 
Panel C: Marginal effects of GFC as opposed to normal times, given different levels of efficiencies 
  CE  TE  AE 
p25  1.1437**  1.2747**  0.6452** 
   (2.08)  (2.06)  (2.06) 
p50  1.1932**  1.2321**  0.7647** 
   (2.09)  (2.08)  (2.06) 
p75  1.2291**  1.1955**  0.8331** 
  (2.06)  (2.05)  (2.05) 
Panel D: Marginal effects of other crisis periods as opposed to normal times, given different levels of efficiencies 
  CE  TE  AE 
p25  1.222  0.1361  0.0561 
  (1.58)  (1.58)  (1.52) 
p50  0.0878  0.0832  0.0652* 
  (1.49)  (1.36)  (1.70) 
p75  0.0628  0.0467  0.0690* 
   (1.14)  (0.83)  (1.73) 
NOTES: This table shows the results of efficiencies, global financial crisis and other crises marginal effects on banks’ probability of failure. 
The dependent variable, Fail, is a dummy that equals one if a bank failed or received government assistance in a given quarter, and zero 
otherwise. The efficiencies employed include cost efficiency (CE), technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE). GFC is a dummy 
that equals 1 for periods of the global financial crisis and the following four quarters; and Other crises is a dummy that equals 1 for periods 
of all other crises and the following four quarters. global financial crisis took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4; and other crises include 
the 1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with the Long-
Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 
terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3. Panel A shows the results of marginal CE, TE and AE effects on banks’ probability of 
failure during normal, GFC and other crisis periods; Panel B shows the equality tests of the marginal CE, TE and AE effects between normal 
and GFC and other crisis periods and GFC; Panel C and Panel D show respectively the results of marginal GFC and Other crises effects on 
banks’ probability of failure given the first (p25), second (p50) and third (p75) quartile of the sample efficiencies. The equality tests of the 
marginal GFC and Other crises effects between the last and first quartile of sample efficiencies are insignificant and excluded to save space. 
The coefficients presented in Panel A, Panel B and Panel C show how a one unit change in the independent variable increases (decreases) 
the hazard rates computed using a parametric survival model. z values are provided in parentheses for Panels A, C and D. * Significant at 
10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
 
  






THE EFFECTS OF BANK EFFICIENCY, BANK YOUTH AND CRISES ON BANKS’ PROBABILITY OF 
FAILURE 
Panel A: PS model results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
CE TE AE 
Efficiencyt-2 0.989*** 0.991*** 0.989*** 
 (-3.427) (-3.046) (-3.783) 
Crises 1.619*** 1.628*** 1.366 
 (3.037) (2.723) (0.988) 
Young 0.995 0.998 1.068 
 (-0.029) (-0.011) (0.186) 
Crises*Efficiency t-2 0.994 0.994 1.000 
 (-1.529) (-1.507) (-0.066) 
Young*Crises 0.816 0.813 0.632 
 (-0.886) (-0.823) (-0.963) 
Young*Efficiency t-2 1.006 1.005 1.002 
 (1.112) (1.055) (0.375) 
Young*Crises*Efficiency t-2 1.012* 1.010* 1.008 
 (1.850) (1.765) (1.327) 
ROA t-2 0.260*** 0.258*** 0.257*** 
 (-33.670) (-33.721) (-33.473) 
Size t-2 1.050** 1.059** 1.073*** 
 (1.962) (2.331) (2.905) 
Leverage t-2 1.084*** 1.084*** 1.086*** 
 (9.736) (9.673) (9.946) 
NPL t-2 1.210*** 1.209*** 1.209*** 
 (13.502) (13.420) (13.599) 
M_share t-2 1.002 1.003 1.001 
 (0.109) (0.162) (0.067) 
TMTF t-2 0.702*** 0.700*** 0.700*** 
 (-6.804) (-6.882) (-6.748) 
Growth t-2 0.900*** 0.901*** 0.900*** 
 (-4.094) (-4.062) (-4.102) 
Constant 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (-16.380) (-16.748) (-14.305) 
Observations 1,160,804 1,160,804 1,160,804 
Panel B: Marginal effects of efficiency on banks probability of failure for young and old banks at normal and crisis periods 
 CE TE AE 
 Young banks Old banks Young banks Old banks Young banks Old banks 
Normal times -0.0072 -0.0051** -0.0061 -0.0045** -0.0097 -0.0041** 
 (-1.21) (-2.17) (-1.19) (-2.13) (-1.57) (-2.27) 
Crises -0.0011 -0.0086** -0.0012 -0.0080** -0.0026 -0.0046* 
 (-0.23) (-2.04) (-0.26) (-2.02) (-0.55) (-1.82) 
Panel C: Marginal effects of financial crises on bank probability of failure for young and old banks given different levels of efficiency 
 CE TE AE 
 Young banks Old banks Young banks Old banks Young banks Old banks 
p25 0.6579* 0.1759* 0.7170* 0.1682* 0.5646* 0.1257* 
 (1.82) (1.75) (1.83) (1.69) (1.74) (1.65) 
p50 0.7441* 0.0984 0.7905* 0.0939 0.6405* 0.1093* 
 (1.87) (1.58) (1.88) (1.50) (1.75) (1.68) 
p75 0.8168* 0.0477 0.8485* 0.0469 0.6796* 0.1009* 
 (1.83) (0.98) (1.85) (0.90) (1.74) (1.64) 
NOTES: This table shows the results of how banks probability of failure is affected by bank efficiencies (the efficiencies employed include 
cost efficiency (CE), technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE)), youth and crises. Panel A shows the results of the parametric 
survival (PS) model, with a Gompertz proportional hazard function. The dependent variable, Fail, is a dummy that equals one if a bank 
failed or received government assistance in a given quarter, and zero otherwise. Banking crises is a dummy that equals one for periods of 
banking crisis and the following four quarters; and Market crises is a dummy that equals one for periods of market crisis and the following 
four quarters. The two banking crises are the 1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the global financial crisis that took 
place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4; and the three market crises are the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together 
with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the 
September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3. Young is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is young, and zero 
otherwise. Young is defined as a bank, which is younger that the first quartile of the banks’ age in the sample. ROA is the ratio between bank 
net income and bank total assets, Size is the log of bank total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real terms, Leverage is the 
ratio between bank total assets and bank book value of equity, NPL is the ratio between non-performing loans and total loans, M_Share is 
the ratio between bank total assets and the volume of bank total assets in the State where the bank is chartered, TMTF is the average capital 
ratio of the other banks in the same State, Growth is the quarterly change of personal income growth in the State where the bank is chartered. 
All independent variables apart from Crises and Young are lagged by two quarters to avoid possible endogeneity. The coefficients presented 
are hazard rates, which show how much a one unit change in the independent variable increases (decreases) the probability of a bank's failure. 
z values are provided in parentheses; values below one indicate a decline in bank probability of failure, and values above one indicate an 





increase in the dependent variable. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. Panel B presents marginal 
efficiency effects on banks probability of failure for young and old banks at normal and crisis periods, and Panel C presents Marginal crises 
effects on bank probability of failure for young and old banks given the first (p25), second (p50) and third (p75) quartile of the sample 
























OLS REGRESSION RESULTS 













Enter_norm 4.331*** 4.627*** 0.673*** 4.339*** 4.633*** 0.681*** 
 (13.418) (13.228) (2.883) (13.444) (13.245) (2.917) 
Enter_cr 7.103*** 6.997*** 2.279***    
 (19.074) (17.661) (7.899)    
Enterbcr    5.540*** 5.915*** 0.858* 
    (10.325) (10.564) (1.873) 
Entermcr    7.860*** 7.521*** 2.967*** 
    (17.975) (16.115) (8.935) 
ROAt-2 2.527*** 2.080*** 1.630*** 2.536*** 2.086*** 1.639*** 
 (19.960) (15.686) (15.418) (20.036) (15.732) (15.516) 
Size t-2 -6.607*** -6.502*** -2.921*** -6.605*** -6.500*** -2.919*** 
 (-85.850) (-79.261) (-56.993) (-85.797) (-79.217) (-56.948) 
Leverage t-2 -0.585*** -0.724*** 0.038** -0.586*** -0.725*** 0.036** 
 (-24.363) (-28.802) (2.550) (-24.421) (-28.833) (2.463) 
NPL t-2 -0.137*** -0.054 -0.154*** -0.136*** -0.053 -0.153*** 
 (-2.734) (-1.002) (-4.078) (-2.714) (-0.988) (-4.054) 
M_share t-2 0.687*** 0.741*** 0.157*** 0.688*** 0.742*** 0.158*** 
 (9.027) (10.590) (3.950) (9.042) (10.601) (3.974) 
TMTF t-2 0.680*** 0.855*** -0.027 0.669*** 0.848*** -0.037 
 (5.206) (6.245) (-0.345) (5.148) (6.214) (-0.462) 
Growth t-2 -0.367*** -0.294*** -0.202*** -0.368*** -0.295*** -0.202*** 
 (-12.218) (-9.170) (-9.347) (-12.237) (-9.181) (-9.370) 
Young -6.782*** -5.928*** -3.161*** -6.783*** -5.929*** -3.161*** 
 (-33.020) (-26.632) (-22.960) (-33.027) (-26.636) (-22.968) 
Time dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 134.589*** 138.628*** 124.708*** 134.629*** 138.656*** 124.744*** 
 (115.106) (111.792) (172.669) (115.354) (112.000) (172.695) 
Observations 1,159,652 1,159,652 1,159,652 1,159,652 1,159,652 1,159,652 
R-squared 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.23 0.24 
Panel B: Equality tests between the effects of entry variables on banks’ efficiency levels 
 CE TE AE CE TE AE 
Enter_norm=Enter_cr 49.36*** 32.02 *** 27.29***    
Enter_norm=Enterbcr    4.72** 4.96** 0.14 
Enter_norm=Entermcr    59.70*** 35.33*** 43.15*** 
Enterbcr=Entermcr    13.91*** 6.14** 16.13*** 
NOTES: This table shows the results of how entry during normal times (Enter_norm), crisis periods (Enter_cr), banking crises (Enterbcr) 
and market crises (Entermcr) affect banks’ cost efficiency (CE), technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE). The method 
employed is an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The dependent variables are CE, TE and AE that present respectively banks’ cost, 
technical and allocative efficiencies. Enter_norm is a dummy that equals one if a bank entered the market during normal times, Enter_cr is 
a dummy that equals one if a bank entered the market during crisis periods, Enterbcr is a dummy that equals one if a bank entered the market 
during a banking crisis, and Entermcr is a dummy that equals one if a bank entered the market during a market crisis. Crisis periods are two 
banking crises (the 1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the global financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 and 
2009:Q4), and three market crises (the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with the Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks 
between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3). Entry is defined as the beginning of a bank’s operations in the sample period. ROA is the ratio between 
bank net income and bank total assets, Size is the log of bank total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real terms, Leverage 
is the ratio between bank total assets and bank book value of equity, NPL is the ratio between non-performing loans and total loans, 
M_Share is the ratio between bank total assets and the volume of bank total assets in the State where the bank is chartered, TMTF is the 
average capital ratio of the other banks in the same State, Growth is the quarterly change of personal income growth in the State where the 
bank is chartered, and Young is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is young, and zero otherwise. Young is defined as a bank, which 
is younger that the first quartile of the banks’ age in the sample. All independent variables apart from Crises and Young are lagged by two 
quarters to avoid possible endogeneity. The coefficients presented show how much a one unit change in the independent variable increases 
(decreases) the efficiencies. Panel B presents equality tests between the effects of entry variables on banks’ efficiency levels. z values are 
provided in parentheses. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. 
*** Significant at 1%. 





3.8.1. Additional Figures and Tables 
TABLE A 3-1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES USED FOR BANK EFFICIENCY ESTIMATION 
 N mean p50 St. dev. p1 p99 
INPUTS       
Total deposits 1,214,969 430,955.700 60,620.000 8,708,278.000 5,647.000 3,955,689.000 
Premises and fixed assets 1,214,969 6,917.480 1,079.000 97,828.200 21.000 64,645.000 
Number of employees 1,214,969 148.534 30.000 2,145.925 4.000 1,462.000 
OUTPUTS       
Total securities 1,214,969 119,270.800 16,519.000 2,292,085.000 250.000 1,167,583.000 
Loans and leases 1,214,969 365,091.400 40,265.000 6,611,377.000 2544.000 3,619,609.000 
INPUT PRICES       
Price of deposits 1,214,969 0.024 0.020 0.112 0.001 0.071 
Price of premises and fixed assets 1,214,969 0.369 0.161 43.097 0.024 1.961 
Price of labour 1,214,969 24.770 20.587 27.065 4.625 82.929 
NOTES: This table presents summary statistics of inputs, outputs, and input prices used for cost, technical and allocative efficiency 
estimation. The inputs are Total deposits, which include demand deposits, money market deposits, other savings deposits, time deposits and 
deposits in foreign offices, Premises and fixed assets, which include bank premises, furniture and fixtures, equipment and other assets 
representing bank premises (including capitalized leases) owned by the institution and Number of employees, which represent the number 
of full-time employees on the payroll of the bank and its subsidiaries at the end of the quarter. The outputs include Total securities that show 
total investment securities, excluding securities held in trading accounts and Total loans and leases that show bank total loans and lease 
financing receivables, including unearned income. Input prices are Price of deposits, measured by the expenses for total deposits divided to 
Total deposits, Price of premises and fixed assets measured by the expenses of premises and fixed assets divided to Premises and fixed assets, 









FIGURE A 3-1 
TIME SERIES TRENDS OF BANKS’ COST, TECHNICAL AND ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCIES IN THE 
SAMPLE BETWEEN 1984 AND 2013 
 
 
NOTES: This figure shows the time series trends of banks’ average cost, technical and allocative efficiency measures in the sample between 1984 
and 2013. The efficiency measures have been obtained using DEA and can acquire the values between 0 and 100, with banks that have an 
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TABLE A 3-2 
EFFICIENCY MEASURES ACROSS NORMAL TIMES, BANKING AND MARKET CRISES 
Symbol Description N mean p50 St. dev. p1 p99 
Panel A: Cost Efficiency 
Full sample       
Normal Times 626979 39.969 39.700 19.703 5.200 90.000 
Market Crises 248319 40.699 41.200 20.136 4.200 90.100 
Banking Crises 285506 44.345 44.400 18.714 5.000 91.600 
Panel B: Technical Efficiency 
Full sample       
Normal Times 626979 49.120 50.200 20.718 8.700 100.000 
Market Crises 248319 48.224 49.100 20.336 6.500 100.000 
Banking Crises 285506 51.460 52.400 19.513 8.400 100.000 
Panel C: Allocative Efficiency 
Full sample       
Normal Times 626979 79.972 84.700 16.087 29.200 99.500 
Market Crises 248319 81.891 86.700 15.289 33.400 99.600 
Banking Crises 285506 85.287 88.900 12.753 37.600 99.600 
NOTES: This table presents summary statistics of the efficiency variables across different time periods used in this chapter. Panel A presents 
summary statistics of the cost efficiency variable during Normal Times, Market Crises and Banking Crises. Panel B and Panel C present 
respectively the summary statistics of the two cost efficiency components, technical and allocative efficiency, across different time periods. 
Efficiency values are reported as percentages, and can acquire a value between 0 and 100. The time periods include Normal Times, Market 
Crises and Banking Crises. Normal Times are when no crisis takes place; Market Crises include the stock market crash in 1987:Q4, the 
Russian debt crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4 and the dot.com bubble 
burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3; and the Banking Crises include the 1990s credit 
crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4 and the global financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4. Crisis periods include 
also four quarters of post-crisis periods. 





TABLE A 3-3 
CORRELATION MATRIX 




crises CE TE AE ROA Size Leverage NPL M_Share TMTF Growth Young 
Enter_nor
m Enter_cr 
Crises 1.000                
Banking 
crises 0.619 1.000               
Market 
crises 0.565 -0.298 1.000              
CE 0.068 0.091 -0.013 1.000             
TE 0.020 0.055 -0.033 0.916 1.000            
AE 0.122 0.134 0.007 0.573 0.244 1.000           
ROA -0.055 -0.073 0.010 0.028 0.019 0.017 1.000          
Size 0.002 -0.006 0.009 -0.409 -0.365 -0.267 0.096 1.000         
Leverage 0.007 0.029 -0.022 -0.150 -0.189 0.017 -0.251 0.127 1.000        
NPL -0.044 -0.009 -0.044 0.059 0.043 0.060 -0.287 -0.144 -0.108 1.000       
M_Share 0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.074 -0.060 -0.067 0.028 0.377 -0.035 0.007 1.000      
TMTF 0.036 0.038 0.005 -0.151 -0.042 -0.243 0.120 0.275 0.275 -0.284 0.060 1.000     
Growth -0.100 -0.113 -0.004 0.001 -0.019 0.026 0.037 -0.042 -0.042 -0.016 0.002 -0.152 1.000    
Young 0.004 0.008 -0.003 -0.094 -0.074 -0.065 -0.185 -0.022 -0.082 0.010 -0.021 -0.023 0.024 1.000   
Enter_norm 0.034 0.025 0.015 -0.049 -0.021 -0.069 -0.125 0.012 0.025 -0.045 -0.008 0.116 -0.012 0.504 1.000  
Enter_cr 0.009 0.015 -0.005 -0.026 0.002 -0.058 -0.092 0.055 0.053 -0.067 0.000 0.186 -0.026 0.414 -0.071 1.000 
NOTES: This table shows the correlation matrix for all explanatory variables used in this chapter. The correlation values in bold represent the variables that have not been used jointly in an analysis. Crises is a dummy 
that equals one for periods of financial distress and the following four quarters. Crisis periods are two Banking crises (the 1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the global financial crisis that took 
place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4) and three Market crises (the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 
1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3). CE, TE and AE are cost, technical and allocative efficiency measures, respectively,  estimated 
using DEA. ROA is the ratio between bank net income and bank total assets, Size is the log of bank total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real terms, Leverage is the ratio between bank total assets 
and bank book value of equity, NPL is the ratio between non-performing loans and total loans, M_Share is the ratio between bank total assets and the volume of bank total assets in the State where the bank is 
chartered, TMTF is the average capital ratio of the other banks in the same State, Growth is the quarterly change of personal income growth in the State where the bank is chartered, and Young is a dummy variable 
that equals one if a bank is young, and zero otherwise. Young is defined as a bank, which is younger that the first quartile of the banks’ age in the sample. Enter_norm and Enter_cr are dummy variables that equal 
one if a bank entered during normal or crisis periods, respectively, and zero otherwise.  





TABLE A 3-4 
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF CRISES 













Efficiencyt-2 0.992*** 0.993*** 0.992*** 0.989*** 0.992*** 0.990*** 
 (-5.073) (-4.769) (-4.539) (-4.664) (-4.349) (-4.819) 
Crises 1.194*** 1.177*** 1.201*** 1.000 1.001 0.714 
 (3.630) (3.334) (3.744) (0.001) (0.007) (-1.381) 
Efficiencyt-2 *Crises    1.005* 1.004 1.007** 
    (1.741) (1.416) (2.166) 
ROA t-2 0.257*** 0.255*** 0.257*** 0.257*** 0.255*** 0.256*** 
 (-33.679) (-33.857) (-33.324) (-33.740) (-33.873) (-33.438) 
Size t-2 1.067*** 1.073*** 1.077*** 1.068*** 1.074*** 1.079*** 
 (2.643) (2.910) (3.077) (2.690) (2.961) (3.130) 
Capital t-2 1.084*** 1.084*** 1.086*** 1.084*** 1.084*** 1.086*** 
 (9.771) (9.667) (9.966) (9.781) (9.677) (9.960) 
NPL t-2 1.202*** 1.201*** 1.203*** 1.202*** 1.202*** 1.203*** 
 (13.062) (12.982) (13.247) (13.108) (13.023) (13.275) 
M_share t-2 1.005 1.005 1.003 1.005 1.005 1.004 
 (0.254) (0.280) (0.185) (0.284) (0.308) (0.216) 
TMTF t-2 0.686*** 0.684*** 0.683*** 0.688*** 0.685*** 0.687*** 
 (-7.103) (-7.142) (-7.113) (-7.060) (-7.141) (-7.006) 
Growth t-2 0.895*** 0.897*** 0.897*** 0.894*** 0.896*** 0.893*** 
 (-4.270) (-4.203) (-4.196) (-4.318) (-4.209) (-4.311) 
Young 1.347*** 1.359*** 1.355*** 1.340*** 1.354*** 1.355*** 
 (6.079) (6.321) (6.258) (5.985) (6.247) (6.255) 
Constant 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (-17.326) (-17.613) (-15.979) (-17.044) (-17.311) (-15.298) 
Observations 1,160,804 1,160,804 1,160,804 1,160,804 1,160,804 1,160,804 
Panel B. Marginal efficiency effects on banks probability of failure at normal and crisis periods 
 CE TE AE 
Normal times -0.0076** -0.0064** -0.0054** 
 (-2.20) (-2.20) (-2.24) 
Crises -0.0046* -0.0041* -0.0024 
 (-1.76) (-1.67) (-1.36) 
Panel C. Marginal crises effects on bank probability of failure given different levels of efficiency 
 CE TE AE 
p25 0.1160 0.1163 0.0962 
 (1.47) (1.45) (1.57) 
p50 0.1607* 0.1518* 0.1304* 
 (1.73) (1.68) (1.74) 
p75 0.1921* 0.1758* 0.1475* 
 (1.73) (1.68) (1.76) 
NOTES: This table shows the results of how bank cost efficiency (CE), technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE) affect banks’ 
probability of failure. The method employed is a parametric survival (PS) model, with a Gompertz proportional hazard function. The 
dependent variable, Fail, is a dummy that equals one if a bank failed or received government assistance in a given quarter, and zero otherwise. 
Crises is a dummy that equals one for periods of financial distress and the following two quarters. Crisis periods are two banking crises (the 
1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the global financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4) and three 
market crises (the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout 
during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 
2002:Q3). ROA is the ratio between bank net income and bank total assets, Size is the log of bank total assets measured in thousands of US 
dollars and in real terms, Leverage is the ratio between bank total assets and bank book value of equity, NPL is the ratio between non-
performing loans and total loans, M_Share is the ratio between bank total assets and the volume of bank total assets in the State where the 
bank is chartered, TMTF is the average capital ratio of the other banks in the same State, Growth is the quarterly change of personal income 
growth in the State where the bank is chartered, and Young is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is young, and zero otherwise. 
Young is defined as a bank, which is younger that the first quartile of the banks’ age in the sample. All independent variables apart from 
Crises and Young are lagged by two quarters to avoid possible endogeneity. The coefficients presented are hazard rates, which show how 
much a one unit change in the independent variable increases (decreases) the probability of a bank's failure. z values are provided in 
parentheses; values below one indicate a decline in bank probability of failure, and values above one indicate an increase in the dependent 
variable. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. Panel B presents marginal efficiency effects on banks 
probability of failure during normal and crisis periods, and Panel C presents Marginal crises effects on bank probability of failure given the 
first (p25), second (p50) and third (p75) quartile of the sample efficiencies. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 





TABLE A 3-5 
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF CRISES (1) 













Efficiencyt-2 0.993*** 0.994*** 0.993*** 0.997 1.000 0.995* 
 (-4.841) (-4.381) (-4.385) (-0.999) (-0.144) (-1.732) 
Crises 1.556*** 1.541*** 1.569*** 1.900*** 2.124*** 1.935** 
 (7.504) (7.316) (7.666) (4.806) (5.031) (2.436) 
Efficiencyt-2 *Crises    0.994* 0.993** 0.997 
    (-1.672) (-2.356) (-0.789) 
ROA t-2 0.257*** 0.255*** 0.258*** 0.258*** 0.255*** 0.258*** 
 (-33.674) (-33.846) (-33.331) (-33.646) (-33.861) (-33.188) 
Size t-2 1.068*** 1.075*** 1.078*** 1.065*** 1.070*** 1.078*** 
 (2.701) (2.975) (3.124) (2.592) (2.805) (3.095) 
Capital t-2 1.084*** 1.084*** 1.087*** 1.085*** 1.084*** 1.087*** 
 (9.917) (9.816) (10.104) (9.933) (9.841) (10.095) 
NPL t-2 1.209*** 1.208*** 1.210*** 1.209*** 1.208*** 1.210*** 
 (13.498) (13.422) (13.687) (13.469) (13.416) (13.658) 
M_share t-2 1.003 1.004 1.002 1.003 1.004 1.002 
 (0.190) (0.211) (0.119) (0.193) (0.214) (0.114) 
TMTF t-2 0.735*** 0.732*** 0.733*** 0.736*** 0.736*** 0.732*** 
 (-5.972) (-6.027) (-5.986) (-5.949) (-5.958) (-5.994) 
Growth t-2 0.878*** 0.880*** 0.878*** 0.878*** 0.880*** 0.879*** 
 (-5.145) (-5.051) (-5.112) (-5.123) (-5.061) (-5.091) 
Young 1.336*** 1.349*** 1.342*** 1.342*** 1.357*** 1.343*** 
 (5.937) (6.187) (6.074) (6.032) (6.309) (6.079) 
Constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
 (-18.491) (-18.754) (-17.142) (-18.379) (-18.701) (-16.171) 
Observations 1,160,804 1,160,804 1,160,804 1,160,804 1,160,804 1,160,804 
Panel B. Marginal efficiency effects on banks probability of failure at normal and crisis periods 
 CE TE AE 
Normal times -0.0044 -0.0007 -0.0064* 
 (-1.06) (-0.15) (-1.85) 
Crises -0.0171** -0.0173* -0.0131* 
 (-1.97) (-1.94) (-1.80) 
Panel C. Marginal crises effects on bank probability of failure given different levels of efficiency 
 CE TE AE 
p25 0.8857* 1.0216* 0.6859* 
 (1.81) (1.80) (1.71) 
p50 0.6753* 0.7441* 0.5944* 
 (1.81) (1.78) (1.74) 
p75 0.5070* 0.5328* 0.5459* 
 (1.71) (1.68) (1.74) 
NOTES: This table shows the results of how bank cost efficiency (CE), technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE) affect banks’ 
probability of failure. The method employed is a parametric survival (PS) model, with a Gompertz proportional hazard function. The 
dependent variable, Fail, is a dummy that equals one if a bank failed or received government assistance in a given quarter, and zero otherwise. 
Crises is a dummy that equals one for periods of financial distress and the following eight quarters. Crisis periods are two banking crises 
(the 1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the global financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4) and 
three market crises (the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) 
bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 
and 2002:Q3). ROA is the ratio between bank net income and bank total assets, Size is the log of bank total assets measured in thousands 
of US dollars and in real terms, Leverage is the ratio between bank total assets and bank book value of equity, NPL is the ratio between 
non-performing loans and total loans, M_Share is the ratio between bank total assets and the volume of bank total assets in the State where 
the bank is chartered, TMTF is the average capital ratio of the other banks in the same State, Growth is the quarterly change of personal 
income growth in the State where the bank is chartered, and Young is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is young, and zero 
otherwise. Young is defined as a bank, which is younger that the first quartile of the banks’ age in the sample. All independent variables apart 
from Crises and Young are lagged by two quarters to avoid possible endogeneity. The coefficients presented are hazard rates, which show 
how much a one unit change in the independent variable increases (decreases) the probability of a bank's failure. z values are provided in 
parentheses; values below one indicate a decline in bank probability of failure, and values above one indicate an increase in the dependent 
variable. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. Panel B presents marginal efficiency effects on banks 
probability of failure during normal and crisis periods, and Panel C presents Marginal crises effects on bank probability of failure given the 
first (p25), second (p50) and third (p75) quartile of the sample efficiencies. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 





TABLE A 3-6 
ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF BANK EFFICIENCY 


























Efficiencyt-2 0.990*** 0.992*** 0.990*** 0.987*** 0.991*** 0.985*** 
 (-6.020) (-5.239) (-5.303) (-4.880) (-3.709) (-5.963) 
Crises 1.506*** 1.474*** 1.504*** 1.307** 1.418** 0.754 
 (8.187) (7.752) (8.168) (2.164) (2.482) (-1.053) 
Efficiencyt-2 *Crises    1.004 1.001 1.009*** 
    (1.252) (0.297) (2.623) 
ROA t-2 0.251*** 0.248*** 0.251*** 0.251*** 0.248*** 0.250*** 
 (-31.544) (-31.597) (-31.235) (-31.545) (-31.586) (-31.256) 
Size t-2 1.073*** 1.083*** 1.089*** 1.074*** 1.083*** 1.090*** 
 (2.788) (3.161) (3.420) (2.845) (3.178) (3.481) 
Capital t-2 1.081*** 1.081*** 1.084*** 1.081*** 1.081*** 1.083*** 
 (9.028) (8.927) (9.222) (9.033) (8.929) (9.216) 
NPL t-2 1.202*** 1.200*** 1.202*** 1.202*** 1.200*** 1.202*** 
 (12.401) (12.273) (12.535) (12.417) (12.268) (12.561) 
M_share t-2 1.002 1.003 1.001 1.002 1.003 1.001 
 (0.102) (0.145) (0.050) (0.122) (0.150) (0.081) 
TMTF t-2 0.706*** 0.704*** 0.704*** 0.708*** 0.704*** 0.710*** 
 (-6.473) (-6.512) (-6.465) (-6.407) (-6.500) (-6.309) 
Growth t-2 0.899*** 0.901*** 0.901*** 0.898*** 0.901*** 0.898*** 
 (-4.078) (-3.967) (-3.967) (-4.105) (-3.965) (-4.116) 
Young 1.376*** 1.392*** 1.388*** 1.371*** 1.391*** 1.387*** 
 (6.336) (6.616) (6.574) (6.274) (6.609) (6.567) 
Constant 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (-17.235) (-17.546) (-15.645) (-17.069) (-17.443) (-14.803) 
Observations 1,097,002 1,097,002 1,097,002 1,097,002 1,097,002 1,097,002 
Panel B. Marginal efficiency effects on banks probability of failure at normal and crisis periods 
 CE TE AE 
Normal times -0.0109** -0.0085** -0.0075** 
 (-2.13) (-2.10) (-2.17) 
Crises -0.0099** -0.0100* -0.0041* 
 (-1.99) (-1.94) (-1.64) 
Panel C. Marginal crises effects on bank probability of failure given different levels of efficiency 
 CE TE AE 
p25 0.4131* 0.4648* 0.2442* 
 (1.86) (1.85) (1.80) 
p50 0.4100* 0.4240* 0.2759* 
 (1.89) (1.86) (1.84) 
p75 0.4000* 0.3916* 0.2898* 
 (1.84) (1.80) (1.83) 
NOTES: This table shows the results of how bank cost efficiency (CE), technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE) affect banks’ 
probability of failure. CE, TE and AE are averaged over 3 quarters. The method employed is a parametric survival (PS) model, with a 
Gompertz proportional hazard function. The dependent variable, Fail, is a dummy that equals one if a bank failed or received government 
assistance in a given quarter, and zero otherwise. Crises is a dummy that equals one for periods of financial distress and the following four 
quarters. Crisis periods are two banking crises (the 1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the global financial crisis that 
took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4) and three market crises (the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with 
the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the 
September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3). ROA is the ratio between bank net income and bank total assets, Size is the 
log of bank total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real terms, Leverage is the ratio between bank total assets and bank 
book value of equity, NPL is the ratio between non-performing loans and total loans, M_Share is the ratio between bank total assets and 
the volume of bank total assets in the State where the bank is chartered, TMTF is the average capital ratio of the other banks in the same 
State, Growth is the quarterly change of personal income growth in the State where the bank is chartered, and Young is a dummy variable 
that equals one if a bank is young, and zero otherwise. Young is defined as a bank, which is younger that the first quartile of the banks’ age 
in the sample. All independent variables apart from Crises and Young are lagged by two quarters to avoid possible endogeneity. The 
coefficients presented are hazard rates, which show how much a one unit change in the independent variable increases (decreases) the 
probability of a bank's failure. z values are provided in parentheses; values below one indicate a decline in bank probability of failure, and 
values above one indicate an increase in the dependent variable. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. 





Panel B presents marginal efficiency effects on banks probability of failure during normal and crisis periods, and Panel C presents Marginal 
crises effects on bank probability of failure given the first (p25), second (p50) and third (p75) quartile of the sample efficiencies. * Significant 























TABLE A 3-7 
EXCLUDING LARGEST BANKS 













Efficiencyt-2 0.992*** 0.993*** 0.992*** 0.992*** 0.994*** 0.990*** 
 (-5.446) (-4.917) (-4.927) (-3.046) (-2.809) (-4.073) 
Crises 1.435*** 1.416*** 1.447*** 1.504*** 1.497*** 1.143 
 (7.454) (7.184) (7.604) (3.628) (3.232) (0.560) 
Efficiencyt-2 *Crises    0.999 0.999 1.003 
    (-0.468) (-0.488) (1.005) 
ROA t-2 0.256*** 0.254*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.254*** 0.256*** 
 (-33.852) (-34.041) (-33.517) (-33.846) (-34.037) (-33.530) 
Size t-2 1.086*** 1.093*** 1.097*** 1.085*** 1.093*** 1.097*** 
 (3.432) (3.739) (3.904) (3.426) (3.726) (3.906) 
Capital t-2 1.083*** 1.082*** 1.085*** 1.083*** 1.082*** 1.085*** 
 (9.663) (9.557) (9.867) (9.659) (9.554) (9.869) 
NPL t-2 1.206*** 1.205*** 1.208*** 1.206*** 1.205*** 1.208*** 
 (13.396) (13.308) (13.602) (13.373) (13.284) (13.626) 
M_share t-2 0.968* 0.969* 0.967* 0.967* 0.969* 0.968* 
 (-1.744) (-1.687) (-1.781) (-1.750) (-1.692) (-1.763) 
TMTF t-2 0.689*** 0.686*** 0.686*** 0.688*** 0.686*** 0.688*** 
 (-7.164) (-7.221) (-7.169) (-7.166) (-7.222) (-7.111) 
Growth t-2 0.900*** 0.902*** 0.901*** 0.900*** 0.902*** 0.900*** 
 (-4.097) (-4.018) (-4.021) (-4.080) (-4.016) (-4.065) 
Young 1.334*** 1.349*** 1.341*** 1.335*** 1.351*** 1.342*** 
 (5.879) (6.161) (6.026) (5.906) (6.189) (6.035) 
Constant 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (-17.863) (-18.161) (-16.491) (-17.794) (-18.061) (-15.727) 
Observations 1,158,653 1,158,653 1,158,653 1,158,653 1,158,653 1,158,653 
Panel B. Marginal efficiency effects on banks probability of failure at normal and crisis periods 
 CE TE AE 
Normal times -0.0075* -0.0064** -0.0068** 
 (-2.04) (-2.00) (-2.22) 
Crises -0.0113* -0.0098* -0.0061* 
 (-2.01) (-1.94) (-1.81) 
Panel C. Marginal crises effects on bank probability of failure given different levels of efficiency 
 CE TE AE 
p25 0.4512* 0.4555* 0.3006* 
 (1.88) (1.86) (1.81) 
p50 0.3764* 0.3864* 0.2999* 
 (1.87) (1.87) (1.85) 
p75 0.3172* 0.3348* 0.2983* 
 (1.78) (1.79) (1.85) 
NOTES: This table shows the results of how bank cost efficiency (CE), technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE) affect banks’ 
probability of failure, after excluding the 19 largest banks per quarter. The method employed is a parametric survival (PS) model, with a 
Gompertz proportional hazard function. The dependent variable, Fail, is a dummy that equals one if a bank failed or received government 
assistance in a given quarter, and zero otherwise. Crises is a dummy that equals one for periods of financial distress and the following four 
quarters. Crisis periods are two banking crises (the 1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the global financial crisis that 
took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4) and three market crises (the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with 
the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the 
September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3). ROA is the ratio between bank net income and bank total assets, Size is the 
log of bank total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real terms, Leverage is the ratio between bank total assets and bank 
book value of equity, NPL is the ratio between non-performing loans and total loans, M_Share is the ratio between bank total assets and 
the volume of bank total assets in the State where the bank is chartered, TMTF is the average capital ratio of the other banks in the same 
State, Growth is the quarterly change of personal income growth in the State where the bank is chartered, and Young is a dummy variable 
that equals one if a bank is young, and zero otherwise. Young is defined as a bank, which is younger that the first quartile of the banks’ age 
in the sample. All independent variables apart from Crises and Young are lagged by two quarters to avoid possible endogeneity. The 
coefficients presented are hazard rates, which show how much a one unit change in the independent variable increases (decreases) the 
probability of a bank's failure. z values are provided in parentheses; values below one indicate a decline in bank probability of failure, and 
values above one indicate an increase in the dependent variable. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. 
Panel B presents marginal efficiency effects on banks probability of failure during normal and crisis periods, and Panel C presents Marginal 
crises effects on bank probability of failure given the first (p25), second (p50) and third (p75) quartile of the sample efficiencies. * Significant 
at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 





TABLE A 3-8 
EXPONENTIAL DISTRIBUTION 













Efficiencyt-2 0.991*** 0.993*** 0.991*** 0.990*** 0.993*** 0.987*** 
 (-5.701) (-4.975) (-5.767) (-3.941) (-3.224) (-5.633) 
Crises 1.540*** 1.523*** 1.555*** 1.447*** 1.499*** 0.920 
 (9.098) (8.855) (9.309) (3.241) (3.194) (-0.357) 
Efficiencyt-2 *Crises    1.002 1.000 1.007** 
    (0.599) (0.139) (2.283) 
ROA t-2 0.245*** 0.242*** 0.246*** 0.245*** 0.242*** 0.246*** 
 (-34.870) (-35.073) (-34.287) (-34.875) (-35.067) (-34.362) 
Size t-2 1.101*** 1.111*** 1.110*** 1.102*** 1.112*** 1.108*** 
 (3.997) (4.383) (4.304) (4.011) (4.388) (4.281) 
Capital t-2 1.087*** 1.087*** 1.090*** 1.087*** 1.087*** 1.089*** 
 (9.965) (9.858) (10.225) (9.964) (9.858) (10.211) 
NPL t-2 1.194*** 1.192*** 1.196*** 1.194*** 1.192*** 1.197*** 
 (12.575) (12.456) (12.842) (12.574) (12.441) (12.916) 
M_share t-2 0.996 0.997 0.995 0.997 0.997 0.996 
 (-0.182) (-0.168) (-0.237) (-0.173) (-0.166) (-0.189) 
TMTF t-2 0.925*** 0.928*** 0.917*** 0.924*** 0.928*** 0.915*** 
 (-5.342) (-5.139) (-5.857) (-5.375) (-5.145) (-5.995) 
Growth t-2 0.901*** 0.903*** 0.903*** 0.901*** 0.903*** 0.900*** 
 (-4.166) (-4.073) (-4.107) (-4.178) (-4.073) (-4.214) 
Young 1.345*** 1.363*** 1.353*** 1.343*** 1.363*** 1.353*** 
 (6.119) (6.450) (6.296) (6.089) (6.448) (6.304) 
Constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (-29.113) (-29.895) (-25.261) (-28.119) (-29.160) (-22.327) 
Observations 1,160,804 1,160,804 1,160,804 1,160,804 1,160,804 1,160,804 
Panel B. Marginal efficiency effects on banks probability of failure at normal and crisis periods 
 CE TE AE 
Normal times -0.0685*** -0.0575*** -0.0475*** 
 (-3.40) (-3.07) (-3.65) 
Crises -0.0874*** -0.0850** -0.0362** 
 (-2.90) (-2.79) (-2.26) 
Panel C. Marginal crises effects on bank probability of failure given different levels of efficiency 
 CE TE AE 
p25 3.8646*** 4.5192*** 1.9848*** 
 (2.88) (2.92) (2.60) 
p50 3.6001*** 4.1157*** 2.1040*** 
 (3.03) (3.02) (2.74) 
p75 3.3604*** 3.8000*** 2.1519*** 
 (2.93) (2.91) (2.76) 
NOTES: This table shows the results of how bank cost efficiency (CE), technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE) affect banks’ 
probability of failure. The method employed is a parametric survival (PS) model, with an Exponential proportional hazard function.. The 
dependent variable, Fail, is a dummy that equals one if a bank failed or received government assistance in a given quarter, and zero otherwise. 
Crises is a dummy that equals one for periods of financial distress and the following four quarters. Crisis periods are two banking crises (the 
1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the global financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4) and three 
market crises (the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout 
during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 
2002:Q3). ROA is the ratio between bank net income and bank total assets, Size is the log of bank total assets measured in thousands of US 
dollars and in real terms, Leverage is the ratio between bank total assets and bank book value of equity, NPL is the ratio between non-
performing loans and total loans, M_Share is the ratio between bank total assets and the volume of bank total assets in the State where the 
bank is chartered, TMTF is the average capital ratio of the other banks in the same State, Growth is the quarterly change of personal income 
growth in the State where the bank is chartered, and Young is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is young, and zero otherwise. 
Young is defined as a bank, which is younger that the first quartile of the banks’ age in the sample. All independent variables apart from 
Crises and Young are lagged by two quarters to avoid possible endogeneity. The coefficients presented are hazard rates, which show how 
much a one unit change in the independent variable increases (decreases) the probability of a bank's failure. z values are provided in 
parentheses; values below one indicate a decline in bank probability of failure, and values above one indicate an increase in the dependent 
variable. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. Panel B presents marginal efficiency effects on banks 
probability of failure during normal and crisis periods, and Panel C presents Marginal crises effects on bank probability of failure given the 
first (p25), second (p50) and third (p75) quartile of the sample efficiencies. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 





TABLE A 3-9 
ACQUISITION AS EXIT 













Efficiencyt-2 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.995*** 0.995*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 
 (-7.491) (-7.530) (-7.525) (-6.091) (-6.160) (-5.878) 
Crises 0.941*** 0.933*** 0.949*** 0.923* 0.914* 0.987 
 (-3.101) (-3.591) (-2.672) (-1.843) (-1.858) (-0.132) 
Efficiencyt-2 *Crises    1.001 1.000 1.000 
    (0.512) (0.458) (-0.418) 
ROA t-2 0.801*** 0.798*** 0.804*** 0.801*** 0.798*** 0.804*** 
 (-11.783) (-11.966) (-11.597) (-11.784) (-11.965) (-11.582) 
Size t-2 1.155*** 1.158*** 1.169*** 1.155*** 1.158*** 1.169*** 
 (15.308) (15.795) (17.337) (15.312) (15.796) (17.309) 
Capital t-2 1.045*** 1.045*** 1.048*** 1.045*** 1.045*** 1.048*** 
 (13.878) (13.712) (14.674) (13.882) (13.717) (14.675) 
NPL t-2 0.912*** 0.912*** 0.911*** 0.912*** 0.912*** 0.911*** 
 (-10.334) (-10.239) (-10.502) (-10.318) (-10.222) (-10.504) 
M_share t-2 1.003 1.003 1.002 1.003 1.003 1.002 
 (0.988) (0.960) (0.435) (0.992) (0.963) (0.433) 
TMTF t-2 0.946*** 0.944*** 0.946*** 0.946*** 0.944*** 0.946*** 
 (-4.278) (-4.418) (-4.326) (-4.253) (-4.408) (-4.341) 
Growth t-2 1.045*** 1.045*** 1.047*** 1.045*** 1.045*** 1.047*** 
 (5.587) (5.551) (5.777) (5.581) (5.552) (5.781) 
Young 1.408*** 1.414*** 1.412*** 1.408*** 1.414*** 1.412*** 
 (16.570) (16.802) (16.798) (16.566) (16.793) (16.784) 
Constant 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (-49.073) (-49.531) (-46.890) (-48.798) (-49.275) (-46.004) 
Observations 1,171,659 1,171,659 1,171,659 1,171,659 1,171,659 1,171,659 
Panel B. Marginal efficiency effects on banks probability of being acquired at normal and crisis periods 
 CE TE AE 
Normal times -0.0221*** -0.0197*** -0.0215*** 
 (-5.46) (-5.52) (-5.75) 
Crises -0.0183*** -0.0165*** -0.0225*** 
 (-4.41) (-4.25) (-4.30) 
Panel C. Marginal crises effects on bank probability of being acquired given different levels of efficiency 
 CE TE AE 
p25 -0.3311*** -0.3668*** -0.2379** 
 (-2.78) (-3.17) (-2.33) 
p50 -0.2742*** -0.3131*** -0.2509** 
 (-2.74) (-3.10) (-2.43) 
p75 -0.2266* -0.2713** -0.2575** 
 (-1.85) (-2.22) (-2.18) 
NOTES: This table shows the results of how bank cost efficiency (CE), technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE) affect banks’ 
probability of being acquired. The method employed is a parametric survival (PS) model, with a Gompertz proportional hazard function.. 
The dependent variable, Acq, is a dummy that equals one if a bank was acquired in a given quarter, and zero otherwise. Crises is a dummy 
that equals one for periods of financial distress and the following four quarters. Crisis periods are two banking crises (the 1990s credit crunch 
between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the global financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4) and three market crises (the 
stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 
and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3). ROA is the 
ratio between bank net income and bank total assets, Size is the log of bank total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real 
terms, Leverage is the ratio between bank total assets and bank book value of equity, NPL is the ratio between non-performing loans and 
total loans, M_Share is the ratio between bank total assets and the volume of bank total assets in the State where the bank is chartered, 
TMTF is the average capital ratio of the other banks in the same State, Growth is the quarterly change of personal income growth in the 
State where the bank is chartered, and Young is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is young, and zero otherwise. Young is defined 
as a bank, which is younger that the first quartile of the banks’ age in the sample. All independent variables apart from Crises and Young are 
lagged by two quarters to avoid possible endogeneity. The coefficients presented are hazard rates, which show how much a one unit change 
in the independent variable increases (decreases) the probability of a bank being acquired. z values are provided in parentheses; values below 
one indicate a decline in bank probability of being acquired, and values above one indicate an increase in the dependent variable. All models 
are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. Panel B presents marginal efficiency effects on banks probability of being 
acquired during normal and crisis periods, and Panel C presents Marginal crises effects on bank probability of being acquired given the first 
(p25), second (p50) and third (p75) quartile of the sample efficiencies. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 





Since 1985 the US banking industry has suffered from a large number of bank failures. The 
1990s credit crunch together with the Recent Global Financial Crisis have obliterated as many 
as 1,365 Commercial banks and Savings institutions.  This number of failures accounts for 
almost 40% of the total insured institution failures since the establishment of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 1933.  
To deal with the numerous bank failures the FDIC has predominantly opted for passing 
the assets of failed banks to the private sector. In this respect, to date the most widely employed 
resolution method is the Purchase and Assumption (P&A) transaction, where some or all of the 
failed bank assets and liabilities are auctioned off to the private sector. For instance, during the 
recent financial crisis approximately 95% of the total bank receivership cases have been resolved 
using P&A transactions (Granja et al., 2014).  
This chapter extends the limited number of studies on the resolution of failed banks via 
P&As by examining the long-term effects of these transactions for the acquiring institutions. 
Chapter 4. Long-Term Effects of Failed Bank Acquisitions 
on Acquiring Banks 
4.1. Introduction 





The analysis is based on a sample of 486 failed bank acquisitions selected for the period between 
1985 and 2010. 
It is widely believed that P&As lower costs to the insurance funds and ensure continuity 
of smooth operations and services to the customers (FDIC, 2014b), as well as the preservation 
of the failed banks’ charter values (James, 1991; Bennett and Unal, 2014). However, surprisingly 
little is known about the long-term impact these transactions have on the acquiring institutions.  
This appears to be an important omission for several reasons. First, in the case of 
evidence on performance gains for the acquirers, the FDIC could benefit from promoting the 
healthy institutions’ participation in failed bank auctions, thus, reducing the costs stemming from 
these resolutions (for evidence on the increased competition gains to the FDIC, see, for example, 
Bennett and Unal, 2014). Second, improved performance of the acquiring banks would suggest 
better use of the failed banks’ assets in the hands of the successors’ management team, which 
would boost confidence of the failed bank depositors, and diminish the likelihood of a run on a 
failing bank prior to closing. If, by contrast, acquiring banks would not achieve significant 
performance gains, alternative resolution design methods could be considered. In essence, if the 
passing of failed bank assets to the private sector harms the existing healthy banks, further 
support to the acquirers and additional post-merger incentives may need to be implemented. 
Despite their relevance, the long-term effects produced by failed bank acquisitions on 
the acquiring institutions are only marginally examined in Peristiani (1997). Specifically, Peristiani 
(1997) analyses X-efficiency gains following three types of consolidation categories: intrastate 
mergers, BHC consolidations and FDIC-assisted mergers. He finds that FDIC-assisted mergers 
resulted in increased scale efficiencies for both, single- and multiple-time acquirers. This chapter 
adds to the study of Peristiani (1997) in several ways. 





First, the analysis presented here focuses on the impact of failed bank acquisitions on a 
wider range of bank characteristics that previous studies have related to non-failed bank 
acquisitions and that are generally linked with stability conditions at the bank level. In particular, 
the impact of these acquisitions on profitability, efficiency, capital adequacy and asset quality is 
examined. The findings show that, on average, failed bank acquirers deteriorate significantly in 
the three years following an acquisition, however, remained more profitable and with better 
quality of assets than the average industry bank. 
Second, by constructing the analysis over a 26-year period, the impact the P&A 
transactions have on acquiring banks in crisis and normal times can be distinguished. In this 
regard Bertin et al. (1989) and Wan and Yiu (2009) argue that firms may benefit from acquisitions 
in times when the economy is in distress, because overpayment of assets is less likely as firms 
may be more prudent in terms of acquisition strategies and managers must avoid costly mistakes. 
In addition, an increase of potential targets due to crises “should allow banks to be more selective 
in their bidding process” (Bertin et al., 1989). Furthermore, Cowan and Salotti  (2015) suggest 
that the gains to the acquirers during crises include wealth transfers from the FDIC, which 
subsidize these sales, and accepts bids below their fair values due to the high numbers of bank 
failures and the other banks reduced ability to bid high.  
The findings in this chapter do not show evidence to support the view that failed bank 
acquisitions in crisis periods resulted in higher gains/losses than acquisitions in normal times. In 
fact, the results show that failed bank acquirers’ performance deteriorates after the acquisition 
regardless of the period of the acquisition. A notable exception is, however, the group of 
acquisitions that took place during the financial crisis that erupted in the second half of 2007. 
Apart from reduced profitability indicators, other performance measures did not change 
significantly following an acquisition. The potential explanation for this is that nearly 60% of the 





P&A transactions during the recent financial crisis in the sample included a loss-sharing 
agreement, which increased the amount of vulnerable assets acquired. However, at the same 
time, it increased the incentives for the assuming institutions to be more prudent in credit 
management (FDIC, 1998). 
This chapter further adds to the existing literature by studying the potential factors that 
help explain the changes in the long-run performance of the acquiring firms following an 
acquisition. Stemming from existing evidence on factors that help explain long-term 
performance changes after acquisitions (see, for instance, Kim and Finkelstein, 2009), it might 
be the case that the change in the difference between the pre and post- acquisition performance 
of the acquirer improves with better pre-acquisition characteristics of the acquirer. The findings, 
however, do not present a clear pattern that allows to identify a type of acquirer that enhances 
the performance of the acquirer.  
Finally, this chapter examines whether, in spite of not leading to benefits that materialize 
in accounting ratios, failed bank acquisitions help the acquirers survive in the market because of 
an increased size. This is done by evaluating the probability of a failed bank’s acquirer to 
disappear in the market through failure or acquisition. The results show that banks that acquired 
failed institutions in the preceding 4 and 8 quarters had a significantly lower likelihood to fail 
and be acquired. These findings are in line with the general consensus that larger banks are more 
likely to survive/and or be bailed out (Berger et al., 1999; Mishkin et al., 2006; Liu and Ngo, 
2014), and with the study by Gorton et al. (2009), who suggest that consolidation in the banking 
industry is often driven by defensive strategies, i.e. banks engage in acquisitions in order to 
reduce the risk of becoming acquisition targets themselves. 





The analysis presented here complements a number of studies that have focused on the 
immediate market reaction on the acquisition announcement. The general consensus stemming 
from these studies is that failed bank acquisitions generate excessive returns to the acquiring 
institutions (see, for example, James and Wier, 1987a; Cochran et al., 1995; Cowan and Salotti, 
2015).  Nevertheless, long-term gains/losses accrued for the acquirers following mergers might 
be very different from the short-term market reactions around merger announcements due to 
several reasons. For instance, as suggested by DeLong & DeYoung (2007), there may be long-
run changes in the set of determinants that are used for the short-run market evaluation of the 
merger, as well as poor-understanding of the event by market participants. The latter may result 
in an inefficient evaluation of a merger, which, therefore, will not be a reliable long-run predictor 
of the firm’s value. Furthermore, looking into the accounting-based performance measures 
rather than the stock price shift (associated with market participants’ expectations toward the 
effects of the merger) has several benefits. First, the actual rather than the expected performance 
can be measured, as suggested by DeLong & DeYoung (2007). Second, using various accounting 
measures allows to identify the sources of gains to the acquireers (DeLong and DeYoung, 2007) 
and to avoid restricting the analysis to a smaller sample of publicly listed companies.  
The analysis presented in this chapter is also related to the number of studies on the 
long-run acquirers’ performance gains of ordinary deals (see, for instance, Cornett and 
Tehranian, 1992; Amel et al., 2004). How much the findings on the long term effects for non-
failed bank acquisitions might be valid for failed acquisition is unclear for several reasons. First, 
failed bank acquisitions mainly occur in times of crisis, when liquidity is scarce and overall bank 
performance has deteriorated. Healthy institutions have several motivations to acquire during 
such disturbed economic conditions, including sending a signal of financial strength to the 
market (Beltratti and Paladino, 2013), acquiring assets at fire sales (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 





2008), and the increased numbers of potential acquisition targets as well as reduced number of 
potential bidders (James and Wier, 1987b) is also likely to have a bearing.  
Second, the FDIC offers loss-share agreement (LSA) – introduced under the FDICIA 
Act of 1991 - replacing the put guarantees, which allowed the acquiring institutions to return 
substandard assets to the FDIC. With the loss-sharing agreement, the FDIC is required to 
reimburse 80% of the losses of the covered assets up to a certain threshold, and 95% for the 
losses above the threshold20; and the remaining losses are covered by the acquiring institution 
(Cowan and Salotti, 2015). Following this LSA was the impact of regulatory capital ratios: under 
the general risk-based capital rules, an asset can be assigned a risk weight that of the eligible 
guarantor (in this case the FDIC) rather the obligor21. As a result of the loss-share agreement, it 
is therefore an opportunity for healthy banks to acquire assets of mitigated risks.   
Third, the whole acquisition process is much quicker than in traditional mergers and 
acquisitions, i.e. the time between the bidding opportunity announcement and the closing of the 
deal is typically two weeks.  Furthermore, the process of due diligence is limited to 2 to 3 days 
(and only if granted by the board of the failing bank) rather than the average of 115 days in 
traditional mergers and acquisitions (Granja, 2013). Such a quick process is thus unlikely to help 
mitigate information asymmetries between the target and the bidder (Granja, 2013), and can, 
therefore, hinder the managers of the potential acquirers from taking the correct actions. 
The remaining part of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses 
the related literature. Section 4.3 introduces the data sample and methodology employed in this 
                                                 
20 “Sharing losses on a 95/5 basis was eliminated for all LSAs executed after March 26, 2010”. (for full details, see 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/lossshare/index.html) 
21 Specifically, the acquiring institutions are allowed to assign a risk weight of 20 % to the guaranteed assets under 
the LSA. 





chapter. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 introduce the results and robustness checks. Finally, the last section 
concludes.    
The long-term effects of failed bank acquisition on the acquirers have been largely overlooked 
in the literature. A partial exception is Peristiani (1997), where FDIC-assisted acquisitions are 
examined in the context of a broader investigation of bank consolidation. Specifically, the 
analysis examines the efficiency gains associated with three categories of banks’ consolidation 
(intrastate mergers, BHC consolidations and FDIC-assisted mergers) and finds that acquirers do 
not improve, in general, their X-efficiencies and rank X-efficiencies following a merger. In fact, 
from the overall sample BHC consolidations result in significantly reduced industry-adjusted 
(rank) X-efficiencies. However, all types of mergers, including the FDIC-assisted mergers 
between 1980 and 1990 resulted in increased scale efficiencies for both, single- and multiple-
time acquirers.  
A much larger number of studies has focused on the short-term wealth effects for the 
shareholders of the acquiring bank generated by the acquisition of a failed institution. This 
literature dates back to the 1980s and is normally based on relatively small samples given the 
need to focus on publicly listed institutions. The general consensus emerging from these studies 
is that the auctions used by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to resolve failing banks 
result in significantly positive excess returns that accrue to the acquiring institutions. 
For example, James and Wier (1987a) find positive abnormal returns for the acquirer 
when auction results are announced over the period 1973-1983 and show that these returns are 
significantly higher than for the acquirers participating in unassisted acquisitions over a 2-day-
period.  However, Zhang (1997), by comparing 128 FDIC assisted acquisitions and 387 non-
assisted acquisitions in the 1980-1990 period, find that the positive abnormal returns for the 
4.2. Related Literature 





FDIC-assisted acquirers are driven by repeated acquirers. They argue that one of the reasons for 
the statistically positive cumulative abnormal returns for the repeated acquirers is the 
information advantage they have in terms of the acquisition process. As a result other potential 
acquirers might refrain from bidding altogether, or offer lower bids. This in turn reduces the 
winning bid and the acquirer benefits at the expense of the FDIC. 
While Cochran et al. (1995) confirm significant abnormal returns for the acquiring banks 
for different typologies of acquisition targets, Bertin et al. (1989) find evidence of significant 
abnormal returns prior and at the date of the announcement. Furthermore, Pettway and Trifts 
(1985) document positive average abnormal stock returns 10 days prior to the merger, which are 
followed by negative abnormal returns in the 50-day period after the merger.  
Evidence of gains by shareholders from the announcement of a failed bank acquisition 
is also reported by a recent study by Cowan and Salotti (2015) focusing on the period 2008-2013. 
Their findings show a 3.23 % average two-day announcement-period cumulative abnormal 
return22. 
The analysis in this chapter is also related to the strand of the literature that examines 
long-term effects stemming from the acquisitions on non-failed banks (see, for instance, 
Rhoades, 1998; Amel et al., 2004; Cornett et al., 2006). This literature shows mixed results in 
terms of effects on the acquiring bank. For instance, in their review of studies on financial sector 
consolidation and efficiency Amel et al. (2004) conclude that in the commercial bank industry, 
                                                 
22 The evidence on positive abnormal returns following a P&A transactions indicate either a synergy effect or a well 
documented wealth transfer from the seller (the FDIC) to the acquirer (Gupta and Misra, 1999). In line with the 
wealth transfer hypothesis are the studies by James and Wier (1987a) and Cowan and Salotti (2015).  Specifically, 
James and Wier (1987a) show that due to restrictions on bidder participation the returns for the winning bidders 
increase, whereas the revenue for the seller (the FDIC) reduces. In support of this finding, Cowan and Salotti (2015) 
show that “acceptance of bids below fair value” by the FDIC is one of the factors contributing to the CARs of the 
acquiring banks. 





there is a lack of evidence to support that there are any cost or profit efficiency gains related to 
the M&As. They explain the lack of evidence due to regulation. The Glass-Steagall Act (of 1933 
up until 1999) could have “impeded realization of gains from cross-selling”, and the restrictions 
on branching and geographic expansion (up until the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994) could have 
restricted the use of scale economies. They also suggest that there is not enough evidence of the 
long-term effects, and suggest that the efficiency gains might emerge in a long-run. Finally, they 
suggest that “non-value maximising23” motives might be the reason for the lack of evidence in 
efficiency gains. 
On the contrary to the conclusions drawn by Amel et al. (2004), DeLong (2003) finds 
that efficiency of combined banks improves in the three-years following an acquisition. 
However, apart from improved efficiency, DeLong (2003) uses improved ROA and long-term 
stock returns as addiditonal measures of improvement in long-term performance from mergers. 
He finds that while long-term stock returns increase significantly, ROA does not. He also shows 
that the improvement in long-term performance manifests when the merger involves an 
inefficient acquirer, also when the partners have similar earning streams, and when the debt 
rating of the combined entity improves, i.e. the costs of bankruptcy reduce. 
Additional evidence of performance gains for merged banks relative to the whole 
banking industry is also presented by Cornett and Tehranian (1992), who study pre- and post-
merger operating cash flows surrounding mergers that occurred in the period between 1982 and 
1987. Specifically, they show that merged banks underperformed the industry by 0.2 % before 
                                                 
23 In the absence of conclusive evidence on M&A gains in the banking industry, the existing literature has proposed 
that other than “value-maximising” motives foster bank concentration. Managers, who make decisions for 
corporate takeovers, might either make irrational decisions or seek personal benefit. In the case of the former, a 
manager can be convinced that his/her valuation of the target is correct, and it is the market which does not 
recognize the true value of the consolidation (Roll, 1986). In the latter case, the objective of managers might be 
“empire building”, which is driven by expectations for higher compensation (Berger et al., 1999). 





the merger, however outperformed the industry by 1.0% after the merger, and the 1.2% increase 
was significantly different from zero. They also demonstrate that the improvement in 
performance was the result of greater ability to attract more loans and deposits per dollar of 
equity, as well as greater employee productivity and asset growth. 
Finally, Cornett et al. (2006) study US commercial bank mergers in the period between 
1990 and 2000. They, like Cornett and Tehranian (1992), use the changes in operating pre-tax 
cash flows as an indicator for performance. They find that the industry-adjusted performance 
significantly improves after a merger, and show that the effect is especially evident in large, 
activity and geographically focusing bank mergers. They also show that the performance gains 
were larger after the implementation of the Riegle-Neal Act in 1997. 
Overall, there is a lack of evidence in the existing literature on the long-term impact 
failed bank acquisitions have on the acquiring banks. With a partial exception of the study by 
Peristiani (1997), who bases his analysis solely on efficiency gains from mergers, the benefits 
stemming from failed bank acquisitions have been mainly analysed through the perspective of 
the immediate market reaction on the acquisition announcement. Although the long-term 
impact of acquisitions has been studied for ordinary deals, the latter findings cannot be 
undoubtedly applied on P&A transactions due to their unique features.  
The analysis in this chapter is based on 486 acquisitions of U.S. FDIC-insured commercial and 
savings banks that were completed between 1985 and 2010. The sample is constructed using the 
acquisition data reported by the FDIC24. Although in the observed period more than 2500 
                                                 
24 The full information on all FDIC-insured banks is obtained from www.data.gov, and includes demographic 
information, operating status, and other key statistics related to the institution. Specifically, the structural event 
changes are used to identify all acquired-with-government-assistance institutions and their successors. Information 
on all non-assisted mergers were also selected from this dataset.  
4.3. Data Sample and Performance Measures 





commercial and savings banks have been auctioned off to the private sector, only the deals for 
which all of the following conditions hold are selected: 1) an active institution took over the 
failing bank; 2) data are available for the acquiring bank for at least 4 quarters (1 year) prior to 
the acquisition and  for at least 12 quarters (3 years) following the acquisition; 3) the acquiring 
institution did not participate in any other government-assisted merger, or in  any other non-
government assisted merger, 4 quarters prior to and 12 quarters following the acquisition. In 
contrast, deals, where a single institution acquires more than one failing bank in the same or two 
consecutive quarters, are not excluded. Instead, the information of the failed banks are 
aggregated and considered as one deal.25 
 For the characteristics of the acquiring and target banks as well as all other banks in the 
market the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income provided by the FDIC (for data after 
the first quarter of 1993) as well as the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (for data before the 
first quarter of 1993) are used. 
Table 4-1 displays descriptive statistics of the merger deals in the dataset for the full 
sample and for the sample by year in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. The number of deals in 
the sample as well as the total number of bank failures is provided for comparison. The average 
and median assets of the acquirer and the average and median assets of the target are shown in 
Columns 3 to 6. For the assets of both, the target and the acquirer, the last entry in the Call 
Reports prior to the merger is used. The dollar value of assets is adjusted using implicit price 
deflator, provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, indexed to the price level of the 
year 2009.  
                                                 
25 From the 486 deals observed in this chapter, 13 are multiple acquisitions. 





The number of failures and the number of failed bank acquisitions included in the 
dataset, not surprisingly, cluster in two distinct periods: 1986-1992, as well as 2007-2010. These 
periods belong mainly to the two banking crises - the 1990s credit crunch and the recent global 
financial crisis (for crisis dating, see chapter 3.3.2). Both the size of the acquirer as well as the 
size of the target seem to have increased throughout the observed time period. Apart from the 
acquisition in 1999, where the target was on average five times larger than the acquirer, most of 
the target to acquirer size ratios cluster around the 39.54% full sample median26.  
[Table 4-1 here] 
To test the long-term effects of the deal for the acquiring bank, the study by Fraser and 
Zhang (2009) is followed and profitability, efficiency, capital adequacy and asset quality 
indicators are used. For profitability return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and net 
interest margin (measured as the difference between interest income and interest expense and 
expressed as a ratio of the book value of total assets) are used. For efficiency indicators cost 
efficiency and its two components: technical and allocative efficiencies, are used. The efficiency 
measures are computed using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which is detailed in chapter 
3.3.3.  
As for the capital adequacy indicators loans to total equity, deposits to total equity and 
the capitalization ratio expressed as a ratio of equity to total assets are used. Allowance for loan 
losses as a ratio of total loans and leases and non-performing loans expressed as a ratio to total 
loans and leases are employed to measure the acquiring banks’ asset quality.  
                                                 
26 The data for the actual amount of assets acquired is available only from 1989, and represents approximately 72% 
of the total sample starting in 1989. For the regression analyses, where the relative size ratio is used, this issue is 
addressed by performing various robustness checks. The extreme value is for the First National Bank of Keystone, 
which was acquired by Ameribanc, Inc.; however, from the over $1 billion of assets that the target bank had at the 
time of failure, only $74 million were acquired. 





All the acquired banks’ performance measures are adjusted by industry performance to 
avoid the possibility that the performance measures are influenced by external factors, such as 
economic conditions, rather than the effects of the merger itself. The industry benchmark is 
based on banks that are located in the same state as the acquiring bank in the specific quarter of 
the acquisition. All banks that were involved in a government-assisted merger in the same state 
and quarter as the event in the sample are not classified as not part of the industry benchmark. 
The study by DeLong and DeYoung (2007) is followed to identify the pre-merger window as a 
1-year period, therefore, the performance measures are averaged over the 4 quarters prior to the 
merger. The post-merger window, which reflects the long-term effects of an acquisition, is 
considered as a three year (12-quarter) period following an acquisition. The definitions and 
summary statistics for all performance measures employed in this chapter are provided in Table 
4-2. 
[Table 4-2 here] 
4.4.1. Failed Bank Acquisitions and Acquirer Long-Term Performance 
For the full sample of 468 acquisitions, Table 4-3 reports the pre- and post-acquisition measures 
for industry-adjusted acquiring banks’ performance. The results show that the acquiring banks 
were significantly more profitable than the average industry bank in the four quarters prior an 
acquisition. Specifically, the acquiring banks were more profitable than the industry banks by 
0.19 percentage points (pp)27, 3.61pp and 0.04pp as indicated by ROA, ROE and Net interest 
margin, respectively. Following an acquisition the profitability of the acquiring banks dropped 
                                                 
27 The difference between the performance of acquiring institution and the average industry bank is expressed as 
the actual change in percentage points rather than the relative change in percent. For the interpretation of 
percentage points, see section 3.4.1. 
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significantly, i.e. ROA dropped by 0.13pp, ROE reduced by 1.93pp and net interest margin 
dropped by 0.04pp. However, apart from net interest margin, which shows no significant 
difference from zero in the post-merger period, both ROA and ROE remained significantly 
higher for the acquiring banks as opposed to the industry average. 
Acquiring banks were not different from the rest of the industry in terms of the overall 
cost efficiency. The insignificant medians of industry-adjusted technical and allocative 
efficiencies suggest that most of the acquiring banks used similar quantities of inputs for the 
given level of outputs as an average industry bank, and were not superior to other banks in 
selecting the input mix. However, the significantly lower average of allocative efficiency suggests, 
that amongst acquiring banks there were some that exhibited extremely lower efficiencies in 
allocating resources. Following an acquisition cost efficiency reduced significantly, and this drop 
was mainly a result of a significant decrease in technical efficiency, as indicated by the greater 
magnitudes of the changes in industry-adjusted technical efficiency coefficients. As a result, in 
the three years following an acquisition the acquiring banks underperformed the average industry 
bank by 5.36 pp, 5.72 pp and 1.58 pp in terms of overall cost, technical and allocative efficiencies, 
respectively.  
Moving on to analyse the capital adequacy indicators, the results suggest that acquiring 
banks were better capitalized prior an acquisition, as indicated by the negative and significantly 
different from zero industry-adjusted loans to capital and deposits to capital ratios, as well as the 
significantly higher than zero industry adjusted equity to assets ratio. After the acquisition, 
however, the capitalization of acquiring banks deteriorated significantly. As a result, loans to 
capital and deposits to capital increased from significantly lower than other banks to not 
significantly different from the industry average. Furthermore, the equity to asset ratio dropped 
from being 0.76pp higher to 0.74pp lower than the industry benchmark. Finally, allowance for 





loan losses to loans did not change significantly after an acquisition and remained lower than 
other banks, whereas the median of non-performing loans to assets increased significantly by 
0.24pp. 
[Table 4-3 here] 
Overall, the results suggest that winning bidders of failed bank auctions did not benefit 
from acquiring failing banks in the long run. On the contrary, all performance measures 
deteriorated significantly following an acquisition.  
4.4.2. Failed Bank Acquisitions and Acquirer Long-Term Performance Across Time 
Periods 
To test whether the results discussed above are consistent throughout the observed timeframe, 
the pre-and post-acquirers’ performance in alternative periods is investigated next.  
First, tests are conducted to check whether acquirers’ performance differs if the 
acquisition occurred in crisis or normal times. The crisis periods are then split into banking and 
market crises and, finally, analysis is conducted with the focus on acquisitions that occurred in 
the recent financial crisis only. The results for crisis periods, normal times, banking crises, market 
crises and the recent financial crisis are reported in Panels A, B, C, D and E of Table 4-4, 
respectively. 
The results in Panel A are not different from those of the full sample. Overall, all 
performance indicators deteriorated following an acquisition during crisis periods. A similar 
conclusion can be drawn for the acquirers’ performance after taking over a failing bank in normal 
times. The only exception from the full sample is that acquiring banks were significantly more 
efficient before an acquisition, however, apart from allocative efficiency, became significantly 
less efficient after an acquisition. Splitting the crisis periods into market and banking crisis, again 





do not change the general finding that failed bank acquirers perform significantly worse 
following an acquisition, as evident from Panels C and D.  
Failed bank acquisitions during the recent financial crisis, however, had a different 
impact on the acquirers’ performance. Interestingly, apart from reduced profitability, failed bank 
acquirers did not perform differently in the three year after the acquisition took place. One of 
the possible explanations for this result is that from the sample of 58 P&A transactions in the 
period of the recent financial crisis, almost 60% included a loss-sharing agreement. According 
to the full sample of P&A transactions, these loss-sharing agreements on average covered 72% 
of failing banks’ total assets at the time of failure (Granja, 2013). The loss-sharing agreement 
increased the level of acquired commercial and real estate loans, however, at the same time, due 
to the portion of losses left for the acquirer to absorb, it provided the incentives for prudent 
credit management (FDIC, 1998)28. 
[Table 4-4 here] 
4.4.3. Additional Tests 
Although to check for consistency in the findings more than one measure for each of the 
performance indicators is included, the results are still potentially sensitive to several key issues. 
First, as the choice of 1 year pre- and 3 years post-acquisition window is to a degree arbitrary, 
the analysis is repeated for -1 years/+5 years windows. In addition, rather than taking the average 
performance of the 12 quarters post and 4 quarters prior the acquisition, the analysis is repeated 
by comparing the actual performance measures at the twelfth quarter post and the fourth quarter 
prior the P&A. The results are reported in Table 4-5. In line with the previous findings, the 
                                                 
28 The acquirers’ pre- and post-performance measures for those deals that included loss-sharing agreement are 
presented in the following section (section 4.4.3). The results are qualitatively similar to those reported for the 
recent financial crisis. 





results show that industry adjusted performance indicators of the acquiring institutions 
deteriorated significantly following an acquisition and this result was not driven by a specific 
pre- and post-event window used. 
[Table 4-5 here] 
Second, while the full sample analysis includes resolutions that occurred between 1985 
and 2010, the enactment of the FDICIA in 1991 fundamentally changed the failed bank 
resolution process. In this regard, the sample is split into pre- and post-FDICIA period for 
further tests and the results are reported in Table 4-6. The results are consistent with the initial 
tests for the both periods, suggesting that the benefits of acquiring a relatively healthier 
institution in the post-FDICIA period were offset by higher bids offered by the bidding 
institutions.  
[Table 4-6 here] 
Third, one of the potential gains associated with acquisitions include the increase in 
market share. If this is so, potentially greater gains from relatively larger acquisitions should be 
observed. Therefore, further analysis is conducted to test the acquirers’ performance changes 
following large acquisitions, i.e. acquisitions, where the relative size of the target to that of the 
acquiring bank is greater than the median (39.54%). The results are reported in Table 4-7 and 
show no differences from the initial analysis, suggesting the performance gains from failed bank 
acquisitions were not dependent on the size of the acquisition.  
[Table 4-7 here] 
Furthermore, it is likely that the differing results for the sample of the recent financial 
crisis is due to the loss-share agreement that was included in the majority of the P&A 
transactions. To test the validity of this inference the analysis is replicated for merely the deals 





that included the loss-sharing agreement. The results are reported in Table 4-8 and are in line 
with the results for the sample of acquisitions that occurred in the recent financial crisis. 
Specifically, apart from ROA, no significant acquirers’ performance changes are evident from 
those P&As that included a loss-sharing agreement. An exception here is, however, the 
improved loans to capital and deposits to capital measures, however, only significant for the 
mean test, not for the median test of equality, suggesting that the improvement in these measures 
were only a result of extreme values. 
[Table 4-8 here] 
4.4.4. Regression Analysis 
This section investigates the determinants of the change in performance produced by the 
acquisition of a failed bank. The changes in the industry-adjusted performance measures after 
the merger are used as the dependent variables in a set of cross-sectional regressions estimated 
via OLS and with standard errors clustered by quarter to control  for any potential time 
dependence across observations. More formally, the regression model is expressed as follows: 
∆𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒i = α0 + 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−𝑛 + 𝑅𝑒𝑙_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
𝐿𝐿𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑗 + 𝐴_𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑇_𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝐿𝑆𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐴𝑡 + 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡+ εi, t 
(4.1) 
where ΔPerformancei is the change in the pre- and the post-acquisition performance measures 
of the acquirer i. Sizei,t-1 is the size of the acquirer, expressed as the natural log of the total assets 
in real terms in thousands. Similarly to DeLong and DeYoung (2007) it is expected that the 
effects of acquisitions are smaller for large institutions, which have already reached their 
diversification and scale efficiencies. Rel_sizei,j,t-1 is the relative size factor, measured as the total 
assets of the target divided by the total assets of the acquirer. There are no a priori expectations 





for its effect on performance. On the one hand, larger institutions might be more difficult to 
assimilate under the existing operations of the acquiring ones, as suggested by Ramaswamy and 
Waegelein (2003). On the other hand, if the size increase after an acquisition is trivial, the 
acquisition might have no bearing on the acquirer’s performance at all. 
Capitali,t-1 is measured as total equity to total assets; NPLi,t-1 is the non-performing loans 
ratio, measured as non-performing loans to total loans and leases; LLAi,t-1 is the acquirer’s loan 
loss allowance, adjusted by total loans and leases. Higher capitalization, lower levels of non-
performing loans and lower loan loss allowance are expected to have a positive effect on the 
performance change. 
Same_statei,j is a dummy variable that acquires a value of one if the headquarters of the 
target bank are in the same state as the headquarters of the acquiring bank, and 0 otherwise. 
There are no a priori expectations for this variable. On the one hand, acquirers might benefit 
expanding their market share from same state acquisitions. On the other hand, it might reduce 
their geographic diversification. 
The age of the acquirer and the age of the target - A_agei,t-1 and T_agej,t-1 , respectively, 
are measured as the natural logarithm of the years since the establishment of the bank. As for 
the age of the acquirer, as in Kim and Finkelstein (2009), it is expected that older age of the 
acquirer improves performance changes, as older age indicates “more resources, management 
skills, and legitimacy”, as well as successful past operations. As for the age of the target, there 
are no a priori expectations on the effect it might have on the acquirers’ performance changes. 
On one hand, if a young firm that fails has not yet reached their full potential (Ouyang, 2009), 
acquirers may benefit from exploiting these lost opportunities and performance gains. On the 
other hand, Povel and Sertsios (2014) suggest that young targets are more opaque, and it is more 
difficult for the acquirer to gather information about it. In fact, Granja (2013) shows higher 





levels of information asymmetries increases the costs to the FDIC, and reduces the portion of 
assets the acquiring institution takes over, suggesting that bidders are prepared to pay less for a 
target they do not have enough information on. This information disadvantage might thus lead 
to an ambiguous outcome for the acquiring bank. 
LSAi,t is a dummy variable, which acquires a value of 1 if the P&A transaction included 
a loss-share agreement, and 0 otherwise. It is expected that P&A transactions including a loss-
sharing agreement should have a positive effect on the post-merger acquirers’ performance, 
because the losses of troubled assets are mainly covered by the FDIC, therefore the risk of the 
assets acquired reduces.  
FDICIAt is a dummy variable that acquires a value of 1 if the deal was after the 
enactment of the FDICIA in 1991, and 0 otherwise. One of the main provisions of the FDICIA 
is the ‘prompt corrective action”, which requires the federal banking agencies to assign banks 
under one of the capital groups: well capitalized, adequately capitalized, undercapitalized, 
significantly undercapitalized, and critically undercapitalized. In the case a bank falls into any of 
the last three categories, the regulatory agencies must take on mandatory supervisory and in 
some cases discretionary actions. Critically undercapitalized banks must be placed under 
conservatorship or receivership in a period of 90 days if the bank fails to restore its capital. In 
general, this ‘prompt corrective action’ allowed a quicker and more vigorous intervention, which 
in turn allowed closing banks “before their accounting net worth is exhausted” (Kane et al., 
2008), and selling them off to the private sector before the condition has further deteriorated 
(Cowan and Salotti, 2015). It is therefore, expected that the dummy FDICIA has a positive effect 
on the post-merger acquirers’ performance. 





Finally, Banking Crisist and Market Crisist – dummy variables that acquire a value of 
one if the transaction occurred during banking or market crises, respectively, and 0 otherwise, 
are included in the regression. It is expected that acquisitions during crisis periods improve post-
acquisition performance due to assets acquired at fire-sale prices, i.e. far below their true value 
(Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008; Bennett and Unal; 2014). It is also believed that this effect is 
especially strong during banking crises, when the number of failing banks increases, and the 
amount if liquid assets in the market diminishes. 
Acquirer- and target-specific variables are observed at the last available quarter prior an 
acquisition, and the remaining variables are included as of the time of the acquisition.  
Table 4-9 reports the regression results of the potential factors that might have an impact 
on the acquirers’ performance changes following a failed bank acquisition. Acquisitions during 
market crises resulted in deteriorated overall cost and allocative efficiencies, whereas acquisitions 
during banking crises had no effect on post-acquisition acquirers’ performance. As expected, 
after the enactment of the FDICIA acquirers’ performance change improved following an 
acquisition. Older acquiring banks and younger targets increased the change in the equity levels. 
Same state acquisitions reduced the post-acquisition cost, and technical efficiencies, and reduced 
the equity to asset ratio. Interestingly, higher levels of loan loss allowance improved the return 
on equity, and recued the loans to equity and deposits to equity ratios. P&As, in which the 
acquirer was larger, resulted in post-acquisition improvements in terms of profitability indicators 
(not significant for the change in ROE). However, the size of the acquirer also increased the 
level of non-performing loans. The smaller the size of the target, relative to the acquiring bank, 
the greater the improvement in net interest margin and the better the capitalization level 
(significant only for the deposit-to-capital change). Interestingly, though, relatively smaller 





acquisitions increased the levels of loan loss allowance. Finally, higher equity levels reduced the 
change in net interest margin.   
Overall, the results mainly support the a priori expectations on the effects the 
explanatory variables have on the acquirers’ performance changes. However, given the lack of 
consistency of the explanatory variable effects across various performance indicators, a 
particular type of acquirer or acquisition target that enhances/diminishes the performance 
changes of the acquirers cannot be specified. It is likely that other factors influence the change 
in performance after an acquisition, and these factors are not captured by the measures included 
in the analysis. For instance, the change in performance may be dependent on the acquiring 
institution’s managerial ability to assimilate the failed bank into its own operations. In addition, 
it is likely that the risk of failed bank assets and its negative effects materialize with a lag after its 
failure, and therefore, cannot be captured using the pre-acquisition measures. 
[Table 4-9 here] 
4.4.4.1. ADDITIONAL TESTS 
One possible concern related to the specification of the relative size measure in the regression 
analysis is that the last observed total assets of the target rather than the actual amount of assets 
that were assumed by the buyer is used. Further analysis is, therefore, conducted for the 220 
P&A transactions, for which data on the actual total assets sold exists, and the relative size 
measure re-estimated. The results are reported in Table 4-10, and are qualitatively similar to the 
initial analysis with a minor exception of the replaced relative size variable. Specifically, the 
variable lost its significance in explaining deposit to capital ratio and loan-loss allowance, 
however, became significant in the ROA and the non-performing loans regressions. 
[Table 4-10 here] 





The previous section suggests that there are no significant performance benefits produced by 
failed bank acquisitions for the acquirer. However, this does not exclude the possibility that this 
type of acquisitions might generate other types of gains for the acquiring institutions. This 
section focuses on two possible benefits that might arise from the deal: 1) an increase in the 
possibility to maintain a preferable relationship with regulators; 2) a decrease in the possibility 
to be subject to a takeover. 
4.5.1. Do Failed Bank Acquisitions Protect the Acquiring Banks from Failing? 
The lack of evidence on the long-term gains to the acquirers’ performance implies that other 
factors might motivate healthy banks to take over failing ones.  
One of such factors could be the possibility to gain a preferable treatment by regulators 
when there is a risk to lose a bank’s charter. In essence acquiring banks might seek to realize the 
deal, simply to maintain a preferable relationship with regulators. In fact, as most P&As happen 
during times of distress, realizing the deal might be an effective strategy for the acquiring banks 
to ensure cheaper access to financial safety net subsidies provided by the government, as well as 
increasing the possibility of being bailed out if their condition deteriorates (Berger et al., 1999; 
Mishkin et al., 2006).  
To test whether failed bank acquirers are less likely to lose their charter after they 
complete the deal, this section employs the data and the Parametric Survival model as described 
in chapter 3.3.4. To capture the failed bank acquisition effect a dummy variable FBA_4j, which 
acquires a value of 1 if the bank acquired a failing bank in the preceding four-quarter period, and 
zero otherwise, is included to the baseline model. The analysis is repeated including alternative 
timeframes of an acquisition. Specifically, the analysis is run using FBA_8j and FBA_12j, which 
4.5. Do Failed Bank Acquisitions Generate Non-Performance Benefits? 





are dummy variables that equal 1 if a bank acquired a failing bank in the preceding 8 and 12 
quarters, respectively. 
Table 4-11 reports the PS model that tests the likelihood of a bank failing if it had 
acquired a failing bank in the past. Specifically, Columns I, II and III show respectively, how a 
failed bank acquisition in the preceding 4, 8 and 12 quarters affected the likelihood of the 
acquiring bank to fail. The results show that the probability to fail reduces significantly for banks 
that acquire a failing bank in the preceding 4 and 8 quarters. In particular, having acquired a 
failed bank reduced the probability of failure by 89.4 pp and 52 pp if the acquisition happened 
in the last 4 and 8 quarters, respectively. The effect, however, is not significant for the 
acquisitions that occurred in the preceding 12 quarters. It, therefore, seems that the benefit of 
acquiring a failing bank in terms of reduced likelihood of failure evaporates with time.  
 [Table 4-11 here] 
Taken together the result reported in this section with the fact that the acquisition does 
lead to a deterioration of the majority of the industry adjusted performance indicators that have 
been analysed, it appears that a major gain from acquiring failed bank is an increase in the 
possibility that the acquirer maintain its charter in time of distress. 
4.5.2. Do Failed Bank Acquisitions Protect the Acquirers From Becoming Takeover 
Targets? 
This section investigates how failed bank acquisitions affect the acquirers’ probability of 
becoming takeover targets themselves. Gorton et al. (2009) propose two alternative theories 
how consolidation may impact banks’ – that are involved in acquisitions – likelihood of being 
acquired. First, by acquiring other firms, managers may use a defensive strategy, which suggests 
they wish to acquire other firms to increase in size, and thus lessen the probability of being 





acquired themselves. On the other hand, managers might involve themselves in “positioning” 
acquisitions, which would allow them to become more attractive targets themselves.  
To test the theories of managerial motives, proposed by Gorton et al. (2009), this section 
analyses whether failed bank acquirers were more or less likely to become acquisition targets. By 
employing in the baseline PS model (described in 3.3.4) as a dependent variable Acqj 
29 - a dummy 
variable that acquires a value of 1 if a bank has been acquired at a specific quarter, and 0 
otherwise – the results, provided in Table 4-12, show that the probability to be acquired reduced 
by 63.4 pp, 59.1 pp and 49 pp for banks that acquired a failed bank in the preceding 4, 8, and 12 
quarter, respectively.  
[Table 4-12 here] 
It is shown in this chapter that on average the acquirers of failed banks over the period ranging 
from 1985 to 2010 did not achieve any long-term performance benefit by realizing the deal. In 
fact, the performance measures deteriorated significantly after the acquisition took place, 
however, remained more profitable and with better asset quality than the average industry bank. 
However, the result observed for the full sample period is not confirmed when the 
analysis is repeated by focusing merely on the acquisitions realized during the recent financial 
crisis. Apart from deteriorated ROA, all acquirers’ performance measures remained unchanged 
from the pre-acquisition period. This result is not striking: during the recent financial crisis nearly 
60% of the sample P&A transactions included a loss-sharing agreement, which protected the 
acquirers from the potential losses of the assets acquired. In addition, as suggested by the FDIC 
                                                 
29 The dependent variable Acqj  is the same as in explained in section 3.4.2. 
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(1998), the included loss-share agreement increased the amount of vulnerable assets acquired, 
which at the same time increased the buyer’s incentives for more prudent credit management. 
Evidence on the factors that help explain the acquirers’ performance changes are 
ambiguous. Although the results do not contradict the general notion that increase (decrease) in 
performance is associated with better (worse) economic conditions as well as better (worse) pre-
acquisition performance of the acquiring institution, the effects of these factors differ across the 
measures of performance used in this study. Therefore, a factor (or a group of factors) that 
consistently improve/worsen the change in acquirers performance after a failed bank’s 
acquisition cannot be depicted. 
However, further analysis suggests that failed bank acquirers, in spite of the lack of any 
significant improvement in performance and asset quality produced by the acquisition, show a 
reduced likelihood to disappear from the market after the completion of the deal. Specifically, 
the results show that banks that participated in failed bank acquisitions had lower likelihood of 
failing in the following 4 and 8 quarters. In addition, further analysis provides evidence that the 
likelihood of becoming an acquisition target reduced significantly for banks that acquired a 
failing bank in the preceding 4, 8 and 12 quarters. In general, these results seem to suggest that 
acquirers of failed institutions enhance their possibilities to maintain their charter within the 
industry.  
Overall, this chapter shows critically that although P&A transactions have become the 
most widely used resolution methods due to reduced costs to the FDIC, there is no evidence 
that these transactions improve the long-term performance of the acquirers. This finding casts 
doubts on the potential systemic benefits arising from the completion of such deals.  
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Size of the Acquirer 
($ millions) 
Size of the Target 
($ millions) 
Relative size of the Target to the 
Acquirer (%) 
   Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: All Acquisitions 
1985-2010 486 2541 549.3866 103.7191 115.9619 39.8076 62.94% 39.54% 
Panel B: By Year of Acquisition 
1985 23 139 127.4281 79.0910 39.8196 21.3564 48.06% 37.20% 
1986 42 159 256.1192 85.1078 55.2403 39.8736 67.13% 36.17% 
1987 72 217 114.4493 74.8969 36.7813 20.8719 53.45% 35.39% 
1988 40 231 110.4683 66.4611 32.1313 24.9805 61.15% 42.44% 
1989 51 527 120.8365 76.4921 39.3607 27.9576 54.88% 50.27% 
1990 79 380 320.6294 110.4697 133.5345 51.0598 79.72% 45.23% 
1991 42 268 713.6012 144.2765 156.8134 54.8070 61.60% 37.77% 
1992 35 178 528.5602 178.7828 326.5623 54.7351 64.47% 56.22% 
1993 15 50 317.9637 284.8986 125.7152 74.3856 57.19% 27.35% 
1994 8 15 544.6661 258.0184 55.1140 58.0286 28.64% 23.01% 
1995 3 8 1229.162 391.9115 173.6320 85.6195 39.23% 13.26% 
1996 2 6 79.7399 79.7399 51.9542 51.9542 65.78% 65.78% 
1997 0 1 - -   - - 
1998 1 3 393.1828 392.1828 294.9688 294.9688 75.30% 75.30% 
1999 2 8 623.8726 623.8726 709.0796 709.0796 1075.46% 1075.46% 
2000 2 7 449.5594 449.5594 90.7004 90.7004 20.74% 20.74% 
2001 3 4 119.9943 113.6570 22.4303 20.9765 20.52% 19.08% 
2002 4 11 1415.7600 363.1720 50.7875 52.4466 15.34% 15.26% 
2003 3 3 2281.4230 320.3826 366.2364 39.9436 12.19% 12.51% 
2004 1 4 3320.5340 3320.5340 32.4940 32.4940 0.99% 0.99% 
2005 0 0 - - - - - - 
2006 0 0 - - - - - - 
2007 1 3 7043.0984 7043.0984 2536.5610 2536.5610 3.34% 3.34% 
2008 5 25 596.1977 210.0533 206.2156 104.3207 56.82% 32.94% 
2009 20 140 1377.8380 394.9959 184.2657 73.7850 31.91% 34.24% 
2010 32 154 726.9550 240.2688 159.8437 68.6513 54.34% 30.13% 
NOTES: This table reports summary statistics for 486 government assisted failed bank acquisitions of US commercial and savings banks between 
1985 and 2010. Panel A shows the summary statistics for all acquisitions employed in the chapter, and Panel B reports the statistics for 
acquisitions by year. Column 1 shows the number of deals included in the sample, and Column 2 shows the total number of bank failures for 
comparison. Column 3 (Column 4) reports the mean and median size of the acquirer (target), measured as total assets prior to an acquisition in 
real terms and expressed in millions of US dollars. Column 5 reports the mean and median relative size of the target to the acquirer, measured 
as a ratio of total assets of the target to the total assets of the acquirer, and expressed as percentages. 
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SUMMARY OF ACQUIRING BANKS’ INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
Variable Definition N Mean p50 S. Dev. p1 p99 
Profitability indicators       
ROA Net income divided bank total assets. 8,082 0.0010 0.0009 0.0039 -0.0102 0.0101 
ROE 
Net income divided bank total equity 
capital. 
8,082 0.0253 0.0142 0.4409 -0.2470 0.4216 
NIM 
Difference between net income and net 
expense divided bank total assets. 
8,082 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0025 -0.0051 0.0064 
Efficiency Indicators       
CE Cost efficiency measured by using DEA. 8,125 -0.0416 -0.0537 0.1722 -0.3804 0.4467 
TE 
Technical efficiency measured by using 
DEA. 
8,125 -0.0436 -0.0501 0.1838 -0.4030 0.4412 
AE 
Allocative efficiency measured by using 
DEA. 
8,125 -0.0149 0.0160 0.1396 -0.4782 0.2335 
Capital adequacy indicators       
Loans_cap 
Total loans and leases divided bank total 
equity capital. 
8,182 -0.4894 -0.5219 12.9389 -12.1639 12.8455 
Dep_cap 
Total deposits divided bank total equity 
capital. 
8,182 -0.3778 -0.1851 18.5696 -18.2905 18.7443 
Capital Total book equity divided total assets. 8182 -0.0042 -0.0087 0.0263 -0.0510 0.0863 
Asset Quality Indicators       
LLA 
Allowance for loans and leases over total 
loans and leases. 
8,182 -0.0032 -0.0046 0.0104 -0.0196 0.0357 
NPL 
Non-performing loans over total loans and 
leases. 
8,182 -0.0048 -0.0045 0.1442 -0.0324 0.0690 
NOTES: This table presents descriptions and summary statistics of the key performance variables of failed bank acquirers. Summary is provided 
for the -4/+12 quarter acquisition window. The performance variables include Profitability indicators – ROA (return on assets), ROE (return 
on equity), and NIM (net interest margin); Efficiency indicators – CE (cost efficiency), TE (technical efficiency), and AE (allocative efficiency); 
Capital adequacy indicators – Loans_cap (loans to capital), Dep_cap (Deposits to capital), and Capital; and Asset quality indicators - LLA 
(loan loss allowance), and NPL (non-performing loans). All variables are adjusted by industry bank average. An industry bank is considered a 
bank in the same state and quarter as the acquiring bank, and which did not participate in failed bank acquisitions that quarter. 
 
  






PRE- AND POST-ACQUISITION CHANGES IN ACQUIRERS' ACCOUNTING-BASED 
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
 Pre-Acquisition Post-Acquisition   
Variable 






of equality  
Profitability Indicators         
ROA 
486 0.0019*** 0.0018*** 486 0.0006*** 0.0005*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** 
 (17.06) (15.00)  (6.70) (8.17) (-8.53) (-9.79) 
ROE 
486 0.0361*** 0.0304*** 486 0.0169** 0.0139*** -0.0193** -0.0165*** 
 (10.67) (15.00)  (2.38) (12.12) (-2.45) (-6.86) 
NIM 
486 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 486 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0004*** -0.0004*** 
 (4.40) (4.15)  (0.44) (-0.74) (-2.85) (-3.52) 
Efficiency Indicators         
CE 
486 -0.0035 0.0017 486 -0.0536*** -0.0640*** -0.0501*** -0.0657*** 
 (-0.50) (-0.83)  (-8.80) (-9.26) (-5.39) (-5.53) 
TE 
486 0.0007 0.0128 486 -0.0572*** -0.0591*** -0.0579*** -0.0718*** 
 (0.09) (-0.07)  (-8.59) (-8.38) (-5.93) (-5.92) 
AE 
486 -0.0118** 0.0132 486 -0.0158*** -0.0016 -0.004 -0.0148* 
 (-2.41) (0.87)  (-3.35) (-0.98) (-0.59) (-1.70) 
Capital Adequacy Indicators         
Loans_cap 
486 -1.3455*** -1.1600*** 486 -0.149 -0.3134*** 1.1965*** 0.8465*** 
 (-6.89) (-8.64)  (-0.52) (-3.54) (3.47) (4.57) 
Dep_cap 
486 -2.2283*** -1.7114*** 486 0.234 0.1088 2.4623*** 1.8201*** 
 (-9.10) (-10.35)  (0.57) (-0.91) (5.17) (7.65) 
Capital 
486 0.0076*** 0.0024*** 486 -0.0074*** -0.0111*** -0.015*** -0.0135*** 
 (5.47) (3.79)  (-7.45) (-9.31) (8.79) (-8.96) 
Asset Quality Indicators         
LLA 
486 -0.0033*** -0.0042*** 486 -0.0031*** -0.0046*** 0.0002 -0.0003 
 (-8.33) (-10.63)  (-7.21) (-9.56) (0.41) (-0.12) 
NPL 
486 -0.0143 -0.006*** 486 -0.0018** -0.0036*** 0.0125 0.0024*** 
 (-1.52) (-11.04)  (-2.50) (-8.37) (1.32) (5.04) 
NOTES: This table reports pre- and post-merger industry-adjusted accounting-based performance measures for the acquiring banks. The 
cells contain the number of observations (N), the mean (mean) and the median (p50) for the averaged industry-adjusted performance 
measures for the 4 quarters before the acquisition (Pre-Acquisition) and 12 quarters after the acquisition (Post-Acquisition). The t-statistics 
and z-statistics presented below the mean and median respectively show the significant differences from zero, which represent the significant 
difference from an average industry bank. The last two columns present the mean and median changes between the post-acquisition and 
pre-acquisition performance measures. Equality tests with the t-statistics and z-statistics are provided in the brackets below. The Performance 
indicators include Profitability Indicators: return on assets (ROA), measured as net income to total assets, return on equity (ROE), measured 
as net income to equity, net interest margin (NIM), measured as the difference between net income and net expense to total assets; Efficiency 
Indicators: Cost efficiency (CE), measured using DEA, and its two components: Technical Efficiency (TE) and Allocative efficiency (AE); 
Capital Adequacy Indicators: Loans to capital (Loans_cap), measured as total loans and leases to total book equity capital, Deposits to 
capital (Dep_cap), measured as total deposits to total book equity capital, Capital, measured as total book equity capital to total assets; 
Asset Quality Indicators: loan loss allowance (LLA), measured as allowance for loans and leases to total loans and leases, non-performing 
loans (NPL), measured as non-performing loans to total loans and leases. All performance measures are adjusted by industry bank average. 
Industry banks are the banks that operated in the same state and the same quarter as the acquiring bank, and exclude the banks that acquired 
failed bank institutions in the given quarter. 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
 
  






PRE- AND POST-ACQUISITION CHANGES IN ACQUIRERS’ ACCOUNTING-BASED 
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS DURING DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS 
Panel A: Crisis periods 
 Pre-Acquisition Post-Acquisition   
Variable 








Profitability Indicators         
ROA 
302 0.0018*** 0.0017*** 302 0.0007*** 0.0004*** -0.0012*** -0.0013*** 
 (12.01) (11.19)  (5.57) (6.02) (-5.91) (-7.02) 
ROE 
302 0.0273*** 0.0242*** 302 0.0163*** 0.0125*** -0.0110** -0.0117*** 
 (5.64) (10.43)  (9.08) (9.69) (-2.13) (-4.56) 
NIM 
302 0.0006*** 0.0004*** 302 0.0002* 0.0001** -0.0003* -0.0004*** 
 (4.41) (4.40)  (1.76) (0.82) (-1.85) (-2.62) 
Efficiency Indicators         
CE 
302 -0.0221** -0.0286*** 302 -0.0781*** -0.0870*** -0.0560*** -0.0584*** 
 (-2.40) (-2.72)  (-10.67) (-9.84) (-4.77) (-4.57) 
TE 
302 -0.0174* -0.0186** 302 -0.0806*** -0.0866*** -0.0632*** -0.0680*** 
 (-1.87) (-2.03)  (-9.61) (-8.62) (-5.05) (-4.95) 
AE 
302 -0.0207*** 0.0092 302 -0.0285*** -0.0109*** -0.0077 -0.0201 
 (-3.20) (-0.66)  (-4.18) (-2.71) (-0.82) (-1.45) 
Capital Adequacy Indicators         
Loans_cap 
302 -1.4040*** -1.2638*** 302 -0.1796 -0.1109 1.2244*** 1.1528*** 
 (-4.89) (-6.35)  (-1.01) (-0.93) (3.63) (4.74) 
Dep_cap 
302 -2.4812*** -1.8838*** 302 -0.0890 0.3059 2.3922*** 2.1897*** 
 (-7.01) (-8.29)  (-0.42) (0.48) (5.81) (7.03) 
Capital 
302 0.0056*** 0.0010* 302 -0.0074*** -0.0116*** -0.0130*** -0.0127*** 
 (3.16) (1.75)  (-5.44) (-7.35) (-5.81) (-6.08) 
Asset Quality Indicators         
LLA 
302 -0.0030*** -0.0038*** 302 -0.0025*** -0.0036*** 0.0005 0.0002 
 (-5.85) (-7.90)  (-4.66) (-6.82) (0.72) (0.62) 
NPL 
302 -0.018 -0.0045*** 302 -0.0005 -0.0029*** 0.0175 0.0016*** 
 (-1.19) (-7.62)  (-0.47) (-5.25) (1.15) (3.86) 
  





Table 4-4 continued 
PRE- AND POST-ACQUISITION CHANGES IN ACQUIRERS’ ACCOUNTING-BASED PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
DURING DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS 
Panel B: Normal times 
 Pre-Merger Post-Merger   
Variable 








Profitability Indicators         
ROA 
184 0.0020*** 0.0020*** 184 0.0006*** 0.0008*** -0.0014*** -0.0012*** 
 (13.03) (9.91)  (3.76) (5.47) (-6.46) (-6.90) 
ROE 
184 0.0506*** 0.0372*** 184 0.0178 0.0165*** -0.0329* -0.0207*** 
 (13.01) (10.93)  (0.96) (7.29) (-1.74) (-5.18) 
NIM 
184 0.0002 0.0001 184 -0.0003** -0.0002** -0.0004** -0.0003** 
 (1.27) (1.05)  (-2.40) (-2.30) (-2.52) (-2.31) 
Efficiency Indicators         
CE 
184 0.0270** 0.0281** 184 -0.0134 -0.0250** -0.0404*** -0.0531*** 
 (2.60) (2.36)  (-1.33) (-2.15) (-2.80) (-3.04) 
TE 
184 0.0303*** 0.0271*** 184 -0.0188* -0.0237** -0.0491*** -0.0508*** 
 (2.82) (2.73)  (-1.82) (-2.25) (-3.29) (-3.43) 
AE 
184 0.0029 0.0277** 184 0.0051 0.0095** 0.0022 -0.0182 
 (0.41) (2.28)  (1.01) (2.32) (0.25) (-1.12) 
Capital Adequacy Indicators         
Loans_cap 
184 -1.2494*** -1.0809*** 184 -0.0987 -1.1358*** 1.1507 -0.0550 
 (-5.90) (-6.01)  (-0.14) (-4.34) (1.59) (1.05) 
Dep_cap 
184 -1.8133*** -1.4706*** 184 0.7640 -0.2353** 2.5773** 1.2352*** 
 (-6.44) (-6.31)  (0.75) (-1.97) (2.43) (3.13) 
Capital 
184 0.0108*** 0.0064*** 184 
-
0.0076*** 
-0.0100*** -0.0184*** -0.0163*** 
 (4.89) (4.02)  (-5.28) (-5.70) (-6.98) (-6.78) 

































Table 4-4 continued 
PRE- AND POST-ACQUISITION CHANGES IN ACQUIRERS’ ACCOUNTING-BASED PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
DURING DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS 
Panel C: Banking Crises 
 Pre-Acquisition Post-Acquisition   







Profitability Indicators         
ROA 229 0.0018*** 0.0016*** 229 0.0006*** 0.0004*** -0.0012*** -0.0011*** 
  (10.94) (10.43)  (5.58) (5.94) (-5.80) (-6.35) 
ROE 229 0.0219*** 0.0213*** 229 0.0142*** 0.0126*** -0.0077 -0.0087*** 
  (3.64) (8.87)  (8.62) (8.97) (-1.23) (-3.71) 
NIM 229 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 229 0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0004** 
  (3.07) (3.04)  (1.00) (0.06) (-1.42) (-2.09) 









-0.1009*** -0.0491*** -0.0556*** 









-0.1216*** -0.0602*** -0.0853*** 
  (-3.12) (-3.29)  (-9.22) (-8.10) (-4.11) (-4.25) 
AE 229 -0.0317*** -0.0064** 229 
-
0.0338*** 
-0.0107** -0.0021 -0.0044 
  (-4.24) (-2.49)  (-3.86) (-2.32) (-0.18) (0.19) 
Capital Adequacy Indicators         
Loans_cap 229 -1.1774*** -1.0270*** 229 -0.2773 -0.0941 0.9002** 0.9329*** 
  (-3.31) (-4.75)  (-1.45) (-0.90) (2.23) (3.48) 
Dep_cap 229 -2.1627*** -1.6468*** 229 -0.2004 0.2366 1.9624*** 1.8834*** 
  (-4.98) (-6.56)  (-0.88) (-0.13) (4.00) (5.33) 
Capital 229 0.0045** -0.0004 229 
-
0.0067*** 
-0.0116*** -0.0112*** -0.0112*** 
  (2.20) (0.85)  (-4.37) (-5.86) (-4.36) (-4.33) 












  (-5.51) (-6.75)  (-4.13) (-6.26) (0.61) (0.01) 




  (-1.10) (-6.34)  (-0.47) (-5.49) (1.07) (2.40) 
 
  





Table 4-4 continued 
PRE- AND POST-ACQUISITION CHANGES IN ACQUIRERS’ ACCOUNTING-BASED PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
DURING DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS 
Panel D: Market Crises 
 Pre-Acquisition Post-Acquisition   







Profitability Indicators         
ROA 73 0.0019*** 0.0023*** 73 0.0008** 0.0002** -0.0011** -0.0021*** 
  (5.29) (4.71)  (2.26) (2.00) (-2.20) (-3.00) 
ROE 73 0.0442*** 0.0367*** 73 0.0228*** 0.0089*** -0.0214** -0.0278*** 
  (6.93) (5.68)  (4.32) (4.04) (-2.58) (-2.58) 
NIM 73 0.0009*** 0.0006*** 73 0.0005* 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0004 
  (3.70) (3.53)  (1.97) (1.56) (-1.29) (-1.60) 
Efficiency Indicators         
CE 73 0.0356* 0.0381* 73 -0.0423*** -0.0463*** -0.0778*** -0.0844*** 
  (1.88) (1.75)  (-3.35) (-3.75) (-3.42) (-2.96) 
TE 73 0.0316* 0.0476 73 -0.0411*** -0.0360*** -0.0728*** -0.0836*** 
  (1.73) (1.63)  (-3.11) (-3.51) (-3.23) (-2.97) 
AE 73 0.0137 0.0339*** 73 -0.0117** -0.0111* -0.0254* -0.0451*** 
  (1.12) (3.08)  (-2.01) (-1.92) (-1.88) (-4.09) 
Capital Adequacy Indicators         
Loans_cap 73 -2.1145*** -2.3774*** 73 0.1269 -0.1473 2.2414*** 2.2301*** 
  (-5.40) (-4.51)  (0.30) (-0.19) (3.86) (3.43) 
Dep_cap 73 -3.4802*** -3.0796*** 73 0.2603 0.3917 3.7406*** 3.4713*** 
  (-6.62) (-5.25)  (0.53) (1.03) (5.19) (4.79) 
Capital 73 0.0090** 0.0048** 73 -0.0095*** -0.0139*** -0.0185*** -0.0186*** 
  (2.62) (2.09)  (-3.29) (-4.63) (-4.12) (-4.56) 
Asset Quality Indicators         
LLA 73 -0.0033** -0.0054*** 73 -0.0026** -0.0040*** 0.0007 0.0014 
  (-2.47) (-4.09)  (-2.18) (-2.86) (0.38) (0.93) 
NPL 73 -0.0055*** -0.0072*** 73 -0.0001 -0.0011 0.0054** 0.0061*** 
  (-3.03) (-4.22)  (-0.08) (-1.17) (2.41) (3.43) 
 
  





Table 4-4 continued 
PRE- AND POST-ACQUISITION CHANGES IN ACQUIRERS’ ACCOUNTING-BASED PERFORMANCE INDICATORS DURING 
DIFFERENT TIME PERIODS 
Panel E: Recent Financial Crisis 
 Pre-Acquisition Post-Acquisition   







Profitability indicators         
ROA 58 0.0028*** 0.0026*** 58 0.0012*** 0.0011*** -0.0016*** -0.0015*** 
  (6.60) (5.73)  (4.20) (4.08) (-3.08) (-3.13) 
ROE 58 0.0153 0.0358*** 58 0.0179*** 0.0187*** 0.0025 -0.0171** 
  (0.86) (3.71)  (4.86) (4.63) (0.14) (-2.04) 
NIM 58 0.0009** 0.0009*** 58 0.0007*** 0.0005*** -0.0002 -0.0004 
  (2.57) (3.20)  (3.05) (3.40) (-0.39) (-0.18) 
Efficiency Indicators         
CE 58 -0.0637*** -0.0938*** 58 -0.0774*** -0.0990*** -0.0137 -0.0051 
  (-2.97) (-3.45)  (-4.39) (-4.86) (-0.49) (-0.61) 
TE 58 -0.0584*** -0.0754*** 58 -0.0642*** -0.0887*** -0.0058 -0.0133 
  (-2.71) (-3.16)  (-2.73) (-2.81) (-0.18) (-0.45) 
AE 58 -0.0398* 0.0039 58 -0.0475* 0.0181 -0.0077 0.0141 
  (-1.98) (-0.96)  (-1.82) (-1.48) (-0.23) (0.53) 
Capital Adequacy Indicators        
Loans_cap 58 1.3655 -0.1568 58 0.0690 -0.0523 -1.2965 0.1045 
  (1.56) (0.32)  (0.29) (0.02) (-1.43) (-0.03) 
Dep_cap 58 1.3178 -0.3454 58 -0.2746 -0.4067 -1.5924 -0.0613 
  (1.27) (-0.66)  (-0.87) (-1.38) (-1.47) (-0.21) 
Capital 58 -0.0054 -0.0122** 58 -0.0053 -0.0105** 0.0001 0.0017 
  (-1.36) (-2.05)  (-1.41) (-2.44) (0.02) (0.39) 
Asset Quality Indicators         
LLA 58 -0.0029*** -0.0032*** 58 -0.0022** -0.0021*** 0.0007 0.0010 
  (-3.58) (-3.67)  (-2.31) (-2.64) (0.54) (0.35) 
NPL 58 -0.0763 -0.0032** 58 0.0041 -0.0012 0.0803 0.0020 
  (-0.97) (-2.12)  (0.82) (-0.65) (1.02) (0.89) 
NOTES: This table reports pre- and post-merger industry-adjusted accounting-based performance measures for the acquiring banks. The cells 
contain the number of observations (N), the mean (mean) and the median (p50) for the averaged industry-adjusted performance measures for 
the 4 quarters before the acquisition (Pre-Acquisition) and 12 quarters after the acquisition (Post-Acquisition). The t-statistics and z-statistics 
presented below the mean and median respectively show the significant differences from zero, which represent the significant difference from 
an average industry bank. The last two columns present the mean and median changes between the post-acquisition and pre-acquisition 
performance measures. Equality tests with the t-statistics and z-statistics are provided in the brackets below. The Performance indicators include 
Profitability Indicators: return on assets (ROA), measured as net income to total assets, return on equity (ROE), measured as net income to 
equity, net interest margin (NIM), measured as the difference between net income and net expense to total assets; Efficiency Indicators: Cost 
efficiency (CE), measured using DEA, and its two components: Technical Efficiency (TE) and Allocative efficiency (AE); Capital Adequacy 
Indicators: Loans to capital (Loans_cap), measured as total loans and leases to total book equity capital, Deposits to capital (Dep_cap), measured 
as total deposits to total book equity capital, Capital, measured as total book equity capital to total assets; Asset Quality Indicators: loan loss 
allowance (LLA), measured as allowance for loans and leases to total loans and leases, non-performing loans (NPL), measured as non-performing 
loans to total loans and leases. All performance measures are adjusted by industry bank average. Industry banks are the banks that operated in 
the same state and the same quarter as the acquiring bank, and exclude the banks that acquired failed bank institutions in the given quarter. 
Panel A and Panel B report the results for crisis periods and normal times, respectively. Crisis periods are two banking crises (the 1990s credit 
crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the global financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4) and three market crises 
(the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 
and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3) full sample 
statistics, Panels C, D and E report separately statistics for the banking crises, market crises and the Global Financial Crisis, respectively. 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
  






DIFFERENT PRE- AND POST-ACQUISITION WINDOW ESTIMATION 
 -1/+5 year window -4/+12 quarter window 




MEAN TEST  
of equality 
MEDIAN TEST 
of equality  
Profitability Indicators     
ROA 
-0.0013*** -0.0014*** -0.0018*** -0.0014*** 
(-8.23) (-9.99) (-7.91) (-10.25) 
ROE 
-0.0242*** -0.0188*** 0.0332 -0.0196*** 
(-6.58) (-7.36) (0.60) (-7.67) 
NIM 
-0.0003* -0.0002** -0.0002 -0.0002* 
(-1.66) (-2.26) (-1.50) (-1.76) 
Efficiency Indicators     
CE 
-0.0650*** -0.0808*** -0.0642*** -0.0767*** 
(-5.96) (-5.91) (-5.98) (-6.08) 
TE 
-0.0753*** -0.0891*** -0.0704*** -0.0812*** 
(-6.68) (-6.54) (-6.17) (-6.10) 
AE 
-0.0068 -0.0305*** -0.0116 -0.015* 
(-1.04) (-3.60) (-1.34) (-1.73) 
Capital Adequacy Indicators     
Loans_cap 
1.5426*** 1.2930*** 0.2376 1.1521*** 
(5.62) (5.49) (0.20) (5.93) 
Dep_cap 
2.7718*** 2.1495*** 0.8333 1.7582*** 
(7.95) (7.72) (0.47) (7.60) 
Capital 
-0.0157*** -0.0161*** -0.0143*** -0.0125*** 
(-8.08) (-8.23) (-7.53) (-8.02) 
Asset Quality Indicators     
LLA 
0.0009 0.0004 0.0015** 0.0005 
(1.35) (1.51) (2.25) (1.19) 
NPL 
0.0173 0.0034*** 0.0231 0.0035*** 
(1.29) (6.17) (1.25) (7.14) 
NOTES: This table reports pre- and post-merger industry-adjusted accounting-based performance measures for the acquiring banks. The 
cells contain the mean (median) tests for the changes in failed bank acquirers’ performance indicators. The first two columns present the 
results for the -1/+5 year window, and the last two columns present the results for the -4/+12 quarter window. The variable changes for 
the -1/+5 window are computed as the change between the average value in the 5 years (20 quarters) post-acquisition and the average value 
of the 1 year (4 quarters) pre-acquisition. The variables changes for the -4/+12 quarter window is the change of the value between the 12th 
quarter post-acquisition and the 4th quarter pre-acquisition. Equality tests with the t-statistics and z-statistics are provided in the brackets 
below. The Performance indicators include Profitability Indicators: return on assets (ROA), measured as net income to total assets, return 
on equity (ROE), measured as net income to equity, net interest margin (NIM), measured as the difference between net income and net 
expense to total assets; Efficiency Indicators: Cost efficiency (CE), measured using DEA, and its two components: Technical Efficiency 
(TE) and Allocative efficiency (AE); Capital Adequacy Indicators: Loans to capital (Loans_cap), measured as total loans and leases to total 
book equity capital, Deposits to capital (Dep_cap), measured as total deposits to total book equity capital, Capital, measured as total book 
equity capital to total assets; Asset Quality Indicators: loan loss allowance (LLA), measured as allowance for loans and leases to total loans 
and leases, non-performing loans (NPL), measured as non-performing loans to total loans and leases. All performance measures are adjusted 
by industry bank average. Industry banks are the banks that operated in the same state and the same quarter as the acquiring bank, and 
exclude the banks that acquired failed bank institutions in the given quarter. 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
 
  






BEFORE AND AFTER THE ENACTMENT OF THE FDICIA 
 Before FDICIA After FDICIA 




MEAN TEST  
of equality 
MEDIAN TEST 
of equality  
Profitability Indicators     
ROA 
-0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0011*** -0.0010*** 
(-7.99) (-8.81) (-3.94) (-4.63) 
ROE 
-0.0268** -0.0188*** -0.0063 -0.0080*** 
(-2.31) (-6.38) (-0.83) (-2.77) 
NIM 
-0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0001 -0.0003 
(-3.83) (-3.45) (-0.54) (-1.21) 
Efficiency Indicators     
CE 
-0.0477*** -0.0593*** -0.0542*** -0.0605*** 
(-4.09) (-4.34) (-3.70) (-3.83) 
TE 
-0.0530*** -0.0616*** -0.0664*** -0.0877*** 
(-4.44) (-4.61) (-4.08) (-4.21) 
AE 
-0.0051 -0.0200*** -0.0021 -0.0083 
(-0.75) (-2.75) (-0.15) (-0.23) 
Capital Adequacy Indicators     
Loans_cap 
1.6059*** 1.2369*** 0.4943 0.5765** 
(3.39) (4.16) (1.06) (1.99) 
Dep_cap 
3.1987*** 2.1124*** 1.1993** 1.4129*** 
(4.72) (6.91) (2.13) (3.47) 
Capital 
-0.0191*** -0.0172*** -0.008*** -0.0079*** 
(-9.12) (-9.10) (-2.79) (-3.05) 
Asset Quality Indicators     
LLA 
0.0001 -0.0006 0.0005 0.0008 
(0.09) (-0.79) (0.60) (0.78) 
NPL 
0.0043*** 0.0037*** 0.0266 0.0009 
(4.10) (5.52) (1.04) (1.57) 
NOTES: This table reports pre- and post-merger industry-adjusted accounting-based performance measures for the acquiring banks. The 
first two columns present the results for the P&A transactions that happened before the enactment of the FDICIA in 1991, and the last two 
columns present the results for the P&A transactions that happened after the enactment of the FDICIA in 1991. The cells contain mean 
and median and median tests of the changes in the averaged industry-adjusted performance measures for the 12 quarters after the merger 
and 4 quarters before the merger. The t-statistics and z-statistics are provided in the brackets below. The Performance indicators include 
Profitability Indicators: return on assets (ROA), measured as net income to total assets, return on equity (ROE), measured as net income to 
equity, net interest margin (NIM), measured as the difference between net income and net expense to total assets; Efficiency Indicators: 
Cost efficiency (CE), measured using DEA, and its two components: Technical Efficiency (TE) and Allocative efficiency (AE); Capital 
Adequacy Indicators: Loans to capital (Loans_cap), measured as total loans and leases to total book equity capital, Deposits to capital 
(Dep_cap), measured as total deposits to total book equity capital, Capital, measured as total book equity capital to total assets; Asset 
Quality Indicators: loan loss allowance (LLA), measured as allowance for loans and leases to total loans and leases, non-performing loans 
(NPL), measured as non-performing loans to total loans and leases. All performance measures are adjusted by industry bank average. 
Industry banks are the banks that operated in the same state and the same quarter as the acquiring bank, and exclude the banks that acquired 
failed bank institutions in the given quarter. 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
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NOTES: This table reports pre- and post-merger industry-adjusted accounting-based performance measures for the acquiring banks for the 
largest deals in the sample. The largest deals are the ones, where the relative size of the target to the acquirer is larger than the median relative 
size in the sample (0.3954). The cells contain mean and median and median tests of the changes in the averaged industry-adjusted 
performance measures for the 12 quarters after the merger and 4 quarters before the merger. The t-statistics and z-statistics are provided in 
the brackets below. The Performance indicators include Profitability Indicators: return on assets (ROA), measured as net income to total 
assets, return on equity (ROE), measured as net income to equity, net interest margin (NIM), measured as the difference between net 
income and net expense to total assets; Efficiency Indicators: Cost efficiency (CE), measured using DEA, and its two components: Technical 
Efficiency (TE) and Allocative efficiency (AE); Capital Adequacy Indicators: Loans to capital (Loans_cap), measured as total loans and 
leases to total book equity capital, Deposits to capital (Dep_cap), measured as total deposits to total book equity capital, Capital, measured 
as total book equity capital to total assets; Asset Quality Indicators: loan loss allowance (LLA), measured as allowance for loans and leases 
to total loans and leases, non-performing loans (NPL), measured as non-performing loans to total loans and leases. All performance 
measures are adjusted by industry bank average. Industry banks are the banks that operated in the same state and the same quarter as the 
acquiring bank, and exclude the banks that acquired failed bank institutions in the given quarter. 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
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NOTES: This table reports pre- and post-merger industry-adjusted accounting-based performance measures for the acquiring banks for the 
largest deals in the sample. The largest deals are the ones, where the relative size of the target to the acquirer is larger than the median relative 
size in the sample (0.3954). The cells contain mean and median and median tests of the changes in the averaged industry-adjusted 
performance measures for the 12 quarters after the merger and 4 quarters before the merger. The t-statistics and z-statistics are provided in 
the brackets below. The Performance indicators include Profitability Indicators: return on assets (ROA), measured as net income to total 
assets, return on equity (ROE), measured as net income to equity, net interest margin (NIM), measured as the difference between net 
income and net expense to total assets; Efficiency Indicators: Cost efficiency (CE), measured using DEA, and its two components: Technical 
Efficiency (TE) and Allocative efficiency (AE); Capital Adequacy Indicators: Loans to capital (Loans_cap), measured as total loans and 
leases to total book equity capital, Deposits to capital (Dep_cap), measured as total deposits to total book equity capital, Capital, measured 
as total book equity capital to total assets; Asset Quality Indicators: loan loss allowance (LLA), measured as allowance for loans and leases 
to total loans and leases, non-performing loans (NPL), measured as non-performing loans to total loans and leases. All performance 
measures are adjusted by industry bank average. Industry banks are the banks that operated in the same state and the same quarter as the 
acquiring bank, and exclude the banks that acquired failed bank institutions in the given quarter. 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 






REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
 Profitability Indicators Efficiency Indicators Capital Adequacy Indicators Asset Quality Indicators 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES ΔROA ΔROE ΔNIM ΔCE ΔTE ΔAE ΔLoans_cap ΔDep_cap ΔCapital ΔLLA ΔNPL 
Sizet-1 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 
 (6.032) (-0.289) (2.983) (0.156) (0.167) (1.476) (0.092) (-0.848) (1.340) (-0.628) (2.310) 
Rel_size 0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 0.064 0.375** -0.003 -0.002*** -0.000 
 (0.718) (0.124) (-2.204) (-0.647) (-0.739) (-0.401) (0.473) (2.044) (-1.573) (-5.529) (-0.084) 
Capitalt-1 -0.002 -0.094 -0.009*** -0.169 -0.156 -0.110 12.850 20.183  -0.006 -0.001 
 (-0.457) (-0.420) (-3.047) (-0.740) (-0.572) (-0.589) (1.385) (1.607)  (-0.532) (-0.053) 
NPLt-1 0.009 0.738 -0.010 0.133 0.303 -0.202 18.973 27.628 0.020 -0.047  
 (0.939) (1.400) (-1.659) (0.407) (0.774) (-0.673) (1.143) (1.021) (0.310) (-1.238)  
LLAt-1 0.023 1.136* -0.006 -0.005 0.175 -0.039 -86.432** -126.103*** 0.167  -0.317*** 
 (1.269) (1.866) (-0.585) (-0.007) (0.237) (-0.085) (-2.543) (-2.738) (1.562)  (-3.309) 
Same_state -0.000 0.011 0.001 -0.070** -0.093** 0.013 0.320 -0.186 -0.016** 0.001 -0.005 
 (-0.577) (0.402) (1.441) (-2.573) (-2.154) (0.478) (0.272) (-0.115) (-2.375) (0.476) (-0.963) 
A_age -0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.722 -1.156 0.007*** -0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.563) (-0.134) (0.366) (-0.309) (-0.306) (-0.811) (-1.487) (-1.583) (4.659) (-0.574) (-1.303) 
T_age 0.000 0.005 -0.000 0.006 0.007 -0.003 -0.119 -0.023 -0.002* -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.716) (1.651) (-0.402) (1.127) (1.227) (-0.961) (-0.716) (-0.101) (-1.915) (-0.360) (-0.197) 
LSA -0.002*** 0.021 -0.000 0.018 0.035 -0.013 -4.061* -5.878** 0.006 0.001 -0.001 
 (-5.366) (0.514) (-0.598) (0.873) (1.267) (-0.711) (-1.883) (-2.374) (1.308) (0.683) (-0.106) 
FDICIA 0.000** 0.013 0.000** -0.018 -0.028 0.005 -0.558 -1.276** 0.007** -0.000 -0.004*** 
 (2.235) (1.279) (2.457) (-1.069) (-1.468) (0.433) (-1.089) (-2.004) (2.219) (-0.106) (-3.183) 
Banking Crisis 0.000 0.025 -0.000 0.003 0.005 -0.008 0.846 1.366 -0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (1.102) (1.387) (-0.753) (0.213) (0.293) (-0.715) (1.058) (1.185) (-0.441) (0.691) (0.088) 
Market Crisis 0.000 0.008 0.000 -0.039* -0.025 -0.027** 1.264 1.341 -0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.448) (0.362) (0.252) (-1.964) (-1.309) (-2.186) (1.433) (1.050) (-0.306) (1.391) (0.398) 
Constant -0.001 -0.077 0.000 0.033 0.039 0.028 3.648 6.527 -0.024*** 0.002 -0.062 
 (-1.165) (-0.902) (0.055) (0.726) (0.682) (0.681) (1.027) (1.275) (-2.654) (0.800) (-1.440) 
Observations 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 486 
R-squared 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.08 0.10 
NOTES: This table presents OLS regression results for the changes in industry-adjusted performance measures of failed bank acquirers. The dependent variables include ΔROA (the change in return on assets), ΔROE 
(the change in return in equity), ΔNIM (the change in net interest margin), ΔCE (the change in cost efficiency), ΔTE (the change in technical efficiency), ΔAE (the change in allocative efficiency), ΔLoans_cap (the 
change in the loans to equity ratio), ΔDep_cap (the change in the deposits to equity ratio), ΔCapital (the change in equity to assets ratio), ΔLLA (the change in loan loss allowance to total loans and leases ratio), ΔNPL 
(the change in non-performing loans to total loans and leases ratio). All the dependent variables are calculated as the difference between the average industry-adjusted value of 12 quarters post- and the average industry-
adjusted value of 4 quarters pre-acquisition. The explanatory variables include Size (the log of acquiring banks’ total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real terms), Rel_size (the ratio of the total assets 
of the target to total assets of the acquirer), Capital (the ratio between the acquirers’ bank book value of equity and bank total assets), NPL (the ratio between acquirers’ non-performing loans and total loans and leases), 
LLA (the ratio between the acquirers’ loan loss allowance and total loans and leases), Same_state (a dummy variable that equals one if both, the target and the acquirer, are headquartered in the same state, and zero 
otherwise), A_age (the log of the age of the acquirer), T_age (the log of the age of the target), LSA (a dummy that equals one if the P&A transaction included a loss sharing agreement, and zero otherwise), FDICIA (a 
dummy that equals one if the P&A transaction happened after the enactment of the FDICIA in 1991, and zero otherwise), Banking Crisis (a dummy variable that equals one if the P&A transaction happened during a 
banking crisis period, and zero otherwise), Market Crisis (a dummy variable that equals one if the P&A transaction happened during a market crisis period, and zero otherwise). Banking crises are the 1990s credit 
crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4, and the global financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4; and the market crises are the stock market crash in 1987:Q4, the Russian debt crisis together with 
the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4, and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3. Size, Rel_size, 
Capital, NPL and LLA are measured with a one quarter lag. The coefficients presented show how much a one unit change in the independent variable increases (decreases) the dependent variables. All models are 
estimated with robust standard errors clustered by quarter. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 






ACTUAL RELATIVE SIZE (USING THE TOTAL ASSETS ACQUIRED TO TOTAL ASSETS OF THE ACQUIRING BANK) 
 Profitability Indicators Efficiency Indicators Capital Adequacy Indicators Asset Quality Indicators 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES ΔROA ΔROE ΔNIM ΔCE ΔTE ΔAE ΔLoans_cap ΔDep_cap ΔCapital ΔLLA ΔNPL 
Sizet-1 0.000*** -0.000 0.000** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 
 (7.350) (-0.410) (2.650) (-0.615) (-0.365) (0.888) (-0.078) (-0.551) (0.991) (-0.872) (3.431) 
Rel_size* 0.001* -0.042 0.000* -0.015 -0.012 0.001 1.307 1.085 0.000 -0.002 0.006** 
 (1.848) (-0.840) (1.720) (-0.715) (-0.501) (0.030) (1.041) (0.675) (0.064) (-1.253) (2.686) 
Capitalt-1 -0.005 -0.052 -0.010*** -0.389 -0.578 -0.072 6.972 13.417  0.014 0.006 
 (-0.810) (-0.141) (-3.143) (-1.075) (-1.265) (-0.231) (0.342) (0.511)  (0.680) (0.177) 
NPLt-1 -0.003 1.588 -0.027*** 0.751 0.757 0.072 18.995 19.614 0.141** -0.059  
 (-0.169) (1.024) (-3.412) (1.230) (1.220) (0.104) (0.524) (0.385) (2.592) (-1.465)  
LLAt-1 0.020 0.966 -0.018 -0.417 0.110 -0.834 -73.704 -64.892 -0.137  -0.102 
 (0.973) (1.324) (-1.246) (-0.439) (0.106) (-1.115) (-1.672) (-1.227) (-0.826)  (-1.198) 
Same_state -0.000 0.015 0.001 -0.057* -0.081* 0.013 0.464 -0.052 -0.015** -0.001 -0.004 
 (-0.310) (0.492) (1.563) (-1.994) (-1.927) (0.449) (0.420) (-0.036) (-2.439) (-0.228) (-1.207) 
A_age -0.000 -0.015 0.000 0.009 0.006 0.001 -0.856 -1.101 0.006*** 0.001 -0.000 
 (-0.070) (-0.741) (0.762) (1.055) (0.576) (0.131) (-1.480) (-1.390) (3.866) (0.714) (-0.068) 
T_age 0.000** 0.017* -0.000 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.401 -0.443 -0.002 -0.001*** -0.002** 
 (2.318) (1.769) (-0.728) (-0.755) (-0.560) (-0.597) (-0.999) (-0.878) (-1.353) (-2.746) (-2.265) 
LSA -0.001*** 0.050 -0.000 0.008 0.023 -0.018 -5.194** -6.886** 0.003 -0.000 -0.005 
 (-4.283) (0.993) (-1.030) (0.389) (0.763) (-0.917) (-2.194) (-2.441) (0.606) (-0.056) (-0.880) 
FDICIA 0.001* 0.004 0.001*** -0.037 -0.048* 0.012 -0.322 -1.241 0.010** -0.000 -0.002* 
 (1.996) (0.204) (2.795) (-1.588) (-1.689) (0.764) (-0.376) (-1.181) (2.525) (-0.332) (-1.824) 
Banking Crisis 0.000 0.044 -0.000 0.037 0.043 -0.009 1.998* 3.205** -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.892) (1.582) (-1.501) (1.525) (1.569) (-0.637) (1.931) (2.371) (-0.231) (0.283) (-0.681) 
Market Crisis 0.002*** 0.058** -0.000 0.017 0.020 -0.020 1.847* 1.647 0.006 -0.005 -0.002 
 (2.743) (2.081) (-0.159) (0.355) (0.370) (-0.464) (1.724) (1.154) (0.641) (-1.323) (-0.696) 
Constant -0.003*** -0.072 0.000 0.041 0.076 0.013 3.795 5.612 -0.019** 0.004 0.016** 
 (-2.740) (-0.490) (0.454) (0.746) (1.158) (0.242) (0.731) (0.817) (-2.117) (0.864) (2.273) 
Observations 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
R-squared 0.15 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.20 0.05 0.17 
NOTES: This table presents OLS regression results for the changes in industry-adjusted performance measures of failed bank acquirers. The dependent variables include ΔROA (the change in return on assets), ΔROE 
(the change in return in equity), ΔNIM (the change in net interest margin), ΔCE (the change in cost efficiency), ΔTE (the change in technical efficiency), ΔAE (the change in allocative efficiency), ΔLoans_cap (the 
change in the loans to equity ratio), ΔDep_cap (the change in the deposits to equity ratio), ΔCapital (the change in equity to assets ratio), ΔLLA (the change in loan loss allowance to total loans and leases ratio), 
ΔNPL (the change in non-performing loans to total loans and leases ratio). All the dependent variables are calculated as the difference between the average industry-adjusted value of 12 quarters post- and the average 
industry-adjusted value of 4 quarters pre-acquisition. The explanatory variables include Size (the log of acquiring banks’ total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real terms), Rel_size* (the ratio of the 
total assets of the target sold to total assets of the acquirer), Capital (the ratio between the acquirers’ bank book value of equity and bank total assets), NPL (the ratio between acquirers’ non-performing loans and total 
loans and leases), LLA (the ratio between the acquirers’ loan loss allowance and total loans and leases), Same_state (a dummy variable that equals one if both, the target and the acquirer, are headquartered in the same 
state, and zero otherwise), A_age (the log of the age of the acquirer), T_age (the log of the age of the target), LSA (a dummy that equals one if the P&A transaction included a loss sharing agreement, and zero 
otherwise), FDICIA (a dummy that equals one if the P&A transaction happened after the enactment of the FDICIA in 1991, and zero otherwise), Banking Crisis (a dummy variable that equals one if the P&A 
transaction happened during a banking crisis period, and zero otherwise), Market Crisis (a dummy variable that equals one if the P&A transaction happened during a market crisis period, and zero otherwise). Banking 
crises are the 1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4, and the global financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4; and the market crises are the stock market crash in 1987:Q4, the Russian 
debt crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4, and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 
2002:Q3. Size, Rel_size, Eq, NPL and LLA are measured with a one quarter lag. The coefficients presented show how much a one unit change in the independent variable increases (decreases) the dependent variables. 
All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by quarter. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 






FAILED BANK ACQUISITIONS AND PROBABILITY OF FAILING 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES FBA4 FBA8 FBA12 
FBA4 0.106**   
 (-2.256)   
FBA8  0.480***  
  (-2.628)  
FBA12   0.745 
   (-1.618) 
ROA t-2 0.451*** 0.450*** 0.450*** 
 (-17.690) (-17.702) (-17.707) 
Size t-2 0.944** 0.945** 0.944** 
 (-2.475) (-2.429) (-2.482) 
Capital t-2 0.338*** 0.338*** 0.338*** 
 (-22.903) (-22.901) (-22.895) 
NPL t-2 1.126*** 1.126*** 1.126*** 
 (9.083) (9.096) (9.111) 
M_share t-2 1.026 1.026 1.024 
 (1.299) (1.254) (1.165) 
TMTF t-2 0.915** 0.914** 0.915** 
 (-2.242) (-2.257) (-2.218) 
Growth t-2 0.876*** 0.877*** 0.877*** 
 (-5.297) (-5.267) (-5.260) 
Young t-2 1.121** 1.122** 1.121** 
 (2.396) (2.417) (2.396) 
Crisis t-2 1.575*** 1.574*** 1.574*** 
 (10.004) (9.986) (9.978) 
CE t-2 0.994*** 0.994*** 0.994*** 
 (-4.037) (-4.068) (-4.062) 
Constant 0.286*** 0.284*** 0.285*** 
 (-2.854) (-2.868) (-2.863) 
Observations 1,160,810 1,160,810 1,160,810 
NOTES: This table shows the results of how having acquired a failing bank in the preceding 4 (FBA4), 8 (FBA8), and 12 (FBA12) quarters 
affect banks’ probability of failing. The method employed is a parametric survival (PS) model, with a Gompertz proportional hazard function. 
The dependent variable, Fail, is a dummy that equals one if a bank failed in a given quarter, and zero otherwise. ROA is the ratio between 
bank net income and bank total assets, Size is the log of bank total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real terms, CE is the 
cost efficiency, measured using DEA, Capital is the ratio between bank book value of equity and bank total assets, NPL is the ratio between 
non-performing loans and total loans and leases, M_Share is the ratio between bank total assets and the volume of bank total assets in the 
State where the bank is chartered, TMTF is the average capital ratio of the other banks in the same State, Growth is the quarterly change of 
personal income growth in the State where the bank is chartered, and Young is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is young, and zero 
otherwise. Young is defined as a bank, which is younger that the first quartile of the banks’ age in the sample. Crises is a dummy that equals 
one for periods of financial distress and the following four quarters. Crisis periods are two banking crises (the 1990s credit crunch between 
1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the global financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4) and three market crises (the stock market 
crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; 
and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3). All independent variables 
apart from Crises and Young are lagged by two quarters to avoid possible endogeneity. The coefficients presented are hazard rates, which 
show how much a one unit change in the independent variable increases (decreases) the probability of a bank's failure. z values are provided 
in parentheses; values below one indicate a decline in bank probability of failure, and values above one indicate an increase in the independent 
variable. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. 
* Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
 
  






FAILED BANK ACQUISITIONS AND THE PROBABILITY OF BEING ACQUIRED 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES FBA4 FBA8 FBA12 
FBA4 0.366***   
 (-5.427)   
FBA8  0.409***  
  (-6.649)  
FBA12   0.510*** 
   (-6.557) 
ROA t-2 0.766*** 0.766*** 0.766*** 
 (-14.475) (-14.482) (-14.476) 
Size t-2 1.169*** 1.172*** 1.172*** 
 (16.891) (17.085) (17.130) 
CE t-2 0.995*** 0.995*** 0.995*** 
 (-8.495) (-8.511) (-8.526) 
Capital t-2 0.967*** 0.967*** 0.967*** 
 (-7.244) (-7.226) (-7.233) 
NPL t-2 0.919*** 0.920*** 0.920*** 
 (-9.516) (-9.455) (-9.462) 
M_share t-2 0.998 0.998 0.999 
 (-0.430) (-0.403) (-0.388) 
TMTF t-2 0.933*** 0.931*** 0.930*** 
 (-5.229) (-5.375) (-5.399) 
Growth t-2 1.046*** 1.047*** 1.047*** 
 (5.700) (5.707) (5.734) 
Young t-2 1.437*** 1.438*** 1.438*** 
 (17.555) (17.566) (17.559) 
Crisis t-2 0.957** 0.958** 0.957** 
 (-2.223) (-2.189) (-2.222) 
Constant 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (-43.777) (-43.817) (-43.826) 
Observations 1,171,602 1,171,602 1,171,602 
NOTES: This table shows the results of how having acquired a failing bank in the preceding 4 (FBA4), 8 (FBA8), and 12 (FBA12) quarters 
affect banks’ probability of being acquired. The method employed is a parametric survival (PS) model, with a Gompertz proportional hazard 
function. The dependent variable, Acq, is a dummy that equals one if a bank was acquired in a given quarter, and zero otherwise. ROA is the 
ratio between bank net income and bank total assets, Size is the log of bank total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real 
terms, CE is the cost efficiency, measured using DEA, Capital is the ratio between bank book value of equity and bank total assets, NPL is 
the ratio between non-performing loans and total loans, M_Share is the ratio between bank total assets and the volume of bank total assets 
in the State where the bank is chartered, TMTF is the average capital ratio of the other banks in the same State, Growth is the quarterly 
change of personal income growth in the State where the bank is chartered, and Young is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is young, 
and zero otherwise. Young is defined as a bank, which is younger that the first quartile of the banks’ age in the sample. Crises is a dummy 
that equals one for periods of financial distress and the following four quarters. Crisis periods are two banking crises (the 1990s credit crunch 
between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the global financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4) and three market crises (the 
stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 
and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3). All 
independent variables apart from Crises and Young are lagged by two quarters to avoid possible endogeneity. The coefficients presented are 
hazard rates, which show how much a one unit change in the independent variable increases (decreases) the probability of a bank's failure. z 
values are provided in parentheses; values below one indicate a decline in bank probability of failure, and values above one indicate an increase 
in the independent variable. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. 









This chapter employs  a sample of 1,040 failed bank P&A transactions, selected for the period 
between 1986 and 2013, to explore how competitive pressures in the banking markets affect 
failed bank resolution costs. Since the establishment in 1933, the FDIC acted as a receiver for 
over 2,500 failed banks and thrifts, which cost the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) a total of 118.5 
billion US dollars to resolve these failures. While the FDIC has been appointed as the most 
efficient receiver of failed banks, the recent wave of bank failures has depleted the insurance 
funds to a record high negative balance of -$20.9 billion (Davison and Carreon, 2010). As a 
result, the FDIC has once again become under the scrutiny of regulators and practitioners, 
bringing back the debate amongst academics as to what drives the resolution costs stemming 
from bank failures. 
In this respect, the point of departure of the analysis presented in this chapter is the set 
of studies that have shown that a higher charter value of a failed bank, which has been by and 
large associated with limited market competition (Buser et al., 1981; Keeley, 1990; Repullo, 
2004), reduces resolution costs (Giliberto and Varaiya, 1989; James, 1991).  Accordingly, the 
Chapter 5. The Effects of Competitive Pressures on 
Failed Bank Resolution Costs 
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chapter postulates that resolution costs are not independent from competitive pressures in the 
banking market. 
Although largely omitted from the existing research, understanding the impact of 
competitive pressures on failed bank resolution costs is important for several reasons. First, if 
increased competitive pressures erode the values of banks’ charters, as suggested by Keeley 
(1990), and, in turn, increases the costs to the FDIC (Giliberto and Varaiya, 1989; and James, 
1991), perhaps a wider use of alternative resolution methods, such as deposit payoffs, should be 
considered in markets that have higher competitive pressures30. Second, the characteristics that 
make a failed bank more (less) desirable may be different across markets with different levels of 
competition (Gorton et al., 2009). Understanding these factors would, therefore, help the FDIC 
to design and market failed bank auctions in a way to attract more and higher bids to the 
advantage of the FDIC. 
To understand how market competitive pressures influence resolution costs, the analysis 
employs the adoption of intrastate branching deregulation in the US as an exogenous shock to 
the degree of market competitive pressures31.  Since the 1970s, the US banking industry changed 
significantly following the relaxation of intrastate branching and interstate banking laws (see, for 
instance, Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Demyanyk et al, 2007; and Gorton et al., 2009). The rapid 
consolidation process that followed considerably changed the competitive dynamics in the 
markets: the average size of a bank increased (Demyanyk et al., 2007), and small banks lost their 
market share (Calem, 1994).  
                                                 
30 It is argued that the value of a franchise is lost, when deposit payoff is used (see, for instance, James, 1991; and 
Bennett and Unal, 2014). However, if the franchise value diminishes in highly competitive markets, perhaps the use 
of deposit payoffs may be a preferable choice for the FDIC for banks that fail in those markets.  
31 The focus is on intrastate rather than interstate deregulation, because due to the S&L crisis in the 1980s, federal 
legislators allowed interstate acquisitions of failed banks and thrifts regardless of the individual state laws (Kerr and 
Nanda, 2009). 





Despite the important implications that the deregulation process has in terms of 
competitive dynamics, to the best of my knowledge, only one early study has attempted to 
examine the relation between such event and failed bank resolution costs. Specifically, James 
(1991) has employed branching deregulation as a determinant of change in the value of the 
charter to explain the losses realized in bank failures without offering conclusive evidence. 
This chapter differs from the study of James (1991) in several ways. First, the analysis 
presented here includes larger pre- and post-deregulation periods for numerous US states. In 
contrast, the analysis of James (1991) includes failed bank resolutions that occurred from 1985 
to the mid-year of 1988, a period where only 7 states experienced the adoption of branching 
deregulation. However, as well as James (1991), the results presented in this chapter do not show 
any direct effect of branching deregulation on failed bank resolution costs. 
Second, the analysis continues by evaluating whether the effect of the shift in competitive 
pressures on resolution costs was dependent on the relative size of the survived banks and the 
size of the failing bank. The relative size factor employed in this study reflects several important 
elements. First, it shows the ability of the survived banks in the local market to acquire the failing 
firms. It is likely that in markets, where the failing bank is relatively large compared to the 
potential acquirers, survived banks in the local market will be less able to offer high bids in failed 
bank auctions, thus, increasing the costs to the FDIC. Second, in markets where branching 
through M&As is allowed, the relative size variable shows the average size of other potential 
acquisitions compared to that of the failing bank. Although a number of studies use the size of 
the failing firm as a factor to explain failed bank resolutions costs (see, for instance, Schaeck, 
2008; Bennett and Unal, 2014; and Kang et al., 2015), the results are highly mixed32. If, in fact, 
                                                 
32 On the one hand, Schaeck (2008) shows that the size of the failing bank is positively related to resolution costs. 
On the other hand, Bennett and Unal (2014) find that lower losses were incurred when resolving larger banks. 





size is an important determinant for potential acquirers, in a market, where alternative targets 
exist, the relative size is a more appropriate measure of size. 
This chapter shows that the effect of intrastate deregulation was dependent on the 
relative size variable. In fact, it is shown that deregulation reduced failed bank resolution costs 
for those failing banks that were closest by size to an average survived bank, whereas the costs 
increased for the relatively smallest failed banks. These findings have a sensible economic 
interpretation. When the restrictions to merge are relaxed, survived banks race to expand their 
market shares by acquiring relatively large institutions. In this case, the relative size factor seems 
to reflect the size of the target relative to other potential acquisition targets rather than the ability 
for the survived banks to acquire. 
Finally, this chapter contributes to the existing literature by analyzing whether branching 
deregulation effect, and by implication the effect of competitive pressures, was different in crisis 
periods and normal times. Stemming from existing evidence that costs to resolve failed banks 
increase during times of economic distress (see, for instance, Bennett and Unal, 2014), the initial 
conjecture is that the effects of branching deregulation materialize merely in normal times. For 
competitive pressures in the market to have an effect on failed bank resolution costs, the 
increased (reduced) incentives to participate in a failed bank auction should be evident in terms 
of increased (reduced) number of bidders and the value of bids offered. However, as argued 
Bennett and Unal (2014), when the industry is in distress, there is a lack of viable bidders in the 
market, and the knowledge of this motivates the existing potential buyers to offer lower bids. 
                                                 
Finally, Kang et al. (2015) shows a positive relation between the size of the failing bank and resolution costs for the 
1986 to 1992 period, however, no significant effect of size was found for the resolutions in the 2008-2012 period. 





Essentially, the findings confirm the expectations and show that the effect of deregulation was 
significant only during normal times. 
The analysis in this chapter further extends the debate on factors that influence failed 
bank resolution costs. The consensus stemming from existing studies is that better quality of 
failed banks’ assets and better macroeconomic conditions reduce the resolution costs incurred 
by the FDIC (see, for instance, Barth et al., 1990; Schaeck, 2008; Bennett and Unal, 2014; and 
Kang et al., 2015). Other factors found to reduce failed bank resolution costs include a greater 
level of the target’s information transparency (Granja, 2013; Granja et al., 2014), lower levels of 
insider loans- a proxy for fraud (Bennett and Unal, 2014), acquirer’s geographic proximity 
(Granja et al., 2014; and Cowan and Salotti, 2015). Finally, bids, which are inversely related to 
resolution costs (Bennett and Unal, 2014), have been found to increase with the number of 
bidders participating in the auction (James and Wier, 1987; Bennett and Unal, 2014). 
The remaining part of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section introduces 
the related literature and presents the development of the hypotheses. The third section 
describes the sample and methodology employed in this chapter. Section 5.4 and section 5.5 
present the results of the analysis and robustness checks, respectively. Finally, conclusions are 
drawn in section 5.6. 
5.2.1. The Effects of Intrastate Deregulation on Failed Bank Resolution Costs 
The existing literature suggests that restrictions on competition should reduce failed bank 
resolution costs (James, 1991). In this regard, studies have identified two main reasons that 
motivate the relationship between restrictions on competition and failed bank resolution costs 
(or the value of the bids offered). 
5.2. Related Research and the Development of Hypotheses 





First, limitations on entry and/or expansion increase the local banks’ franchise values 
(see, for instance, Giliberto and Varaiya, 1989; James, 1991) and, consequently, the potential 
value of the bids in the resolution process. More specifically, the value of a bank’s franchise is 
determined by “the capitalized value of expected future profits” (Hellmann et al., 2000), and this 
is by and large associated with limited competition due to tough entry requirements in local 
banking markets (see, for example, Buser et al., 1981; Keeley, 1990; Repullo, 2004). 
Second, in regulated markets, where alternative takeover targets are limited, branching 
through failed bank acquisitions may be a more attractive expansionary strategy, prompting 
overbidding in failed bank auctions (Bertin et al., 1989). In more detail, branching deregulation 
in the US changed the competitive dynamics in the market, which in turn had a great influence 
on the consolidation process (see, for instance, Palia, 1993; Demyanyk et al., 2007). The lifting 
of restrictions to participate in M&As increased the numbers of potential acquisition targets, 
thus, likely reducing the incentives to bid in failed bank auctions. In this regard, Bertin et al. 
(1989) show that cumulative abnormal returns were higher for those failed bank acquirers, which 
were located in the states that allowed branch banking, and offer the following explanation. “The 
ability to branch statewide promotes an active takeover market that provides management with 
value-maximizing incentives and also reduces the attraction to branching through failed bank 
acquisitions. Thus, the existence of unrestricted statewide branching reinforces the underbidding 
behaviour”. 
The above arguments imply that lifting branching restrictions in the US eroded bank 
charter values, as suggested by Keeley (1990), with the consequence of increased resolution costs 
of failed banks.  





Empirical support for this prediction is, however, scarce. The direct relationship between 
branching restrictions and failed bank resolution costs has been studied only by a very limited 
number of early studies and under an empirical setting that makes it problematic to infer the 
competitive effects of the deregulation process. 
Specifically, James (1991) studies 412 bank failures in the period between 1985 and 1988 
and he fails to find any significant relation between the losses realized in failed bank resolutions 
and state branching laws. The lack of evidence to support the relation between branching 
deregulation and resolution costs in his study, however, may be a result of the limited 
deregulation events in the sample period analysed. Specifically, only seven states experienced the 
adoption of branching deregulation in the years between 1985 and 1988. He further employs 
core deposits as a proxy for the value of the charter of the failed bank to analyse its effects on 
resolution costs and the level of bids offered in the auction process and shows that the higher 
the level of core deposits (charter value) the lower are the resolution costs incurred by the FDIC, 
which suggests that “at least a portion of the bank's charter value accrues to the FDIC”. In 
addition, he finds a positive and significant effect of core deposits on the premiums paid in failed 
bank auctions, which is consistent with the notion that core deposits contribute to the value of 
the charter. 
In a similar manner, Giliberto and Varaiya (1989) test state branching restrictions as a 
control variable to test for the effects the value of the charter has on the value of the bids offered 
in 219 failed bank auctions over the 1975-1985 period. Again, they do not find any statistically 
significant relation between the branching restrictions and the value of the bids offered, and 
explain this as follows. Because the states with restrictions on branching are neighbouring states, 
the Federal District control that they include in their analysis might already reflect the restrictions 





on branching. However, similarly to James (1991) they show that the value of bids increases with 
the level of core deposits acquired. 
The empirical evidence contradicts, therefore, the theory of aforementioned studies, 
which suggests that branching deregulation should have increased the failed bank resolution 
costs incurred by the FDIC. The lack of evidence on the relationship between state branching 
restrictions and resolution costs and/or the premiums paid in failed bank auctions suggests other 
factors may affect these relations. In particular, none of the existing studies differentiate how 
the impact of the deregulation process might depend on the characteristics of the failed 
institution. 
In this respect, it is likely that in an environment with higher competitive pressures, 
gaining an additional share in the market drives the acquisition process. Gorton et al. (2009) 
suggest that regime shifts (in technology or regulation such as the intrastate deregulation) makes 
larger firms more attractive acquisition targets due to economies of scale. Accordingly, if the 
competitive pressure is higher, due to the anticipation of other banks expansion, healthy banks 
may bid high to take over a large failing institution. It is, therefore, plausible that the size of the 
failing bank should have an impact on failed bank resolution costs when the competitive dynamic 
changes. 
The more general nexus between the size of the failing bank and the losses incurred by 
the FDIC in the existing literature is mixed. On the one hand, Schaeck (2008) shows that in the 
period between 1984 and 2003 the losses to FDIC were positively related to the size of the failing 
target. On the other hand, Bennett and Unal (2014) find that larger banks were less costly to 
resolve in the period between 1986 and 2007. Finally, Kang et al. (2015) find that smaller banks 





were more costly to resolve in the period between 1986 and 1992. The effect of size was, 
however, not significant for the resolution costs that occurred in the 2008-2012 period.  
The contradictory results regarding the relation between the size of the failing bank and 
the resolution costs are not entirely surprising. First, the observed time frames in these studies 
differ. Based on the theory proposed by Gorton et al. (2009), the race to expand the market 
share may be induced by a regime shift. Therefore, large institutions may be preferable targets 
in more competitive markets or in markets where there is high anticipation of increased merger 
activities amongst rivals. It follows that the relation between the size of the failing institution 
and the costs to the FDIC may be dependent on individual states’ restrictions on competition.  
Furthermore, the size variable employed in these studies does  not reflect how large (or 
small) a failing bank is in the given local market. As a result, the relative size of other banks in 
the market to that of the failing bank (hereinafter relative size) may be a more appropriate 
measure of size in the context of a regulatory shift that modifies competitive conditions. More 
precisely, a relative size measure  provides indications not only for the size of the failing bank in 
the market, but also for the average size of alternative takeover targets and/or the average size 
of potential acquirers. 
Given the arguments discussed above, it is argued in this chapter that failed bank 
resolution costs depend on the interplay between the shift in competition induced by the removal 
of branching restrictions imposed by individual state laws and the size distribution of the 
surviving banks and the failed bank.  
In this respect, the following two hypotheses are formulated: 
Hypothesis 1: An increase in competitive pressures increased failed bank resolution 
costs for those banks that were relatively smaller to other banks in the market. 





Hypothesis 2: An increase in competitive preesures reduced failed bank resolution costs 
for those banks that were relatively larger to other banks in the market. 
5.2.2. Crises Effects 
Additional studies have also drawn attention to the effect of crises on failed bank resolution 
costs. The general view is that crisis periods increase failed banks’ resolution costs substantially. 
This is because during periods of severe economic distress more failed banks are auctioned off, 
less and lower bids are received, and liquidity constraints in the banking industry result in failed 
banks being bought at fire-sale prices, thus increasing the costs to the insurance fund (see, 
Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008; Schaeck, 2008). Bennet and 
Unal (2014) show that once the industry escaped the 1986-1991 crisis period, the FDIC received 
higher bids for failed banks, which in turn led to lower costs. In this regard, Schaeck (2008) 
suggests that during episodes of economic distress, it is more cost-effective for the FDIC to 
liquidate the failed banks’ assets, even after controlling for the premiums paid for the franchise 
value in private-sector reorganizations. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) argue that it becomes 
optimal for the regulators to bail out banks, which in turn, increases the incentives for banks to 
herd ex-ante, thus increasing the risk of them failing together. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) 
show that in order to avoid the ex-ante herding, liquidity provisions should be provided for the 
surviving banks to purchase the failed banks.  
From the studies above, it follows that deregulation might have the anticipated reducing 
effect on failed bank resolution costs only during normal times, whereas this effect may fail to 
materialise during periods of economic distress. In this regard, the following hypothesis is 
constructed: 
Hypothesis 3: Deregulation reduced failed bank resolution costs only in normal times.  





Validation of Hypothesis 3 would verify the findings of Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008) 
and Bennet and Unal (2014) that during crises potential acquirers have limited liquidity to assume 
failing banks, thus, reducing the bids offered. It would further imply that, as in Bertin et al. 
(1989), with an increase of potential targets, banks would be more selective in their bidding 
process, and that during crises managers are less likely to overbid in order to reduce the risk of 
costly mistakes. If Hypothesis 3 is, however, rejected it would imply crises do not reduce the 
incentives for other banks to bid and the effects of deregulation are strong regardless of the time 
period of failure.  
5.3.1. Sample  
Data on failed bank resolution costs are obtained from the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) from 1986 to 2013. Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income are 
used for failed and acquiring bank specific variables as well as for aggregated local banking 
market controls. Most of the acquirers’ certificate IDs were obtained from the SNL Financial 
with the missing ones collected manually from the FDIC website33. The years of intrastate 
deregulation were used as in Demyanyk et al. (2007) and the missing date for Iowa was collected 
from the Iowa Legislature (for the full list of deregulation years by state, see Table A 5-1 in 
section 5.7.1). 
The initial data set consisted of 2,929 banks that were included in the FDIC’s failed bank 
list during the sample period between 1986 and 2013. After excluding 347 resolutions, in which 
the bank’s charter survived (assistance transactions), and observations with missing data on 
resolution costs, a sample of 2,489 failed banks was left. The acquisitions for which there was 
                                                 
33 https://research.fdic.gov/bankfind/ offers history of all FDIC-insured banking institutions. 
5.3. Sample and Methodology 





no financial data on either the failing or the acquiring institutions were further removed. 
Specifically, deals, where the last observed Call Report entry for the failing bank was more than 
two years (eight quarters) prior the failure, were excluded. Finally, deals, where the financial data 
on the acquiring institution were absent, were also excluded. These rearrangements led to a total 
sample of 1,040 unique failed bank resolutions, including P&As, P&As of insured deposits only 
and insured deposit transfers.  
The computation of the main dependent variable (Loss_ass) is based on previous 
studies (see, for instance, Granja et al., 2014; Kang et al., 2015). It is, therefore, equal to the total 
value of resolution costs incurred by the FDIC, adjusted by the failed bank’s total assets. 
Summary statistics of the main dependent variable Loss_ass, as well as its constituents, total 
losses (Tot_losses) and total assets (Asset), are provided in Panel A of Table 5-1. 
[Table 5-1 here] 
In the empirical setting a dummy variable that takes a value of one to identify years 
following the permission by states for banks to branch statewide through M&As, and 0 
otherwise, is used. The summary statistics of the deregulation dummy variable is provided in 
Panel B of Table 5-1. The mean of 0.821 shows that from the full sample of 1,040 failed bank 
resolutions, 81.7 % occurred in deregulated states, and 18.3 % occurred in states that restricted 
branching through M&As.  
The relative size variables SASS_FASS is computed as the ratio between the average size 
of a survived bank in the market and the size of the failing bank. The survived banks in the 
market are the ones that did not fail in a given quarter and are headquartered in the same state 
as the failing bank. Size is measured as banks’ total assets at the time of the P&A transaction for 
survived banks and at the last available entry for the failed banks. The variable SASS_FASS is 





summarized in Panel C of Table 5-1. The mean of 11.57 shows that an average survived bank in 
the market was 11.57 times larger than the failing bank. 
For crisis dating, as in the previous empirical chapters, the study by Berger and Bouwman 
(2013) is followed. Accordingly, crises include the two banking crises - the 1990s credit crunch 
between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4 and the global financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 
and 2009:Q4, as well as the three market crises - the stock market crash in 1987:Q4, the Russian 
debt crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 
and 1998:Q4 and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks 
between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3.  
To identify crisis periods in the empirical analysis a dummy variable that takes a value of 
1 for all crisis periods together with a four-quarter post-crisis period, and 0 otherwise, is included. 
The four-quarter post-crisis period is included to capture the effect of crises that materialize 
from the initial shock with a lag.  
5.3.2. Regression Analysis for Resolution Costs 
To evaluate the impact of intrastate deregulation on failed banks’ resolution costs, the following 
linear regression is estimated: 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑠 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡−𝑛 +  𝛽3𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡
+  Γ𝑖,𝑡−𝑛𝚱𝑖,𝑡−𝑛 +  Θ𝑖,𝑡−𝑛,𝑠𝐋𝑖,𝑡−𝑛,𝑠 +Φ𝑡𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑠 
(5.1) 
where i indexes a failed bank at time t in state s. Loss_assi,t,s is the dependent variable that 
measures the losses incurred by the FDIC from failed banks’ resolutions, scaled by the last 
reported failed bank’s assets. The main independent variables include Deregulationt,s, which is 
a dummy variable that represents deregulation at time t for state s, SASS_FASSi,t-n,s, which is a 
ratio between the average size of the survived bank in the state to the size of the failing bank; 





and Crisest - a dummy variable that equals one if time t is in a crisis period, and 0 otherwise. Ki,t-
n is the vector of target specific controls, Li,t-n, s is the vector for other controls, and timet controls 
for the specific quarter of the resolution.  
The hypotheses are tested by including interaction terms in the baseline model between 
deregulation and relative size, as well as deregulation and crises and the following regressions are 
estimated, accordingly: 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑠 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−𝑛
+  𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑠 ∗ 𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−𝑛 +  𝛽4𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡
+  Γ𝑖,𝑡−𝑛𝚱𝑖,𝑡−𝑛 +  Θ𝑖,𝑡−𝑛,𝑠𝐋𝑖,𝑡−𝑛,𝑠 + Φ𝑡𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑠 
((5.2) 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠_𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡,𝑠 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡
+  𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡,𝑠 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆_𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−𝑛
+  Γ𝑖,𝑡−𝑛𝚱𝑖,𝑡−𝑛 +  Θ𝑖,𝑡−𝑛,𝑠𝐋𝑖,𝑡−𝑛,𝑠 + Φ𝑡𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑠 
((5.3) 
where the interaction term Deregulationt,s*SASS_FASSi,t,s measures the effects of deregulation 
given different levels of the relative size of the average survived banks’ size to the size of the 
failing bank in a state; and where the interaction term Deregulationt,s*Crisest measures the effect of 
deregulation given normal and crisis periods.  
The set of target-specific controls employed in the econometric analysis are as in Schaeck 
(2008) and Bennett and Unal (2014) and are presented in Panel E of Table 5-1. Target bank Size 
is measured as the natural logarithm of assets in thousands and in real terms. There are no a 
priori expectations for the target size and resolution costs relation, as the existing literature 
provides mixed results. On the one hand, Schaeck (2008) finds that larger banks are more costly 
to resolve; on the other hand, Bennett and Unal (2014) find an opposite relation and argue that 





larger banks have different asset characteristics, and the higher amount of assets allows the 
receivership to form, service and market asset pools more efficiently. Finally, Kang et al., 2015 
show that asset size reduced resolution costs in the 1986-1992 period, however played no effect 
in the 2008-2012 period. Capital is measured as total equity to total assets, and is expected to 
reduce resolution costs because, as in Schaeck (2008), it is expected that equity serves as a 
cushion between the asset value and the payments to debtholders. Non-performing loans 
(NPL), measured as the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, other real estate owned 
(ORE), measured as other real estate owned to total assets, reflect asset quality, are expected to 
be inversely related to resolution costs (see, James, 1991; Schaeck, 2008; Bennett and Unal, 
2014). The ratio of real estate loans to total assets (REL) is further included in the econometric 
model because it is expected that high reliance on real estate lending had a negative effect on 
banks’ performance during crises, thus, deteriorating asset quality and in turn increasing costs 
incurred by the FDIC. Finally, the ratio of brokered deposits to total deposits (Bro) is included, 
which is inversely related to the charter value (James, 1991), and is expected to have a positive 
effect on resolution costs (see James, 1991; Bennett and Unal, 2014; Kang et al., 2015). 
Other controls employed in the econometric analysis are described in Panel F of Table 
5-1. TSAS measures the relative size of the target to that of the acquirer and is calculated as the 
ratio between total assets of the target and total assets of the acquirer. There are no a priori 
expectations for the relation between the acquirer size and resolutions costs. On the one hand, 
larger banks may be financially capable to offer higher bids, thus, reducing the costs to the FDIC. 
On the other hand, if a large bank exhibits market power in a local market, it may reduce other 
banks’ incentives to participate in an auction, thus, allowing the large bank to offer a lower bid. 
Similarly, the size of the target (Size_target), measured as the natural logarithm of assets in 
thousands and in real terms, can have either a positive, or a negative effect on resolution costs. 





A further variable included in the empirical analysis is a dummy that represents deals that 
occurred after the enactment of the FDICIA (FDICIA), and as in Schaeck (2008), is expected 
to have a negative relation with resolution costs, as the purpose of this act was to reduce the 
costs for deposit insurers that result from bank failures.  
Two dummy variables are included to control for the type of the resolution: insured 
deposit transfer (IDT), and P&A transaction of insured deposits only (PI). The benchmark is 
the most widely used P&A transaction, where both, insured and uninsured deposits are 
transferred (as well as some other liabilities), and a portion of the assets are sold to the acquirer 
(P&A). IDTs and PIs are expected to be a more costly resolution method than other P&A 
transactions, because less assets and/or liabilities are transferred to the private sector, leaving 
more for the FDIC to liquidate.   
Other banks’ capitalization (OBC), measured as the average survived banks’ total equity 
to total assets in the state, is expected to have a negative relation with resolution costs (Granja 
et al., 2014; and Kang et al., 2015). Finally, better local economic conditions, measured by 
Unemployment (the ratio of unemployment in the state), and Growth (quarterly income 
growth rate in the local state of the failing bank), are expected to reduce failed banks’ resolution 
costs (Schaeck, 1991; Bennett and Unal, 2014; Kang et al., 2015). 
5.4.1. Intrastate Deregulation and Relative Size Effects on Failed Bank Resolution 
Costs 
Panel A of Table 5-2 reports the results of the baseline model in column (1), which tests the 
general effect of intrastate deregulation on failed bank resolution costs. As in previous studies, 
the results suggest that intrastate deregulation had no significant effect on failed bank resolution 
costs. While this result does not contradict the notion that intrastate branching restrictions 
5.4. Results 





elevate the value of a bank’s charter, neither does it support the idea that more bids and higher 
premiums were offered merely due to higher restrictions on competition. 
As for the control variable, as expected, better failed banks’ characteristics and strong 
macroeconomic conditions reduce failed bank resolution costs. Specifically, better capitalization, 
lower levels of non-performing loans, less other real estate owned, lower levels of real estate 
loans, and lower levels of brokered deposits reduce resolution costs. Failed banks that operate 
in states where other banks are better capitalized, and income growth is higher, as well as banks 
that fail during normal times are less costly to resolve. From the three types of resolutions, banks 
resolved using P&A transactions result in lower losses to the FDIC than those resolved using 
insured deposit transfer or P&A transaction of insured deposits only. As expected, failing banks 
were less costly to resolve after the enactment of FDICIA.  
As for the size effect, the results are contradictory. While larger banks seem to be less 
costly to resolve, the relative size of other banks to the failing bank seems to have a positive 
effect on the costs incurred by the FDIC. However, the coefficient of the relative size effect is 
not economically meaningful, hence, needs further evaluation. The relative size of the target to 
the acquirer has a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that the bigger the failing bank 
compared to the acquiring bank, the higher the resolution costs. State unemployment and the 
size of the acquirer has no significant effect on resolution costs. Finally, the greater the 
concentration in the market, the higher the costs, suggesting some large institutions exhibit 
market power, thus, eliminating the smaller banks from the competition. 
[Table 5-2 here] 
To test the validity of the first and second hypotheses an interaction term between 
intrastate deregulation and the relative size variable is included. The results are reported in 





column (2) of Table 5-2. The significant coefficients of the interaction term and of its 
components indicate that the effect of intrastate deregulation on failed bank resolution costs was 
dependent on the relative size of the failed bank.  
More importantly, for the direct test of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, Figure 5-1 shows 
the marginal effects of deregulation for each decile of the sample distribution of the variable 
SASS_FASS. The graph shows that intrastate deregulation had a significant impact on resolution 
costs at the 10th, 20th and the 90th percentile of the SASS_FASS distribution. Specifically, when 
the average survived bank was similar by size to the failing bank (merely 1.08 times larger), 
intrastate deregulation reduced the costs to the insurance fund by 4.5 pp34. However, when the 
average survived bank was nearly 20 times (19.20 times) larger than the failing bank, intrastate 
deregulation, in fact, increased failed bank resolution costs by 5.2 pp. These effects also seem to 
be economically relevant. Considering that the average failed bank’s loss to assets ratio is 23.7%, 
a 4.5 pp reduction means that on average the total costs of a failed bank reduced by almost 19 
% (4.5÷23.7*100), whereas a 5.2 pp increase is equivalent to almost a 22 % (5.2/23.7*100) 
increase in costs.  
This finding is in support of the first and second hypotheses and shows that when the 
restrictions to merge freely were lifted, failed bank resolution costs were lower for those failed 
banks that were of a similar size to the survived banks; and larger for the failed banks that were 
relatively small compared to the average survived bank in the market. 
It, therefore, seems that a sudden shift in competition not only increased the 
consolidation process amongst healthy banks, as suggested by Palia (1993) and Demyanyk et al. 
(2007), but also prompted failed bank acquisitions of relatively large insolvent banks, as indicated 
                                                 
34 For the interpretation of percentage points, see section 3.4.1. 





by the negative effect on failed bank resolution costs. The relatively small failing banks, however, 
seem to be more costly to resolve in market with higher competitive pressures, which is not 
surprising. As argued by Gorton et al. (2009), a regime shift makes larger acquisition targets more 
preferable due to economics of scales. In addition, in anticipation of other firms’ concentration, 
acquisition of smaller targets may become a less attractive strategy, as they add smaller market 
share. Finally, branching deregulation may reduce large banks’ franchise values less, as they hold 
higher market shares. Therefore, small failing banks become even less attractive, whereas large 
failing banks may attract higher premiums for the value of the charter. 
[Figure 5-1 here] 
The findings are further supported by the effect of SASS_FASS in regulated and 
deregulated states. To ease the interpretation, and to evaluate the significance of the combined 
SASS_FASS and the interaction term effect, marginal effects are reported in Panel B of Table 5-
2. The results show that, on the one hand, in regulated markets the relative size of survived banks 
to that of the failing bank reduces resolution costs by 0.5 pp. On the other hand, the opposite is 
true for deregulated markets: there the relative size factor increases failed bank resolution costs 
by 0.04 pp. This finding has a sensible economic interpretation. In regulated markets, where 
acquiring a failing institution can be seen as the only means for expansion, and the value of the 
charter is high, the competition amongst bidders may be particularly strong especially for small 
banks, as more survived firms can participate in the auction and offer higher bids. In deregulated 
markets, however, the incentives to acquire a failing bank is reduced due to existence of other 
potential acquisition targets in the market, and larger targets become more desirable, as suggested 
by the existing literature and confirmed by the negative coefficient of the size variable in this 





study. Therefore, smaller failing banks most likely attract fewer bidders and smaller premiums 
in states, where expansion through M&As is free, hence increasing the costs to the DIFs.  
5.4.2. Intrastate Deregulation and Crises Effect on Failed Bank Resolution Costs 
To test the validity of the third hypothesis, which states that the effects of deregulation  
materializes during normal times, an interaction term between deregulation and crisis is included 
in the baseline model specification. The results of the regression analysis are provided in Table 
5-3 Panel A. However, more importantly, Panel B shows the marginal effects of deregulation 
separately for normal times and crisis periods. The results provide support for the third 
hypothesis. Specifically, they show that intrastate deregulation reduced failed bank resolution 
costs in normal times while it had no effect in crisis periods. This suggests that the benefits 
stemming from deregulation in terms of resolution costs do not materialise during times of 
economic distress. 
The reason why a shift in competition has an effect on failed bank resolution costs 
merely in normal times can be explained as follows. Failed bank resolution costs are by and large 
dependent on other banks’ willingness and financial ability to bid (Cowan and Salotti, 2015), i.e. 
the more bidders in the auction and the better their financial ability to offer higher bids, the 
lower are the resolution costs. Both of these determinants are, however, distorted in times of 
crisis. First, willingness to acquire during crises may be reduced due to uncertainty, which urges 
managers to act conservatively (Wan and Yiu, 2009) and avoid costly mistakes (Bertin et al., 
1989). Second, in times of crisis, lack of liquidity in the banking system reduces the number of 
buyers, who wish to buy illiquid assets (Cowan and Salotti, 2015) and can afford to offer high 
bids (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008; Bennett and Unal, 2014). Finally, as argued Bennett and 
Unal (2014), the knowledge of the lack of viable bidders in periods of industry distress motivates 
the existing auction participants to offer lower bids.  





Overall, the effects of the reduced number of potential buyers and the increased number 
of targets in crisis periods seems to eliminate the effects of the competitive pressures in the 
market on failed bank resolution costs.  
[Table 5-3 here] 
In this section the results of a series of robustness checks are summarized. The results are 
provided in the Additional Tables section (section 5.7.1). 
First, one of the potential drawbacks of the relative size measure included in the analysis 
is the use of the average size of survived banks, which may be sensitive to extreme values. 
Therefore, the initial analysis is replicated by replacing in the current measure of relative size the 
average of survived banks’ assets to the median of their assets. The results are reported in Table 
A 5-2, and are consistent with the initial findings. 
Second, the arguments in this chapter are based on the behaviour of local market 
participants, as well as their reaction to the change in the competitive environment. However, 
some states allowed interstate acquisitions before they permitted intrastate branching through 
M&As. As a result, additional analysis is provided after excluding all interstate acquisitions. Once 
again, the results, which are reported in Table A 5-3, are fundamentally similar to those reported 
in the initial analysis.  
Finally, it can be argued that the results, and the conclusions drawn, are driven by very 
large failed bank acquisitions. To check whether the findings are robust to extreme sizes of failed 
banks, the analysis is repeated after excluding the largest 1% and 5% failed banks according to 
their assets (in real terms). The results are reported in Table A 5-4, and are qualitatively similar 
to the initial findings.  
5.5. Robustness Checks 





Based on 1,040 failed bank P&A transactions that were completed in the period between 1986 
and 2013, this chapter shows that the relation between failed bank resolution costs and 
competitive pressures in the failed bank’s market depends on the relative size of the failed bank 
to the size of other banks in the market. For the purpose of evaluating the shift in competition, 
individual state branching deregulation through M&As is employed as an instrument in the 
empirical setting.  
Essentially, the results show that branching deregulation reduced the costs to resolve 
those failed banks that were of a similar size to an average bank in the market; however, increased 
the costs for the relatively smallest failed banks. This finding is in support of the notion that a 
shift in competition induces acquisitions of bigger targets, which offer a larger gain in terms of 
market share. Further analysis, however, shows that this effect was evident merely in normal 
times and eliminated in times of crisis.  
Overall, the results in this chapter suggest that competitive pressures in the market 
should be considered when dealing with a failed bank. Specifically, in order to reduce the costs 
incurred from resolving failed banks, alternative resolution strategies and/or additional 
incentives for potential buyers should be introduced, when dealing with small failed banks in 











Panel A. Dependent variable and its constituents 
Variable Symbol Description N mean p50 St. dev. p1 p99 
Loss on assets ratio Loss_ass 
Ratio of resolution losses incurred by the FDIC to total failing 
bank's asset last observed 
1040 0.237 0.222 0.135 0.004 0.632 
Loss Loss Failed bank's resolution loss incurred by the FDIC (000s) 1040 46868.630 9686.500 163931.700 127.000 651308.000 
Total assets Asset Failed bank's assets before failure (000s) 1040 554391.500 43118.500 9580282.000 4555.000 3715433.000 
Panel B. Deregulation variable 
Intrastate deregulation Deregulation 
A dummy that equals one following intrastate deregulation in a 
state, and 0 otherwise 
1040 0.817 1.000 0.387 0.000 1.000 
Panel C. Relative Size variable 
Relative size SASS_FASS Average survived banks' assets in a state to the failing bank's assets 1040 11.572 4.817 36.073 0.186 138.766 
Panel D. Crisis dummy 
Crisis period dummy Crises 
Crises is a dummy variable equal 1 if a quarter is in a crisis or post-
crisis period, and 0 otherwise. 
1040 0.606 1.000 0.489 0.000 1.000 
Panel E. Target-specific control variables 
Size Size Log(assets) (000s)a 1040 11.315 11.056 1.453 8.924 15.445 
Equity capital Capital Ratio of total equity to total assetsa 1040 -0.003 0.006 0.052 -0.209 0.086 
Non-performing Loans NPL Non-performing loans to total loansa 1040 0.070 0.051 0.068 0.000 0.326 
Other real estate owned OREO Ratio of other real estate owned to total assets 1040 0.050 0.038 0.049 0.000 0.203 
Real estate loans REL Ratio of real estate loans to total assets 1040 0.400 0.380 0.214 0.036 0.833 
Brokered deposits Bro Ratio of brokered deposits to total deposits 1040 0.046 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.507 
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TABLE 5-1 continued 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Panel F. Other control variables 
Target to acquirer size TSAS 
A ratio between the total assets of the target and the total assets of 
the acquirer. 
1040 0.438 0.241 1.254 0.002 2.856 
Size of the acquirer Size_acquirer Log(assets) (000s)a 1040 12.825 12.431 1.899 9.790 18.763 
Enactment of the 
FDICIA 
FDICIA 
A dummy variable that equals one if the quarter is after the 
enactment of FDICIA, and 0 otherwise. 
1040 0.538 1.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
P&A transactions PA 
Purchase and Assumption, where the insured and uninsured 
deposits, certain other liabilities and a portion of the assets were 
sold to an acquirer.* 
1040 0.818 1.000 0.386 0.000 1.000 
Insured Deposit Transfer IDT 
Insured Deposit Transfer, where the acquiring institution served as 
a paying agent for the insurer, established accounts on their books 
for depositors, and often acquired some assets as well. Includes 
ABT.* 
1040 0.095 0.000 0.294 0.000 1.000 




Purchase and Assumption of the insured deposits only, where the 
traditional P&A was modified so that only the insured deposits 
were assumed by the acquiring institution.* 




The average capital ratio of the survived banks in the state, where 
the failed bank is headquartered. 
1040 0.095 0.090 0.020 0.070 0.157 
Unemployment Unemployment 
The unemployment rate in the state, where the failed bank is 
headquartered. 
1040 7.720 7.300 1.998 4.200 12.800 
Income Growth Growth 
Personal income growth rate in the state of the failed bank’s 
headquarters. 
1040 3.275 3.900 3.288 -5.900 8.600 
Asset concentration index HHI 
Concentration index of the banks’ assets in the same state as the 
failed bank’s headquarters, estimated using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index. 
1040 0.075 0.025 0.124 0.002 0.541 
NOTES: This table presents descriptions and summary statistics of the key variables used in this chapter. Panel A presents definition and summary statistics of the dependent variable Loss_ass, used in the regression analyses, 
as well as definitions and summary statistics of its constituents: Loss and Total assets. Panel B presents the description and summary statistics of the intrastate deregulation variable Deregulation, and Panel C presents the 
relative size measure (SASS_FASS) employed in the empirical analyses. Crisis dummy Crises is presented in Panel D. Crisis periods are two banking crises (the 1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the 
global financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4) and three market crises (the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout 
during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3), and include four quarters of post-crisis periods. Panel E and Panel F present 
respectively target-specific controls, and other controls. Target-specific controls include Size, Capital, non-performing loans (NPL), other real estate owned (OREO), real estate loans (REL) and brokered deposits (Bro). 
Other controls are the relative size of the target to the acquirer (TSAS), the size of the acquirer (Size_target), dummy for the enactment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), the type 
of transaction, including the dummy for P&A transaction (P&A), insured deposit transfer (IDT), and P&A transaction of insured deposits only (PI), as well as state-specific controls, including other banks average equity 
capital (OBC), state unemployment rate (Unemployment), and state income growth (Growth). 
*Definitions are taken from the FDIC help website  https://www5.fdic.gov/hsob/help.asp#BF1TT 
 







THE EFFECTS OF INTRASTATE DEREGULATION AND RELATIVE SIZE ON FAILED BANKS' 
RESOLUTION COSTS 
Panel A. OLS regression analysis results 
 (1) (2) 
Deregulation -0.017 -0.052** 
 (-0.884) (-2.048) 
SASS_FASSt-n 0.000** -0.005*** 
 (2.428) (-3.447) 
Deregulation*.SASS_FASS  0.006*** 
  (3.674) 
Crises 0.079*** -0.041 
 (4.060) (-0.646) 
Sizet-n -0.027*** -0.030*** 
 (-3.746) (-4.338) 
Capitalt-n -0.565*** -0.563*** 
 (-10.119) (-10.449) 
NPLt-n 0.169*** 0.161*** 
 (2.830) (2.767) 
OREOt-n 0.625*** 0.639*** 
 (10.274) (10.393) 
RELt-n 0.091*** 0.094*** 
 (2.909) (2.994) 
Brot-n 0.209*** 0.211*** 
 (4.928) (5.036) 
TSASt-n 0.009*** 0.009*** 
 (2.927) (3.015) 
Size_acquirert-n 0.003 0.003 
 (0.692) (0.837) 
FDICIA -0.161*** 0.123* 
 (-3.046) (1.680) 
IDT 0.061*** 0.061*** 
 (3.566) (3.631) 
PI 0.052*** 0.054*** 
 (2.718) (2.779) 
OBC -1.850*** -1.825*** 
 (-3.931) (-3.973) 
Unemployment 0.004 0.005 
 (1.367) (1.465) 
Growth -0.012*** -0.011*** 
 (-4.195) (-4.038) 
HHI 0.041* 0.044* 
 (1.789) (1.993) 
Constant 0.538*** 0.582*** 
 (6.959) (7.332) 
Time fixed effects + + 
Observations 1,040 1,040 
R-squared 0.44 0.45 





Table 5-2 continued 
THE EFFECTS OF INTRASTATE DEREGULATION AND RELATIVE SIZE ON FAILED BANKS' RESOLUTION COSTS 
Panel B: Marginal SASS_FASS effects in regulated and deregulated states 
Regulated states -0.0053*** 
 (-3.45) 
Deregulated states 0.0004** 
 (2.38) 
NOTES: This table shows the results of how intrastate deregulation (Deregulation) and the relative size (SASS_FASS) affect failed bank 
resolution costs (Loss_ass). The method employed is an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The dependent variable Loss_ass is the loss 
incurred by the FDIC from resolving a failed bank, adjusted by the failed bank’s total assets. Deregulation is a dummy that equals one if the 
failed bank’s acquisition occurred in a state after intrastate branching was permitted, and zero otherwise. SASS_FASS is the ratio between 
the average survived banks’ total assets in a state at a specific quarter and the total assets of the failed bank. Crises is a dummy that equals 
one for periods of crises and the following four quarters. Crisis periods are two banking crises (the 1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 
and 1992:Q4; and the global financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4) and three market crises (the stock market crash 
in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; and 
the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3). The target-specific variables 
include the following: Size - the log of the bank total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real terms, Capital, which is the ratio 
between bank book value of equity and bank total assets, NPL - the ratio between non-performing loans and total loans, OREO – the ratio 
between other real estate loans to total assets, REL – the ratio between real estate loans and total assets, and Bro - ratio of brokered deposits 
to total deposits. TSAS is the ratio between the total assets of the target and the total assets of the acquirer. Size_acquirer is the log of the 
acquiring bank total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real terms. FDICIA is a dummy that equals one if the transaction 
occurred after the enactment of the FDICIA in 1991, and zero otherwise. IDT is a dummy that equals one if the method of the resolution 
was deposit insurance transfer, and zero otherwise PI is a dummy that equals one if the method of the resolution was Purchase and 
Assumption of the insured deposits only, and zero otherwise. OBC represents the average survived banks’ capitalization level, and is 
measured as the average capital ratio of the survived banks in the same State, Unemployment is the level of unemployment in the state, 
where the failed bank is chartered, Growth is the quarterly change of personal income growth in the State where the bank is chartered, and 
HHI is the concentration index of the total assets of the banks in a state, where the failed bank is chartered, and measured using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Quarter fixed effects are also included. All target- (acquirer-) specific independent variables are observed at 
the last available quarter before failure (acquisition). Other independent variables are observed at the time of the acquisition. The coefficients 
presented show how much a one unit change in the independent variable increases (decreases) the dependent variable Loss_ass. z values are 
provided in parentheses. For the ease of interpretation of the interaction term and its components, Panel B presents marginal SASS_FASS 
effects for regulated and deregulated states separately. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. * Significant 
at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 
 
  






MARGINAL DEREGULATION EFFECTS ON FAILED BANK RESOLUTION COSTS 
 
NOTES: This graph shows the results of Deregulation marginal effects on failed banks’ resolution costs. The dependent variables, Loss_ass, 
is the loss incurred by the FDIC from resolving a failed bank, adjusted by bank total assets. The independent variable, Deregulation, is a dummy 
that equals one for all the years following deregulation of state branching restrictions by M&As. The marginal effects of Deregulation, shown 
by the progressive line, are presented for each 10th percentile of the sample distribution of the variable SASS_FASS, which is the ratio between 
the average survived banks’ total assets in a state at a specific quarter and the total assets of the failed bank. The shaded grey area presents the 
90th percent confidence interval for the marginal Deregulation effect. The reference line at 0 shows at which points of the SASS_FASS 
distribution are the marginal Deregulation effects are significantly greater than zero at the 90 percent confidence level. Specifically, the crossing 
(not crossing) of the shaded area suggests an insignificant (significant) marginal Deregulation effect at that point of SASS_FASS. 
 
  






THE EFFECTS OF INTRASTATE DEREGULATION AND CRISES ON FAILED BANKS' 
RESOLUTION COSTS 


















































TABLE 5-3 continued 
THE EFFECTS OF INTRASTATE DEREGULATION AND CRISES ON FAILED BANKS' RESOLUTION COSTS 
Panel B. Marginal deregulation effects during normal times and crisis periods 




NOTES: This table shows the results of how intrastate deregulation (Deregulation) and Crises affect failed bank resolution costs (Loss_ass). 
The method employed is an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The dependent variable Loss_ass is the loss incurred by the FDIC from 
resolving a failed bank, adjusted by the failed bank’s total assets. Deregulation is a dummy that equals one if the failed bank’s acquisition 
occurred in a state after intrastate branching was permitted, and zero otherwise. SASS_FASS is the ratio between the average survived banks’ 
total assets in a state at a specific quarter and the total assets of the failed bank. Crises is a dummy that equals one for periods of crises and 
the following four quarters. Crisis periods are two banking crises (the 1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the global 
financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4) and three market crises (the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt 
crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst 
coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3). The target-specific variables include the following: Size 
- the log of the bank total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real terms, Capital, which is the ratio between bank book value 
of equity and bank total assets, NPL - the ratio between non-performing loans and total loans, OREO – the ratio between other real estate 
loans to total assets, REL – the ratio between real estate loans and total assets, and Bro - ratio of brokered deposits to total deposits. TSAS 
is the ratio between the total assets of the target and the total assets of the acquirer. Size_acquirer is the log of the acquiring bank total assets 
measured in thousands of US dollars and in real terms. FDICIA is a dummy that equals one if the transaction occurred after the enactment 
of the FDICIA in 1991, and zero otherwise. IDT is a dummy that equals one if the method of the resolution was deposit insurance transfer, 
and zero otherwise PI is a dummy that equals one if the method of the resolution was Purchase and Assumption of the insured deposits 
only, and zero otherwise. OBC represents the average survived banks’ capitalization level, and is measured as the average capital ratio of the 
survived banks in the same State, Unemployment is the level of unemployment in the state, where the failed bank is chartered, Growth is 
the quarterly change of personal income growth in the State where the bank is chartered, and HHI is the concentration index of the total 
assets of the banks in a state, where the failed bank is chartered, and measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Quarter fixed effects 
are also included. All target- (acquirer-) specific independent variables are observed at the last available quarter before failure (acquisition). 
Other independent variables are observed at the time of the acquisition. The coefficients presented show how much a one unit change in 
the independent variable increases (decreases) the dependent variable Loss_ass. z values are provided in parentheses. For the ease of 
interpretation of the interaction term and its components, Panel B presents marginal SASS_FASS effects during normal times and crisis 
periods separately. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** 
















5.7.1. Additional Tables 
TABLE A 5-1 
YEARS OF INTRASTATE DEREGULATION 






























New Hampshire 1987 
New Jersey 1977 
New Mexico  1991 
New York 1976 
North Carolina 1960 





Rhode Island 1960 
South Carolina 1960 
South Dakota 1960 
Tennessee 1985 
Texas 1988 





Table A 5-1 continued 





West Virginia 1987 
Wisconsin 1990 
Wyoming 1988 
This table presents the years, when the states removed restrictions on intrastate geographic expansion. The data is based on Demyanyk et 
al. (2007) and the missing date for Iowa deregulation has been obtained from Iowa Legislature. 
  





TABLE A 5-2 
















































Table A 5-1 continued 
ALTERNATIVE RELATIVE SIZE VARIABLE 
Constant 0.523*** 
 (5.680) 
Time fixed effects + 
Observations 1,040 
R-squared 0.45 
NOTES: This table shows the results of how intrastate deregulation (Deregulation) and the relative size (SMASS_FASS) affect failed bank 
resolution costs (Loss_ass). The method employed is an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The dependent variable Loss_ass is the loss 
incurred by the FDIC from resolving a failed bank, adjusted by the failed bank’s total assets. Deregulation is a dummy that equals one if the 
failed bank’s acquisition occurred in a state after intrastate branching was permitted, and zero otherwise. SMASS_FASS is the ratio between 
the average survived banks’ total assets in a state at a specific quarter and the total assets of the failed bank. Crises is a dummy that equals 
one for periods of crises and the following four quarters. Crisis periods are two banking crises (the 1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 
and 1992:Q4; and the global financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4) and three market crises (the stock market crash 
in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; and 
the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3). The target-specific variables 
include the following: Size - the log of the bank total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real terms, Capital, which is the ratio 
between bank book value of equity and bank total assets, NPL - the ratio between non-performing loans and total loans, OREO – the ratio 
between other real estate loans to total assets, REL – the ratio between real estate loans and total assets, and Bro - ratio of brokered deposits 
to total deposits. TSAS is the ratio between the total assets of the target and the total assets of the acquirer. Size_acquirer is the log of the 
acquiring bank total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real terms. FDICIA is a dummy that equals one if the transaction 
occurred after the enactment of the FDICIA in 1991, and zero otherwise. IDT is a dummy that equals one if the method of the resolution 
was deposit insurance transfer, and zero otherwise PI is a dummy that equals one if the method of the resolution was Purchase and 
Assumption of the insured deposits only, and zero otherwise. OBC represents the average survived banks’ capitalization level, and is 
measured as the average capital ratio of the survived banks in the same State, Unemployment is the level of unemployment in the state, 
where the failed bank is chartered, Growth is the quarterly change of personal income growth in the State where the bank is chartered, and 
HHI is the concentration index of the total assets of the banks in a state, where the failed bank is chartered, and measured using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Quarter fixed effects are also included. All target- (acquirer-) specific independent variables are observed at 
the last available quarter before failure (acquisition). Other independent variables are observed at the time of the acquisition. The coefficients 
presented show how much a one unit change in the independent variable increases (decreases) the dependent variable Loss_ass. z values are 
provided in parentheses. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. 
















TABLE A 5-3 
















































Table A 5-2 continued 
EXCLUDING INTERSTATE ACQUISITIONS 
Constant 0.617*** 
 (7.579) 
Time fixed effects + 
Observations 898 
R-squared 0.45 
NOTES: This table shows the results of how intrastate deregulation (Deregulation) and the relative size (SASS_FASS) affect failed bank 
resolution costs (Loss_ass) of intrastate acquisitions only. The method employed is an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The dependent 
variable Loss_ass is the loss incurred by the FDIC from resolving a failed bank, adjusted by the failed bank’s total assets. Deregulation is a 
dummy that equals one if the failed bank’s acquisition occurred in a state after intrastate branching was permitted, and zero otherwise. 
SASS_FASS is the ratio between the average survived banks’ total assets in a state at a specific quarter and the total assets of the failed bank. 
Crises is a dummy that equals one for periods of crises and the following four quarters. Crisis periods are two banking crises (the 1990s credit 
crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the global financial crisis that took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4) and three market crises 
(the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 
1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3). 
The target-specific variables include the following: Size - the log of the bank total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real 
terms, Capital, which is the ratio between bank book value of equity and bank total assets, NPL - the ratio between non-performing loans 
and total loans, OREO – the ratio between other real estate loans to total assets, REL – the ratio between real estate loans and total assets, 
and Bro - ratio of brokered deposits to total deposits. TSAS is the ratio between the total assets of the target and the total assets of the 
acquirer. Size_acquirer is the log of the acquiring bank total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real terms. FDICIA is a 
dummy that equals one if the transaction occurred after the enactment of the FDICIA in 1991, and zero otherwise. IDT is a dummy that 
equals one if the method of the resolution was deposit insurance transfer, and zero otherwise PI is a dummy that equals one if the method 
of the resolution was Purchase and Assumption of the insured deposits only, and zero otherwise. OBC represents the average survived 
banks’ capitalization level, and is measured as the average capital ratio of the survived banks in the same State, Unemployment is the level of 
unemployment in the state, where the failed bank is chartered, Growth is the quarterly change of personal income growth in the State where 
the bank is chartered, and HHI is the concentration index of the total assets of the banks in a state, where the failed bank is chartered, and 
measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Quarter fixed effects are also included. All target- (acquirer-) specific independent variables 
are observed at the last available quarter before failure (acquisition). Other independent variables are observed at the time of the acquisition. 
The coefficients presented show how much a one unit change in the independent variable increases (decreases) the dependent variable 
Loss_ass. z values are provided in parentheses. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by bank. * Significant at 10%. 









TABLE A 5-4 
EXCLUDING LARGEST BANK FAILURES 
 
(1) 
Without 1% largest failed banks 
(2) 
Without 5% largest failed banks 
Deregulation -0.049* -0.049* 
 (-1.950) (-1.923) 
SASS_FASSt-1 -0.005*** -0.004*** 
 (-3.024) (-2.767) 
Deregulation*SASS_FASSt-1 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (3.251) (2.987) 
Crises -0.040 0.014 
 (-0.656) (0.196) 
Sizet-1 -0.026*** -0.021*** 
 (-3.446) (-2.703) 
Capitalt-1 -0.571*** -0.612*** 
 (-10.884) (-12.224) 
NPLt-1 0.164*** 0.156** 
 (2.711) (2.555) 
OREOt-1 0.627*** 0.612*** 
 (10.127) (9.651) 
RELt-1 0.087*** 0.066** 
 (2.751) (2.387) 
Brot-1 0.203*** 0.181*** 
 (4.699) (3.349) 
TSASt-1 0.008*** 0.006** 
 (2.738) (2.277) 
Size(target)t-1 0.003 0.003 
 (0.775) (0.625) 
FDICIA 0.115 0.089 
 (1.638) (1.152) 
IDT 0.061*** 0.062*** 
 (3.700) (3.818) 
PI 0.049** 0.037* 
 (2.549) (1.885) 
OBC -1.709*** -1.633*** 
 (-3.745) (-3.890) 
Unemployment 0.004 0.003 
 (1.391) (1.010) 
Growth -0.012*** -0.011*** 
 (-3.972) (-3.906) 
HHI 0.043* 0.086*** 










Table A 5-3 continued 
EXCLUDING LARGEST BANK FAILURES 
Constant 0.530*** 0.494*** 
 (6.553) (6.228) 
Time fixed effects + + 
Observations 1,029 988 
R-squared 0.45 0.45 
NOTES: This table shows the results of how intrastate deregulation (Deregulation) and the relative size (SASS_FASS) affect failed bank 
resolution costs (Loss_ass), excluding the 1% and 5 % largest failures, according to the failing bank total assets. The method employed is an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The dependent variable Loss_ass is the loss incurred by the FDIC from resolving a failed bank, 
adjusted by the failed bank’s total assets. Deregulation is a dummy that equals one if the failed bank’s acquisition occurred in a state after 
intrastate branching was permitted, and zero otherwise. SASS_FASS is the ratio between the average survived banks’ total assets in a state at 
a specific quarter and the total assets of the failed bank. Crises is a dummy that equals one for periods of crises and the following four 
quarters. Crisis periods are two banking crises (the 1990s credit crunch between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q4; and the global financial crisis that 
took place between 2007:Q3 and 2009:Q4) and three market crises (the stock market crash in 1987:Q4; the Russian debt crisis together with 
the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bailout during 1998:Q3 and 1998:Q4; and the dot.com bubble burst coinciding with the 
September 11 terrorist attacks between 2000:Q2 and 2002:Q3). The target-specific variables include the following: Size - the log of the bank 
total assets measured in thousands of US dollars and in real terms, Capital, which is the ratio between bank book value of equity and bank 
total assets, NPL - the ratio between non-performing loans and total loans, OREO – the ratio between other real estate loans to total assets, 
REL – the ratio between real estate loans and total assets, and Bro - ratio of brokered deposits to total deposits. TSAS is the ratio between 
the total assets of the target and the total assets of the acquirer. Size_acquirer is the log of the acquiring bank total assets measured in 
thousands of US dollars and in real terms. FDICIA is a dummy that equals one if the transaction occurred after the enactment of the FDICIA 
in 1991, and zero otherwise. IDT is a dummy that equals one if the method of the resolution was deposit insurance transfer, and zero 
otherwise PI is a dummy that equals one if the method of the resolution was Purchase and Assumption of the insured deposits only, and 
zero otherwise. OBC represents the average survived banks’ capitalization level, and is measured as the average capital ratio of the survived 
banks in the same State, Unemployment is the level of unemployment in the state, where the failed bank is chartered, Growth is the quarterly 
change of personal income growth in the State where the bank is chartered, and HHI is the concentration index of the total assets of the 
banks in a state, where the failed bank is chartered, and measured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Quarter fixed effects are also 
included. All target- (acquirer-) specific independent variables are observed at the last available quarter before failure (acquisition). Other 
independent variables are observed at the time of the acquisition. The coefficients presented show how much a one unit change in the 
independent variable increases (decreases) the dependent variable Loss_ass. z values are provided in parentheses. All models are estimated 
















Throughout its history, the US banking industry has faced numerous bank failures that have 
mainly clustered in waives caused by economic downturns. These failure waives have caused 
severe damages to the economy and, as a result, attracted great attention from academics, 
regulators and practitioners, who have sought to identify the causes and offer solutions to 
minimise the negative consequences associated with these failures. This thesis contributes to the 
general debate on bank failures and is aimed to provide further insight into the management of 
insolvent banks in the US. Specifically, based on commercial and savings bank failures in the 
period between 1984 and 2013 and structured around three empirical investigations, this thesis 
has covered several questions regarding the determinants of bank failures in normal and crisis 
times, the performance of failed bank acquirers and the determinants of failed bank resolution 
costs.  
The first question raised in this thesis concerns how the interplay between crises and 
bank efficiency affects the likelihood of a bank failing. The point of departure for this 
investigation is the notion, first offered by Schumpeter (1939), that crises may have a “cleansing” 
effect on the markets, by removing the most inefficient market participants and replacing them 
with the ones that can take over the released resources and employ them more effectively. An 
Chapter 6. Conclusions 
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alternative view of crises, known as the “scarring” view, however, suggests that  crises destroy 
firms regardless their productivity. Although there is lack of empirical evidence on which view 
prevails in the banking industry, understanding it is of a great importance for crises management. 
On the one hand, evidence on the “cleansing” effect would motivate more limited government 
interventions to minimise the short-term impact of crises on bank failures. On the other hand, 
evidence on the “scarring” effect would justify a wider use of bailout policies to reduce the short-
term effects of crises on bank failures. 
The second question raised in this thesis concerns the impact of failed bank acquisitions 
on the acquiring banks’ long-term performance and is of a great importance for failed bank 
management. Specifically, prevalence of performance gains for the acquirers would motivate the 
FDIC to promote healthy institutions’ participation in failed bank auctions, thus, reducing the 
costs stemming from these resolutions. In addition, it would suggest that the successors of the 
failed banks’ assets are more successful in managing these assets, which, in turn, would boost 
confidence of the failed bank depositors, and reduce the likelihood of a run on a failing bank 
prior to its closing. If, however, no performance gains to the acquiring banks are evident, 
alternative resolution design methods could be considered. In other words, if these acquisitions 
harm the existing healthy banks, further support to the acquirers and additional post-merger 
incentives may need to be implemented. 
The final question raised in this thesis is how competitive pressures affect failed bank 
resolution costs, incurred by the FDIC. Understanding the impact that competitive pressures 
may have on failed bank resolution costs is important for two main reasons. First, if increased 
competitive pressures increase the costs to the FDIC, perhaps a wider use of alternative 
resolution methods should be used in markets that have higher pressures for competition. 
Second, if the characteristics that make failed banks more or less desirable are different across 





markets with different levels of competitive pressures, as suggested by Gorton et al. (2009), the 
FDIC could design and market failed bank auctions in a way to reduce the costs stemming from 
these failures. 
The remaining part of this chapter summarises the main findings in the three empirical chapters 
and depicts policy implications. Further, it indicates the limitations of the empirical analyses 
conducted and offers directions for future research.  
6.2.1. The First Empirical Chapter 
Based on quarterly US commercial and savings bank data between 1984 and 2013, the first 
empirical chapter of this thesis shows that the nature of bank failures during financial crises 
cannot be fully explained by either the cleansing or the scarring view. In line with the scarring 
view, it is shown that especially in severe crises, as was the recent global financial crisis that 
started in the second half of 2007, efficiency does not help banks survive, and the magnitude of 
the effect of crises does not differ according to the efficiency levels of banks. In other words, 
crises that are extremely detrimental to the banking industry do not tend to accelerate the 
removal of inefficient banks compared to normal times. However, while the scarring view is 
evident when analysing the global financial crisis, the analysis of other crises effects on bank 
survival provides ambiguous results. Although it is shown that efficiency reduces the likelihood 
of a bank failing in other crisis periods, the effects of these crises are no different than normal 
times and are not dependent on the levels of bank efficiency. 
Additional support for the scarring view is provided in further analysis, which extends 
the initial empirical models by incorporating the impact of bank age. While the results partly 
support the cleansing effect of crises for older banks, they also show that crises have a scarring 
effect on young banks, which have not reached their full potential. Specifically, the least efficient 
6.2. Summary of Findings 





older banks are more likely to be removed from the market, however, efficiency does not help 
young banks survive in times of crises.  
Finally, although the results regarding which effect of crises, the cleansing or the scarring, 
prevails in the US banking industry are controversial, the final step of the analysis conducted in 
this chapter shows that some benefits arise from crises via an entry effect. In essence, the results 
show that banks that enter the market during crisis periods achieve higher levels of efficiency 
than incumbent banks and the banks that enter in normal times. It, therefore, seems that 
although sometimes scarring to the existing banks, crises liberate the resources for new banks to 
take over and use more efficiently. 
6.2.2. The Second Empirical Chapter 
The analysis presented in the second empirical chapter shows that in the period between 1985 
and 2010 failed bank acquirers did not gain in terms of long-term performance after realizing 
the deal. In fact, the results show that the performance measures deteriorated significantly after 
the acquisition took place.  
However, the result observed for the sample of acquisitions realized during the recent 
financial crisis does not confirm the results of the full sample period analysis. Specifically, with 
an exception being the declining ROA, all other acquirers’ performance measures after the deal 
remained unchanged as compared to the pre-acquisition period. This result has a sensible 
economic interpretation: nearly 60% of the sample P&A transactions that occurred during the 
recent financial crisis included a loss-sharing agreement, which largely eliminated the costs of 
potential losses of the assets acquired for the acquirer. Furthermore, as a result of the loss-share 
agreement, the amount of vulnerable assets acquired by a healthy firm increased, which in turn 
increased the buyer’s incentives for more prudent credit management (FDIC, 1998). 





The results from the OLS regression analysis on the determinants of acquirers’ 
performance changes do not present a clear pattern. While the explanatory variables employed 
confirm the view that better (worse) pre-acquisition characteristics of the acquirer and better 
(worse) economic conditions improve (worsen) the performance measures of the acquirer, the 
effects differ across the performance measures used in the analysis. Specifically, the effects of 
the variables employed differ across the measures of performance used in this analysis. 
Therefore, from the results presented it is not clear which factor (or a group of factors) helps 
improve the change in failed bank acquirers’ performance. 
Despite the lack of evidence to support any performance gains that materialize to the 
acquirer after an acquisition of a failed bank, further analysis shows that having acquired a failed 
bank reduces the likelihood to disappear from the market. Specifically, banks are less likely to 
fail if they had participated in failed bank acquisitions in the preceding 4 and 8 quarters. In 
addition, banks that acquired a failed bank were significantly less likely to become acquisition 
targets themselves for the following 4, 8 and 12 quarters. Overall, the results suggest that failed 
bank acquirers increase their possibilities to maintain their charter within the industry.  
Overall, the analysis conducted in the second empirical chapter shows critically that 
despite the fact that P&A transactions have become the most widely used method to resolve 
failed banks, these transactions are not beneficial for the acquirers in terms of their long-term 
post-acquisition performance. It, therefore, seems that although the least costly to the insurance 
funds, such deals may be systemically harmful to the banking sector.   
6.2.3. The Third Empirical Chapter 
Based on a sample of 1,040 failed bank P&A transactions, selected for the period between 1986 
and 2013, the third empirical chapter shows that the relation between competitive pressures in 





the market of a failed bank and the costs associated with resolving it depends on the size of the 
failed bank relative to the size of other banks in the market. Specifically, the results show that 
relaxed competitive pressures to merge lower the costs for those failed banks that are of a similar 
size to an average bank in the market. However, deregulation increased resolution costs for the 
failed banks that were relatively small compared to other banks in the market. These findings 
support the notion that relaxed restrictions on competitive pressures induce acquisitions of 
bigger targets, which become more desirable due to their larger market share. Further analyses, 
however, show that the abovementioned findings hold for normal times, whereas, do not emerge 
during crisis periods.   
Failures in the US banking industry, especially when they appear in waves, have been associated 
with tremendous consequences on the financial system and the economy in general. Not 
surprisingly, policymakers have sought to identify the causes and evaluate the consequences of 
bank failures and design the regulatory framework in a way to reduce the number and the extent 
of bank failure episodes, as well as resolve the troubled and failed banks in the least disruptive 
to the economy and most cost efficient to the federal system way. 
The empirical findings in this thesis have highlighted the need for modifications in both, 
ex-ante and ex-post, mechanisms for the management of troubled and failed banks in the US. 
Specifically, the lack of evidence to support the cleansing view of financial crises, which suggests 
that the least efficient institutions are removed from the market in times of economic distress, 
indicates a need of ex-ante mechanisms for crisis management (such as the establishment of 
resolution funds) to reduce the required costly bailout policies.  
Furthermore, the lack of gains evident from the analysis on the long-term performance 
of failed bank acquirers, with an exception being the deals that occurred during the recent global 
6.3. Policy Implications 





financial crisis, demonstrates the need for modifications in the process of P&A transactions. 
Essentially, although the most beneficial to the insurance funds in terms of costs, policymakers 
should avoid transferring failed banks’ assets to healthy firms, if these transactions harm the 
healthy firms in the system. Instead, additional support for the acquirers, such as the loss-share 
agreements used during the recent global financial crisis, should be offered. 
Finally, the results presented in the last empirical chapter of this thesis shows that the 
FDIC should consider the competitive pressures in the market when designing the resolution 
strategy and marketing the auction of a failed bank. Specifically, it seems that gaining market 
share in markets reduces the incentives for healthy institutions to acquire small targets, which 
consequently increases the costs to the insurance funds. Therefore, an alternative resolution 
strategy or additional incentives for the acquirers could be introduced when dealing with small 
failed banks. 
The empirical investigation presented in the first empirical chapter is subject to two main 
limitations. First, other than outright failure exit mechanism could be considered in the empirical 
analysis. While robustness tests, where bank acquisitions are modelled as a separate exit event, 
are provided in the first empirical chapter and show that the two exit mechanisms should not be 
investigated jointly, an alternative empirical model could be employed. Specifically, a 
classification method, which allows investigating more than two discrete outcomes in the 
empirical model, such as multinomial logistic regression, could be employed in future analysis.  
Second, an alternative entry mechanism could be further employed in the empirical 
models. To this end, the investigation has been carried out using the date of the institution’s 
establishment for the definition of entry, however, further analysis could be conducted using 
entry via branching in new locations. 
6.4. Limitations and Directions for Future Research 





The main constraint regarding the econometric analysis presented in the second 
empirical chapter concerns the regression analysis, which is aimed to identify potential 
determinants of the change in the performance measures of failed bank acquirers. The lack of a 
clear pattern of the exogenous variable effects employed in the analysis suggests other factors 
influence the change in the post-acquisition performance of failed bank acquirers. Specifically, 
factors representing geographic proximity and the business model similarity could be further 
employed in the model to help explain the change in the acquirers’ pre- and post-performance 
measures. 
Finally, the analysis presented in the third empirical chapter could be extended by 
analysing a longer time frame. As most of the states allowed branching through M&As before 
the sample period employed, older resolutions could be included in the analysis. The main issue 
here is, however, the lack of available data on resolution losses incurred by the FDIC prior 1986, 
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